Share count
2.9Bpeak FY2018
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ORCL, Oracle Corp.
Oracle sells software that large organizations use to run the core of their operations — databases that store and manage their data, and applications for functions such as finance, human resources, and supply chains. It delivers this software both as licenses customers install and as cloud services Oracle hosts and runs for them, and it earns the rest from support, consulting, and a smaller hardware line. The buyers depend on these systems to keep the business running day to day.
Our products and services include enterprise applications and infrastructure offerings that incorporate and are enhanced by artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including embedded AI-driven automation and analytics and generative AI capabilities.
We provide choice and flexibility to our customers as to when and how they deploy Oracle applications and infrastructure technologies.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$67.4B
+17.3% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $67.4B 5-yr avg $54.0B
Gross margin 97%
Revenue $17.2B +21.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 31.8% yr-ago 30.8%
Net income $3.7B yr-ago $2.9B
Net margin 21.5% yr-ago 20.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 83% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- The question that governs this business is switching costs: once a customer builds its mission-critical records and applications on Oracle, moving off is costly and risky, and that reluctance is what would let a software company charge well and renew — look to the gross margin and the durability of the support stream below for whether the lock-in is real. Set against it, the filing names its own warning: low barriers to entry and new competitors that keep appearing, so any pricing power here is never owed. The cloud ambition also tests an asset-light history against the heavier spending and the debt that hosting at scale demands — watch the operating margin, the returns on capital, and the balance between cash earnings and what is borrowed, all set out in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 32% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →41% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2026
- United States59%$39.8B
- Other Countries31%$20.8B
- United Kingdom4%$2.8B
- Germany3%$2.0B
- Japan3%$1.9B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $37.8B | $39.4B | $39.5B | $39.1B | $40.5B | $42.4B | $50.0B | $53.0B | $57.4B | $67.4B | $67.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 2% | 2% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 16% | 15% | 15% | 16% | 16% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 15% | 15% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $12.9B | $13.3B | $13.5B | $13.9B | $15.2B | $10.9B | $13.1B | $15.4B | $17.7B | $20.6B | $20.6B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 34.2% | 33.7% | 34.3% | 35.6% | 37.6% | 25.7% | 26.2% | 29.0% | 30.8% | 30.6% | 30.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $9.5B | $3.6B | $11.1B | $10.1B | $13.7B | $6.7B | $8.5B | $10.5B | $12.4B | $17.1B | $17.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 19% | — | 10% | 16% | -6% | 12% | 7% | 11% | 12% | 13% | 13% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $14.1B | $15.4B | $14.6B | $13.1B | $15.9B | $9.5B | $17.2B | $18.7B | $20.8B | $32.0B | $32.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $3.9B | $7.6B | $7.6B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $2.3B | $9.0B | $585M | $32M | ($1.2B) | ($1.8B) | $2.6B | $1.1B | ($163M) | $2.5B | $2.5B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $4.5B | $8.7B | $6.9B | $21.2B | $55.7B | $55.7B | CapexCapex |
| 5.3% | 4.4% | 4.2% | 4.0% | 5.3% | 10.6% | 17.4% | 13.0% | 37.0% | 82.6% | 82.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $13.1B | $14.2B | $13.3B | $11.6B | $14.3B | $7.6B | $14.6B | $15.5B | $17.0B | $24.4B | $24.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 34.7% | 36.1% | 33.7% | 29.6% | 35.5% | 17.8% | 29.3% | 29.3% | 29.5% | 36.2% | 36.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $12.1B | $13.7B | $12.9B | $11.6B | $13.8B | $5.0B | $8.5B | $11.8B | ($394M) | ($23.7B) | ($23.7B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 32.0% | 34.7% | 32.6% | 29.6% | 34.0% | 11.8% | 17.0% | 22.3% | −0.7% | −35.2% | −35.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $11.2B | $1.7B | $363M | $124M | $41M | $148M | $27.7B | $63M | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $2.6B | $3.1B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.4B | $4.7B | $5.8B | $5.8B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $3.6B | $11.3B | $36.1B | $19.2B | $20.9B | $16.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $600M | $95M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 12% | 8% | 21% | 25% | 26% | 20% | 15% | 16% | 15% | 13% | 13% | ROICROIC |
