← All companies ← OFIX Manual OGN → ← NRG Electric Utilities ORA →
OGE, OGE Energy
OGE Energy is a holding company whose primary investment provides electricity in Oklahoma and western Arkansas.
Its business model is centered around growth and sustainability for employees (internally referred to as "members"), communities and customers and the owners of OGE Energy, its shareholders.
OG&E does not currently serve wholesale customers in either state.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 61% and operating margin about 23% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −29 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $3.6B | $3.3B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 61% | 60% | 60% | 64% | 69% | 41% | 50% | 65% | 63% | 61% | 60% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | 4% | 4% | 6% | — | — | 5% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $531M | $532M | $490M | $504M | $522M | $544M | $650M | $650M | $745M | $799M | $779M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 23.5% | 23.5% | 22.1% | 23.2% | 25.2% | 15.2% | 19.7% | 24.9% | 25.6% | 25.1% | 24.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $338M | $619M | $426M | $434M | ($174M) | $737M | $666M | $417M | $442M | $471M | $458M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 30% | -9% | 15% | 6% | — | 16% | 16% | 12% | 15% | 16% | 16% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $645M | $785M | $951M | $682M | $713M | ($230M) | $952M | $1.2B | $813M | $1.1B | $1.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $323M | $284M | $322M | $355M | $391M | $416M | $461M | $507M | $540M | $560M | $559M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($21M) | ($127M) | $191M | ($121M) | $485M | ($1.4B) | ($184M) | $296M | ($180M) | $93M | $265M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $660M | $824M | $574M | $636M | $651M | $779M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | CapexCapex |
| 29.2% | 36.4% | 25.9% | 29.2% | 31.4% | 21.7% | 31.8% | 45.2% | 37.4% | 33.0% | 33.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $322M | $501M | $630M | $327M | $322M | ($646M) | $492M | $726M | $273M | $577M | $738M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 14.3% | 22.2% | 28.5% | 15.0% | 15.5% | −18.0% | 14.9% | 27.8% | 9.4% | 18.1% | 23.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($15M) | ($40M) | $378M | $46M | $62M | ($1.0B) | ($99M) | $54M | ($278M) | $83M | $225M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.7% | −1.8% | 17.1% | 2.1% | 3.0% | −28.1% | −3.0% | 2.1% | −9.5% | 2.6% | 7.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $225M | $248M | $272M | $299M | $315M | $325M | $329M | $333M | $339M | $342M | $344M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 6% | 8% | 6% | 6% | — | 5% | 6% | 6% | 7% | 6% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 16% | 11% | 10% | -5% | 18% | 15% | 9% | 10% | 9% | 9% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | 10% | 4% | 3% | −13% | 10% | 8% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $300K | $14M | $94M | $0 | $1M | $0 | $88M | $200K | $600K | $200K | $200K | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $173M | $191M | $175M | $154M | $158M | $162M | $250M | $209M | $241M | $348M | $305M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $80M | $84M | $58M | $46M | $37M | $41M | $109M | $159M | $148M | $112M | $109M | InventoryInvent. |
| $205M | $230M | $239M | $195M | $252M | $274M | $449M | $276M | $306M | $351M | $283M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $47M | $45M | ($7M) | $5M | ($57M) | ($71M) | ($90M) | $91M | $83M | $109M | $131M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $550M | $497M | $557M | $430M | $429M | $614M | $1.3B | $772M | $895M | $858M | $809M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.0B | $951M | $869M | $658M | $697M | $1.1B | $1.8B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $9.9B | $10.4B | $10.7B | $11.0B | $10.7B | $12.6B | $12.5B | $12.8B | $13.7B | $14.4B | $14.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.3B | $5.1B | $5.4B | $5.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.3B | $5.1B | $5.4B | $5.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.7× | 3.7× | 3.1× | 3.4× | 3.3× | 3.4× | 3.9× | 2.9× | 2.9× | 3.0× | 3.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.4B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $4.4B | $4.5B | $4.6B | $5.0B | $4.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 200M | 200M | 201M | 201M | 200M | 200M | 201M | 201M | 201M | 203M | 207M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $11.30 | $11.31 | $11.03 | $10.84 | $10.34 | $17.92 | $16.46 | $12.98 | $14.49 | $15.76 | $15.38 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.69 | $3.10 | $2.12 | $2.16 | $-0.87 | $3.68 | $3.32 | $2.07 | $2.19 | $2.32 | $2.21 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.61 | $2.50 | $3.14 | $1.63 | $1.61 | $-3.22 | $2.45 | $3.61 | $1.36 | $2.85 | $3.56 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.08 | $-0.20 | $1.88 | $0.23 | $0.31 | $-5.03 | $-0.49 | $0.27 | $-1.38 | $0.41 | $1.09 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.13 | $1.24 | $1.36 | $1.49 | $1.57 | $1.62 | $1.64 | $1.66 | $1.68 | $1.69 | $1.66 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $3.30 | $4.12 | $2.86 | $3.17 | $3.25 | $3.89 | $5.23 | $5.86 | $5.42 | $5.21 | $5.17 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $17.23 | $19.26 | $19.98 | $20.63 | $18.15 | $20.25 | $21.98 | $22.46 | $23.05 | $24.58 | $23.84 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.8%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +6.5%/yr | +12.2%/yr |
