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TLN, Talen Energy Corporation

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityUnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Talen is a leading independent power producer and energy infrastructure company dedicated to powering the future.

We produce and sell electricity, capacity, and ancillary services into wholesale U.S. power markets, with our generation fleet principally located in the Mid-Atlantic, Ohio, and Montana.

See "—Our Key Markets and Revenue Streams—Contracted Revenues—AWS PPA" for additional information.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TLN · Talen Energy Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.6B

+22.0% YoY · −11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $3.4B

Operating margin 6.8% 5-yr avg 4.6%

ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 2%

Owner-earnings margin 28% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin 28% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Electricity Sales and Ancillary Services (77%), Capacity revenues (19%) and Physical electricity sales, bilateral contracts, other (4%).
Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 11% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.9%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Electricity Sales And Ancillary Services is 77% of revenue, with Capacity revenues the other meaningful line at 19%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Electricity Sales And Ancillary Services77%$1.9B
Capacity revenues19%$485M
Physical electricity sales, bilateral contracts, other4%$93M
Product and Service, Other0%$0

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2013–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2013’13	2014’14	2015’15	2022’22	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
							Income statement
$4.5B	$4.6B	$4.5B	$3.1B	$2.1B	$2.6B	$3.3B	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	3%	8%	24%	18%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($293M)	$397M	($39M)	$241M	$226M	($90M)	$226M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−6.5%	8.7%	−0.9%	7.8%	10.7%	−3.5%	6.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($230M)	$410M	($341M)	($1.3B)	$998M	($219M)	($21M)	Net incomeNet inc.
							Cash flow & returns
$410M	$462M	$768M	$187M	$256M	$704M	$1.0B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$299M	$297M	$356M	$520M	$298M	$279M	$297M	DepreciationDeprec.
$341M	($245M)	$753M	$956M	($1.1B)	$118M	$256M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$583M	$416M	$451M	$232M	$85M	$98M	$122M	CapexCapex
13.0%	9.1%	10.1%	7.5%	4.0%	3.8%	3.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($173M)	$46M	$317M	($45M)	$171M	$606M	$924M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−3.8%	1.0%	7.1%	−1.5%	8.1%	23.5%	27.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($173M)	$46M	$317M	($45M)	$171M	$606M	$924M	Free cash flowFCF
−3.8%	1.0%	7.1%	−1.5%	8.1%	23.5%	27.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$603M	—	$0	$3.8B	$3.8B	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$0	$2.0B	$103M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	5%	-0%	—	5%	-1%	2%	ROICROIC
-5%	10%	-8%	—	72%	-20%	-2%	Return on equityROE
−5%	10%	−8%	—	72%	−20%	−2%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
							Balance sheet
$239M	$352M	$141M	$988M	$328M	$689M	$1.0B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$186M	$205M	—	$66M	$160M	$109M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$455M	$508M	—	$302M	$278M	$244M	InventoryInvent.
—	$361M	$291M	—	—	—	$260M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$280M	$422M	—	$368M	$438M	$93M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$2.7B	$2.8B	—	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.5B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$2.9B	$2.1B	—	$455M	$1.1B	$1.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.9×	1.3×	—	2.3×	1.3×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$86M	$72M	$0	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$10.8B	$12.8B	—	$6.1B	$10.9B	$11.0B	Total assetsAssets
—	$2.2B	$4.2B	—	$3.0B	$6.8B	$6.8B	Total debtDebt
—	$1.9B	$4.1B	—	$2.7B	$6.1B	$5.8B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.8×	3.2×	-0.2×	0.7×	0.9×	-0.3×	0.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.8B	$3.9B	$4.3B	($482M)	$1.4B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	0.0%	1.6%	20.4%	15.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
							Per share
83.5M	83.5M	110M	0K	56.5M	45.7M	47.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$53.82	$54.85	$40.77	—	$37.44	$56.49	$70.00	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.75	$4.91	$-3.10	—	$17.67	$-4.79	$-0.44	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.07	$0.55	$2.88	—	$3.03	$13.26	$19.48	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.07	$0.55	$2.88	—	$3.03	$13.26	$19.48	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$6.98	$4.98	$4.10	—	$1.50	$2.14	$2.57	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$57.44	$46.78	$39.15	—	$24.55	$23.92	$22.62	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.95 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	12-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+0.4%/yr	+50.9%/yr (1-yr)
Owner earnings / share	—	+338.1%/yr (1-yr)
Capital spending / share	−9.4%/yr	+42.5%/yr (1-yr)
Book value / share	−7.0%/yr	−2.6%/yr (1-yr)