| 18% | 8% | 51% | 84% | 262% | — | 792% | 120% | 61% | 40% | 40% | Return on equityROE |
| 13% | 1% | 37% | 59% | 204% | — | 451% | 70% | 38% | 27% | 27% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $66.1B | $67.3B | $20.5B | $37.2B | $30.1B | $21.4B | $9.8B | $10.5B | $10.8B | $31.3B | $72.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $5.3B | $5.1B | $5.1B | $5.6B | $5.4B | $6.0B | $6.9B | $7.9B | $8.6B | $10.4B | $10.4B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $300M | $398M | $320M | $211M | $142M | $314M | $298M | $334M | $303M | — | $303M | InventoryInvent. |
| $599M | $529M | $580M | $637M | $745M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $2.4B | $5.1B | $11.0B | $11.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $5.0B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $5.1B | $4.8B | $5.0B | $6.0B | $5.9B | $3.7B | ($592M) | ($289M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $74.5B | $76.2B | $46.4B | $52.1B | $55.6B | $31.6B | $21.0B | $22.6B | $24.6B | $46.6B | $46.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $24.2B | $19.1B | $18.6B | $17.2B | $24.2B | $19.5B | $23.1B | $31.5B | $32.6B | $41.8B | $41.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.1× | 4.0× | 2.5× | 3.0× | 2.3× | 1.6× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $43.0B | $43.8B | $43.8B | $43.8B | $43.9B | $43.8B | $62.3B | $62.2B | $62.2B | $62.3B | $62.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $135.0B | $137.9B | $108.7B | $115.4B | $131.1B | $109.3B | $134.4B | $141.0B | $168.4B | $261.8B | $261.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $57.9B | $60.6B | $56.2B | $71.6B | $84.2B | $75.9B | $90.5B | $86.9B | $92.6B | $129.5B | $129.5B | Total debtDebt |
| ($8.2B) | ($6.6B) | $35.7B | $34.4B | $54.1B | $54.5B | $80.7B | $76.4B | $81.8B | $98.3B | $56.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 7.2× | 6.6× | 6.5× | 7.0× | 6.1× | 4.0× | 3.7× | 4.4× | 4.9× | 4.5× | 4.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $53.9B | $46.4B | $21.8B | $12.1B | $5.2B | ($6.2B) | $1.1B | $8.7B | $20.5B | $42.5B | $42.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 3.6% | 4.1% | 4.2% | 4.1% | 4.5% | 6.2% | 7.1% | 7.5% | 8.1% | 7.1% | 7.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 4.22B | 4.24B | 3.73B | 3.29B | 3.02B | 2.79B | 2.77B | 2.82B | 2.87B | 2.91B | 2.91B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $8.96 | $9.29 | $10.59 | $11.86 | $13.39 | $15.23 | $18.06 | $18.76 | $20.03 | $23.11 | $23.11 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.24 | $0.85 | $2.97 | $3.08 | $4.55 | $2.41 | $3.07 | $3.71 | $4.34 | $5.86 | $5.86 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.11 | $3.36 | $3.57 | $3.51 | $4.75 | $2.72 | $5.29 | $5.51 | $5.92 | $8.36 | $8.36 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.87 | $3.22 | $3.45 | $3.51 | $4.55 | $1.80 | $3.06 | $4.18 | $-0.14 | $-8.13 | $-8.13 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.62 | $0.74 | $0.79 | $0.93 | $1.01 | $1.24 | $1.33 | $1.56 | $1.65 | $1.99 | $1.99 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.48 | $0.41 | $0.44 | $0.47 | $0.71 | $1.62 | $3.14 | $2.43 | $7.40 | $19.10 | $19.10 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $12.77 | $10.94 | $5.84 | $3.67 | $1.73 | $-2.23 | $0.39 | $3.08 | $7.14 | $14.59 | $14.59 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +11.1%/yr | +11.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +11.6%/yr | +12.0%/yr |
| EPS | +11.3%/yr | +5.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +13.7%/yr | +14.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +50.6%/yr | +93.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.5%/yr | +53.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
13%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.0×peak FY2022
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$24.4Bowner earningsvs.$17.1Bnet incomelow FY2022
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2017FY2026
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned $24.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $7.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put $48.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($23.7B).
