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OSPN, OneSpan Inc.

Software asset-light Cyclical

This acquisition provides OneSpan's customers with a wider range of flexible, adaptable authentication options.

Item 1 Business Overview OneSpan helps organizations build secure, seamless, and trusted digital experiences through two solution portfolios: Cybersecurity and Digital Agreements.

Our cybersecurity solutions protect identities, secure mobile apps, and safeguard access through advanced high-assurance authentication, threat intelligence, fraud prevention, and robust mobile app protection, defending users, devices, and applications against sophisticated attacks.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

OSPN · OneSpan Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$243M

+0.0% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $246M 5-yr avg $231M

Gross margin 74% 5-yr avg 69%

Operating margin 18.8% 5-yr avg 0.3%

ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 1%

Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 5%

Free cash flow margin 19% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Cybersecurity (73%) and Digital Agreements (27%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 20% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.4%) on a 68% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Cybersecurity is 73% of revenue, with Digital Agreements the other meaningful segment at 27%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Cybersecurity73%$178M
Digital Agreements27%$65M

By geographyEMEA42%Americas39%Asia Pacific18%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$192M	$193M	$211M	$253M	$216M	$214M	$219M	$235M	$243M	$243M	$246M	RevenueRevenue
68%	70%	69%	66%	69%	67%	68%	67%	72%	74%	74%	Gross marginGross mgn
16%	19%	20%	17%	21%	25%	25%	25%	19%	19%	19%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
12%	12%	15%	17%	19%	22%	19%	16%	13%	14%	14%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$10M	$6M	($920K)	$14M	($5M)	($26M)	($27M)	($29M)	$45M	$48M	$46M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
5.0%	3.2%	−0.4%	5.6%	−2.4%	−12.2%	−12.4%	−12.3%	18.4%	19.9%	18.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$11M	($22M)	$3M	$8M	($5M)	($31M)	($14M)	($30M)	$57M	$73M	$70M	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$28M	$18M	$1M	$18M	$15M	($3M)	($6M)	($11M)	$56M	$59M	$58M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$11M	$11M	$12M	$12M	$12M	$9M	$7M	$6M	$8M	$10M	$11M	DepreciationDeprec.
$4M	$26M	($18M)	($5M)	$4M	$15M	($7M)	($2M)	($19M)	($35M)	($33M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$3M	$4M	$7M	$3M	$2M	$5M	$12M	$9M	$9M	$10M	CapexCapex
1.1%	1.6%	1.7%	2.9%	1.4%	1.0%	2.3%	5.3%	3.8%	3.7%	4.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$26M	$15M	($2M)	$11M	$12M	($5M)	($11M)	($17M)	$46M	$50M	$48M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
13.7%	7.5%	−1.2%	4.3%	5.5%	−2.3%	−4.9%	−7.3%	19.1%	20.8%	19.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$26M	$15M	($2M)	$11M	$12M	($5M)	($11M)	($23M)	$46M	$50M	$48M	Free cash flowFCF
13.7%	7.5%	−1.2%	4.3%	5.5%	−2.3%	−4.9%	−9.9%	19.1%	20.8%	19.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	$53M	—	—	$0	$0	$2M	$0	$15M	$49M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$18M	$19M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	—	$5M	$7M	$6M	$29M	$3K	$13M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
4%	2%	-1%	4%	-2%	-13%	-20%	-20%	35%	24%	21%	ROICROIC
4%	-9%	1%	3%	-2%	-14%	-7%	-19%	27%	27%	26%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	−19%	27%	20%	19%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$144M	$79M	$77M	$84M	$88M	$63M	$96M	$43M	$83M	$70M	$150M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$37M	$48M	$60M	$62M	$58M	$57M	$65M	$64M	$56M	$56M	$33M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$17M	$12M	$14M	$20M	$13M	$10M	$12M	$16M	$11M	$10M	$9M	InventoryInvent.
$9M	$8M	$7M	$11M	$6M	$8M	$17M	$17M	$13M	$14M	$11M	Accounts payablePayables
$45M	$52M	$67M	$71M	$65M	$59M	$60M	$62M	$54M	$53M	$31M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$207M	$228M	$192M	$210M	$207M	$187M	$198M	$146M	$175M	$172M	$123M	Current assetsCur. assets
$68M	$66M	$72M	$74M	$75M	$89M	$111M	$115M	$110M	$115M	$98M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×	3.4×	2.7×	2.8×	2.8×	2.1×	1.8×	1.3×	1.6×	1.5×	1.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$54M	$56M	$92M	$95M	$98M	$96M	$91M	$94M	$92M	$104M	$128M	GoodwillGoodwill
$327M	$338M	$353M	$383M	$375M	$342M	$335M	$289M	$339M	$398M	$383M	Total assetsAssets
($144M)	($79M)	($77M)	($84M)	($88M)	($63M)	($96M)	($43M)	($83M)	($70M)	($150M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$253M	$238M	$252M	$262M	$257M	$220M	$203M	$159M	$213M	$272M	$272M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%	1.8%	1.9%	1.3%	2.2%	2.0%	3.9%	6.1%	3.7%	4.6%	4.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
39.8M	39.8M	40.0M	40.1M	40.0M	39.6M	40.1M	40.2M	39.1M	38.9M	38.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.83	$4.86	$5.28	$6.32	$5.39	$5.41	$5.46	$5.85	$6.22	$6.25	$6.46	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.26	$-0.56	$0.08	$0.20	$-0.14	$-0.77	$-0.36	$-0.74	$1.46	$1.88	$1.84	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.66	$0.37	$-0.06	$0.27	$0.30	$-0.12	$-0.27	$-0.43	$1.19	$1.30	$1.26	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.66	$0.37	$-0.06	$0.27	$0.30	$-0.12	$-0.27	$-0.58	$1.19	$1.30	$1.26	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$0.47	$0.50	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.05	$0.08	$0.09	$0.19	$0.08	$0.05	$0.12	$0.31	$0.24	$0.23	$0.27	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.36	$5.98	$6.28	$6.54	$6.43	$5.55	$5.06	$3.96	$5.44	$6.99	$7.15	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.9%/yr	+3.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+7.8%/yr	+34.5%/yr
EPS	+24.3%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+18.2%/yr	+24.4%/yr
Book value / share	+1.1%/yr	+1.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

39Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

24%low FY2022

Gross margin

74%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$50Mowner earningsvs.$73Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $73M of profit but $50M of owner earnings: $22M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$73M

Owner earnings$50M · 21% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$73M	$57M	($30M)	($14M)	($31M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$10M	+$8M	+$6M	+$7M	+$9M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$11M	+$9M	+$14M	+$9M	+$4M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$35M	−$19M	−$2M	−$7M	+$15M
Cash from operations	$59M	$56M	($11M)	($6M)	($3M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$9M	−$9M	−$6M	−$5M	−$2M
Owner earnings	$50M	$46M	($17M)	($11M)	($5M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$6M	—	—
Free cash flow	$50M	$46M	($23M)	($11M)	($5M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	21%	19%	-7%	-5%	-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $39M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$165M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $70M + ST investments $95M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $165M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 65d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 84 + DIO 60 − DPO 78 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -23%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -7%–21%; latest $50M = operating cash $59M − maintenance capex $9M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $39M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.82×

Mostly cash-backed

Cash from ops $59M ÷ net income $73M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 63%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $32M ÷ Owner Earnings $50M

What this means
Of $50M Owner Earnings, $32M (63%) went back to shareholders, $18M dividends, $13M buybacks. Net of $11M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.89×

Maintaining

Capex $9M ÷ depreciation $10M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $243M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.50×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.90/share (latest year $1.97), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 3% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 9% lately, median −0% — pricing power intact or improving.
Owner earnings growth +10%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −12.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.3%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, AI may reduce barriers to entry in our markets by allowing new entrants to rapidly and cost-effectively create competitive and potentially disruptive software solutions.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$123M

Cash & short-term investments$150M
Receivables$33M
Inventory$9M

Current liabilities$98M

Accounts payable$11M
Other current liabilities$87M

Current ratio1.25×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.16×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.53×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$25Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$127Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$12MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$8M$8M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$63Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $176M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$57M · 32%
Dividends$18M · 10%
Buybacks$61M · 34%
Retained (debt / cash)$40M · 23%

Returned to owners$79M
63% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $18M as dividends and $61M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$12.86
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $61M, about $12.86 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $10.80 (2023) to $24.90 (2021); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $10.80 ($29M).
Net change in share count−4.3%
The diluted count fell from 40M to 38M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.47/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$114M29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity38%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$70Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $57M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$11M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why OneSpan Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
AGYSAgilysys	$319M	61%	-2.5%	-14%	17%
CRNCCerence Inc.	$252M	70%	1.3%	-1%	12%
INODInnodata Inc.	$252M	—	-0.8%	-1%	3%
AIC3.ai Inc.	$250M	67%	-80.5%	-36%	-37%
OSPNOneSpan Inc.	$243M	68%	1.4%	1%	5%
WEAVWeave Communications Inc.	$239M	63%	-35.0%	-111%	-10%
TLSTelos Corporation	$165M	36%	-8.5%	-61%	2%
IONQIonQ Inc.	$130M	—	-715.7%	-23%	-405%
Group median	—	65%	-5.5%	-18%	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what OneSpan Inc. has delivered.

OneSpan Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, OneSpan Inc. earns about $12M on its 4.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($12M) Net of stock comp (−$10M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($49M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $48M on 37M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net cash $150M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($11M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $49M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh OSPN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "OneSpan Inc. (OSPN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OSPN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← OSK its page in the Manual OSS →

Industry order: ← ORCL the Software chapter OTEX →