The record, charted

FY2013–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

46Mpeak FY2015

ROIC

−1%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

10.1×peak FY2014

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$606Mowner earningsvs.($219M)net incomelow FY2013

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2013FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2014–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $219M loss into $606M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2022	FY2015	FY2014
Reported net income	($219M)	$998M	($1.3B)	($341M)	$410M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$279M	+$298M	+$520M	+$356M	+$297M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$526M	+$33M	—	—	—
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$118M	−$1.1B	+$956M	+$753M	−$245M
Cash from operations	$704M	$256M	$187M	$768M	$462M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$98M	−$85M	−$232M	−$451M	−$416M
Owner earnings	$606M	$171M	($45M)	$317M	$46M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	23%	8%	-1%	7%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $526M), owner earnings is nearer $80M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($90M) ÷ interest expense $302M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $6.1B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $689M − debt $6.8B

What this means
Netting $689M of cash and short-term investments against $6.8B of debt leaves $6.1B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -0%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range -1%–5%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($71M) ÷ invested capital $7.2B

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin through the cycle

6-yr median margin, range -4%–23%; latest $606M = operating cash $704M − maintenance capex $98M

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $526M of SBC) leaves $80M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $704M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($219M) · cash from operations $704M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 17%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $103M ÷ Owner Earnings $606M

What this means
Of $606M Owner Earnings, $103M (17%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $103M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($526M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.35×

Harvesting

Capex $98M ÷ depreciation $279M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.28×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $6.8B vs $299M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (6-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.74/share (latest year $-4.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2013–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 6

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 0% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The words confirm the number: the filing says price increases held their volume, and the margin widened with them — Buffett’s strongest mark of pricing power.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 0% early to 5% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2013 · −6.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2013, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“We believe the emerging data economy and the growing importance of artificial intelligence and continued re-shoring of manufacturing and other industries will require an all-of-the-above approach to generating the electricity necessary to power load in a responsible and efficient…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.5B

Cash & short-term investments$1.0B
Receivables$109M
Inventory$244M
Other current assets$131M

Current liabilities$1.2B

Debt due within a year$29M
Accounts payable$260M
Other current liabilities$921M

Current ratio1.25×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.05×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$299Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$29M due · $1.0B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+139.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.5× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($8.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$6.8Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

Deferred revenue$662Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$29M

'27$29M

'28$29M

'29$29M

'30$2.0B

later$4.8B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$29Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$58Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$2.0Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$6.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$1.0B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$606M

Together, against $29M due next year56.2×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.6B against the $29M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 56 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2013–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.9B · 67%
Buybacks$2.1B · 74%

Returned to owners$2.1B
224% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.1B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$1.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$150.67
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $2.1B, about $150.67 each.
Net change in share count−43.2%
The diluted count fell from 84M to 47M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$310M3% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$4.4Bover 6 years buying other businesses, against $1.9B of capital spent building

$465M written down across 1 year (2015): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$526M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 20% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Talen Energy Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2013–2025.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PORPortland General Electric	$3.6B	—	15.6%	5%	9%
OGEOGE Energy	$3.2B	61%	23.5%	6%	15%
HEHawaiian Electric Industries Inc.	$3.1B	—	11.9%	6%	7%
TLNTalen Energy Corporation	$2.6B	—	3.5%	2%	4%
BKHBlack Hills	$2.3B	—	23.0%	6%	17%
PNMPNM Resources	$2.1B	—	18.3%	5%	11%
CWENClearway Energy Inc.	$1.4B	67%	21.6%	2%	36%
OTTROtter Tail	$1.3B	—	18.8%	10%	13%
Group median	—	—	18.5%	6%	12%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Talen Energy Corporation has delivered.

Talen Energy Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Talen Energy Corporation earns about $104M on its 4.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($104M) Net of stock comp (−$514M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($948M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’14→’25+7%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+254%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $924M on 45M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $5.8B. The if-converted diluted count is 47M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($122M) runs well above depreciation ($297M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $948M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TLN against another business →

The owners of TLN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Talen Energy Corporation (TLN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TLN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TKR its page in the Manual TLRY →

Industry order: ← TAC the Electric Utilities chapter TXNM →