| EPS | +3.6%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +4.6%/yr | +1.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.2%/yr | +9.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +4.0%/yr | +6.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $577M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $560M it takes just to hold its position. It put $495M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $83M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $471M | $442M | $417M | $666M | $737M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$560M | +$540M | +$507M | +$461M | +$416M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$14M | +$12M | +$13M | +$10M | +$10M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$93M | −$180M | +$296M | −$184M | −$1.4B |
| Cash from operations | $1.1B | $813M | $1.2B | $952M | ($230M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$560M | −$540M | −$507M | −$461M | −$416M |
| Owner earnings | $577M | $273M | $726M | $492M | ($646M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$495M | −$551M | −$672M | −$590M | −$363M |
| Free cash flow | $83M | ($278M) | $54M | ($99M) | ($1.0B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 18% | 9% | 28% | 15% | -18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $560M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $495M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $563M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $799M ÷ interest expense $270M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.4B · 6.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $200K − debt $5.4B
What this means
Netting $200K of cash and short-term investments against $5.4B of debt leaves $5.4B owed, about 6.7× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 40 + DIO 32 − DPO 102 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range 5%–8%; 6% latest = NOPAT $671M ÷ invested capital $10.3BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -18%–28%; latest $577M = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $560MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years. It chose to put $495M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $83M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $563M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $471M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $342M ÷ Owner Earnings $577M
What this means
Of $577M Owner Earnings, $342M (59%) went back to shareholders, $342M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.88×ExpandingCapex $1.1B ÷ depreciation $560M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.78×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $5.4B vs ($236M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −4%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.15/share (latest year $2.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 23% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 23% early to 25% lately, median 23% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · 15.2% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We and our third-party vendors, many of whom leverage artificial intelligence capabilities, have been subject to, and will likely continue to be subject to, attempts to gain unauthorized access to systems and/or confidential data, or to disrupt operations.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$200K
- Receivables$305M
- Inventory$109M
- Other current assets$395M
- Accounts payable$283M
- Other current liabilities$949M
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $7.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$8.5B · 111%
- Dividends$3.0B · 39%
- Returned to owners$3.0B
86% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.0B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$3.8B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.8B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.6B to $5.4B.
- Net change in share count3.7%
The diluted count rose from 200M to 207M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.69/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained3%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $41M, so each retained $1 added about 0.03 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Sean Trauschke | $8.0M | $9.1M | ($646M) |
| 2022 | Sean Trauschke | $7.3M | $10.9M | $492M |
| 2023 | Sean Trauschke | $8.4M | $6.8M | $726M |
| 2024 | Sean Trauschke | $10.1M | $15.3M | $273M |
| 2025 | Sean Trauschke | $12.0M | $8.1M | $577M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio83:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$14M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why OGE Energy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?18.4% vs 21.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 21.6% early in the record and 18.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.7%
Diluted shares grew 3.7% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.6B → $5.4B
Debt rose from $2.6B to $5.4B while owner earnings went from about $484M to $525M — about 5.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 10 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Electric Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PNWPinnacle West | $5.3B | 71% | 20.5% | 6% | 11% |
| PORPortland General Electric | $3.6B | — | 15.6% | 5% | 9% |
| OGEOGE Energy | $3.2B | 61% | 23.5% | 6% | 15% |
| HEHawaiian Electric Industries Inc. | $3.1B | — | 11.9% | 6% | 7% |
| TLNTalen Energy Corporation | $2.6B | — | 3.5% | 2% | 4% |
| BKHBlack Hills | $2.3B | — | 23.0% | 6% | 17% |
| PNMPNM Resources | $2.1B | — | 18.3% | 5% | 11% |
| CWENClearway Energy Inc. | $1.4B | 67% | 21.6% | 2% | 36% |
| Group median | — | 67% | 19.4% | 6% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what OGE Energy has delivered.
OGE Energy’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, OGE Energy earns about $487M on its 15.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $225M on 206M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $5.4B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.1B) runs well above depreciation ($559M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $737M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← OFIX its page in the Manual OGN →
Industry order: ← NRG the Electric Utilities chapter ORA →