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $17.1B | $12.4B | $10.5B | $8.5B | $6.7B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$7.6B | +$3.9B | +$3.1B | +$2.5B | +$2.0B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$4.8B | +$4.7B | +$4.0B | +$3.5B | +$2.6B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$2.5B | −$163M | +$1.1B | +$2.6B | −$1.8B |
| Cash from operations | $32.0B | $20.8B | $18.7B | $17.2B | $9.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$7.6B | −$3.9B | −$3.1B | −$2.5B | −$2.0B |
| Owner earnings | $24.4B | $17.0B | $15.5B | $14.6B | $7.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$48.0B | −$17.3B | −$3.7B | −$6.2B | −$2.5B |
| Free cash flow | ($23.7B) | ($394M) | $11.8B | $8.5B | $5.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 36% | 30% | 29% | 29% | 18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $7.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $48.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $4.8B), owner earnings is nearer $19.5B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $20.6B ÷ interest expense $4.6B
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $52.6B · 2.6× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $31.3B + ST investments $45.6B − debt $129.5B
What this means
Netting $76.9B of cash and short-term investments against $129.5B of debt leaves $52.6B owed, about 2.6× a year's operating profit (6.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -1838dNegative, funded by othersDSO 56 + DIO 54 − DPO 1948 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 8%–26%; 13% latest = NOPAT $18.0B ÷ invested capital $140.8BIndustry peers: median 25%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 18%–36%; latest $24.4B = operating cash $32.0B − maintenance capex $7.6BIndustry peers: median 32%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 36% of revenue this year, a 30% median across 10 years. It chose to put $48.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($23.7B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4.8B of SBC) leaves $19.5B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $32.0B ÷ net income $17.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $5.9B ÷ Owner Earnings $24.4B
What this means
Of $24.4B Owner Earnings, $5.9B (24%) went back to shareholders, $5.8B dividends, $95M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($4.8B SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 7.30×ExpandingCapex $55.7B ÷ depreciation $7.6B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $67.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.12×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $129.5B vs $4.8B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +66%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.63/share (latest year $5.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 34% → 30% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 34% early to 30% lately, median 31% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 19%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · 25.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −4.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.
“Our products and services include enterprise applications and infrastructure offerings that incorporate and are enhanced by artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including embedded AI-driven automation and analytics and generative AI capabilities.”
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, May 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$46.6B
- Cash & short-term investments$72.9B
- Receivables$10.4B
- Inventory$303M
Current liabilities$41.8B
- Debt due within a year$7.2B
- Accounts payable$11.0B
- Other current liabilities$23.6B
Current ratio1.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.11×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.75×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$7.2B due · $72.9B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($23.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$37.4B$30.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $167.4B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$15.4Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2031, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$7.2Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$17.4Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$10.1Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$130.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, May 31, 2026$72.9B
One year of owner earnings (FY2026)$24.4B
Together, against $7.2B due next year13.5×
Cash on hand as of May 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $97.3B against the $7.2B due in the twelve months after the May 31, 2026 schedule: 13 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s May 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$4.4Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$53.3Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$37.9Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$129.5B
Lease obligations (present value)$37.9B
Total fixed claims on the business$167.4B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $167.4B, of which the leases are 23%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s May 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $171.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$106.1B · 62%
- Dividends$36.9B · 22%
- Buybacks$110.7B · 65%
- Returned to owners$147.5B
101% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $36.9B as dividends and $110.7B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$82.4B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $82.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $57.9B to $129.5B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$56.27
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1965M shares were bought for $110.6B, about $56.27 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $41.60 (2017) to $153.85 (2025); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $49.25 ($36.1B).
- Net change in share count−30.9%
The diluted count fell from 4217M to 2914M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$1.99/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$65.5B25% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$41.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $106.1B of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Safra A. Catz | $10.6M | $40.4M | $14.3B |
| 2022 | Safra A. Catz | $138.2M | $139.2M | $7.6B |
| 2023 | Safra A. Catz | $5.3M | $304.1M | $14.6B |
| 2024 | Safra A. Catz | $6.5M | $94.3M | $15.5B |
| 2025 | Safra A. Catz | $1.1M | $461.8M | $17.0B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership40.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$4.8B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 23% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Oracle Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$57.9B → $129.5B
Debt rose from $57.9B to $129.5B while owner earnings went from about $13.6B to $19.0B — about 4.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSFTMicrosoft Corp. | $281.7B | 68% | 39.3% | 28% | 36% |
| METAMeta Platforms Inc. | $201.0B | 82% | 40.5% | 25% | 45% |
| ORCLOracle Corp. | $67.4B | 97% | 32.2% | 16% | 32% |
| CRMSalesforce Inc. | $41.5B | 74% | 3.7% | 3% | 22% |
| XYZBlock Inc. | $24.2B | 34% | -0.7% | -1% | 4% |
| ADBEAdobe Inc. | $23.8B | 87% | 32.2% | 33% | 39% |
| INTUIntuit Inc. | $18.8B | 99% | 26.0% | 35% | 32% |
| NOWServiceNow Inc. | $13.3B | 77% | 4.4% | 6% | 30% |
| Group median | — | 80% | 29.1% | 20% | 32% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Oracle Corp. has delivered.
Oracle Corp.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Oracle Corp. earns about $21.3B on its 31.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 36.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow ($23.7B) on 2880M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-06-12; net debt $56.6B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($55.7B) runs well above depreciation ($7.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $24.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Oracle Corp. (ORCL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ORCL, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← ORC its page in the Manual ORI →
Industry order: ← OPRA the Software chapter OSPN →