← All companies ← PARA Manual PATH → ← OXY Oil & Gas Producers PBR →

PARR, Par Pacific Holdings

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Cyclical

We operate in logistically complex, niche markets and, as such, each of our refineries has unique cost advantages and disadvantages as compared to their respective relevant market indices.

We will operate and manage the day-to-day operations at the Renewable Fuels Facility on behalf of Hawaii Renewables and provide certain services, such as construction management services, operating and corporate services, and terminalling services, to Hawaii Renewables.

After aggressively raising interest rates in early 2023 to bring down inflation, the Fed cut interest rates in 2024 and 2025 in response to positive indicators of economic growth, including easing labor market conditions and lower inflation.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PARR · Par Pacific Holdings

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$7.5B

−6.4% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $7.5B 5-yr avg $7.1B

Gross margin 78%

Operating margin 8.2% 5-yr avg 4.4%

ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 31%

Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 2.4% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −10% and 8.3% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 14% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.9B	$2.4B	$3.4B	$5.4B	$3.1B	$4.7B	$7.3B	$8.2B	$8.0B	$7.5B	$7.5B	RevenueRevenue
2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($20M)	$94M	$82M	$148M	($318M)	($8M)	$438M	$680M	$48M	$539M	$620M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−1.1%	3.8%	2.4%	2.7%	−10.2%	−0.2%	6.0%	8.3%	0.6%	7.2%	8.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($46M)	$73M	$39M	$41M	($409M)	($81M)	$364M	$729M	($33M)	$369M	$454M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	-2%	1%	—	—	—	0%	—	—	23%	22%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($23M)	$106M	$91M	$106M	($37M)	($28M)	$453M	$579M	$84M	$445M	$406M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$32M	$46M	$53M	$86M	$90M	$94M	$100M	$120M	$132M	$144M	$142M	DepreciationDeprec.
($16M)	($19M)	($8M)	($28M)	$274M	($49M)	($21M)	($281M)	($40M)	($85M)	($207M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$25M	$32M	$48M	$84M	$64M	$30M	$53M	$82M	$136M	$149M	$151M	CapexCapex
1.3%	1.3%	1.4%	1.6%	2.0%	0.6%	0.7%	1.0%	1.7%	2.0%	2.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($48M)	$75M	$42M	$22M	($101M)	($57M)	$400M	$497M	($52M)	$296M	$255M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−2.6%	3.1%	1.2%	0.4%	−3.2%	−1.2%	5.5%	6.0%	−0.6%	4.0%	3.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($48M)	$75M	$42M	$22M	($101M)	($57M)	$400M	$497M	($52M)	$296M	$255M	Free cash flowFCF
−2.6%	3.1%	1.2%	0.4%	−3.2%	−1.2%	5.5%	6.0%	−0.6%	4.0%	3.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$209M	$0	$74M	$273M	$0	$0	$36M	$595M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$1M	$2M	$8M	$68M	$142M	$125M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-2%	13%	10%	—	-28%	-1%	66%	40%	—	19%	21%	ROICROIC
-12%	16%	8%	6%	-166%	-31%	57%	55%	-3%	24%	30%	Return on equityROE
−12%	16%	8%	6%	−166%	−31%	57%	55%	−3%	24%	30%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$48M	$118M	$75M	$126M	$68M	$112M	$491M	$279M	$192M	$164M	$172M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$102M	$122M	$160M	$229M	$112M	$195M	$253M	$367M	$398M	$313M	$482M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$198M	$345M	$322M	$616M	$430M	$790M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.4B	InventoryInvent.
$65M	$53M	$55M	$162M	$107M	$155M	$151M	$391M	$437M	$342M	$578M	Accounts payablePayables
$236M	$415M	$428M	$682M	$435M	$831M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$403M	$604M	$587M	$1.0B	$636M	$1.1B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$2.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$383M	$471M	$507M	$1.0B	$879M	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.3B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×	1.3×	1.2×	1.0×	0.7×	0.8×	1.0×	1.3×	1.6×	1.6×	1.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$106M	$107M	$153M	$196M	$128M	$127M	$129M	$129M	$129M	$127M	$127M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$2.7B	$2.1B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$3.9B	$3.8B	$3.8B	$4.2B	Total assetsAssets
$370M	$385M	$393M	$612M	$709M	$565M	$506M	$651M	$1.1B	$803M	$948M	Total debtDebt
$323M	$266M	$318M	$486M	$640M	$452M	$15M	$372M	$921M	$639M	$775M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.7×	3.0×	2.1×	2.0×	-4.5×	-0.1×	6.4×	9.4×	0.6×	6.5×	8.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$369M	$448M	$512M	$648M	$246M	$266M	$645M	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
42.3M	45.6M	45.8M	50.5M	53.3M	58.3M	59.9M	61.0M	56.8M	51.6M	49.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$44.04	$53.60	$74.54	$107.02	$58.63	$80.83	$122.27	$134.92	$140.46	$144.69	$151.99	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.08	$1.59	$0.86	$0.81	$-7.68	$-1.40	$6.08	$11.94	$-0.59	$7.16	$9.15	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.14	$1.64	$0.92	$0.43	$-1.89	$-0.98	$6.67	$8.14	$-0.91	$5.75	$5.14	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.14	$1.64	$0.92	$0.43	$-1.89	$-0.98	$6.67	$8.14	$-0.91	$5.75	$5.14	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.59	$0.70	$1.06	$1.66	$1.19	$0.51	$0.89	$1.35	$2.39	$2.89	$3.04	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.71	$9.82	$11.20	$12.84	$4.62	$4.56	$10.76	$21.89	$20.98	$29.30	$30.54	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+14.1%/yr	+19.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+19.4%/yr	+19.3%/yr
Book value / share	+14.4%/yr	+44.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

52Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

19%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.2×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$296Mowner earningsvs.$369Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $369M of profit but $296M of owner earnings: $73M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$369M

Owner earnings$296M · 4% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$369M	($33M)	$729M	$364M	($81M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$144M	+$132M	+$120M	+$100M	+$94M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$17M	+$26M	+$12M	+$9M	+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$85M	−$40M	−$281M	−$21M	−$49M
Cash from operations	$445M	$84M	$579M	$453M	($28M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$149M	−$136M	−$82M	−$53M	−$30M
Owner earnings	$296M	($52M)	$497M	$400M	($57M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	-1%	6%	5%	-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $280M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 6.5×

Comfortable

Operating income $539M ÷ interest expense $82M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $639M · 1.2× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $164M − debt $803M

What this means
Netting $164M of cash and short-term investments against $803M of debt leaves $639M owed, about 1.2× a year's operating profit (1.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 213d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 15 + DIO 274 − DPO 76 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 10%

Solid through the cycle

8-yr median, range -28%–66%; 19% latest = NOPAT $414M ÷ invested capital $2.2B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 19% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 0%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -3%–6%; latest $296M = operating cash $445M − maintenance capex $149M

Industry peers: median 23%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $280M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.21×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $445M ÷ net income $369M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 42%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $125M ÷ Owner Earnings $296M

What this means
Of $296M Owner Earnings, $125M (42%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $125M buybacks. Net of $17M stock comp, the real buyback was about $108M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.03×

Maintaining

Capex $149M ÷ depreciation $144M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.61×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $803M vs $670M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +1508%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.08/share (latest year $7.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 5% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 26%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +28%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 28% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −10.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +2.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.2B

Cash & short-term investments$172M
Receivables$482M
Inventory$1.4B
Other current assets$135M

Current liabilities$1.3B

Debt due within a year$5M
Accounts payable$578M
Other current liabilities$742M

Current ratio1.62×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.60×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$826Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $172M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($507M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$395M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$130M

'27$121M

'28$104M

'29$26M

'30$19M

later$122M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$130Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$522Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$426Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$803M

Lease obligations (present value)$426M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 35%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$702M · 40%
Buybacks$346M · 19%
Retained (debt / cash)$728M · 41%

Returned to owners$346M
32% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $346M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $577M and cash and short-term investments rose $124M.
Average price paid for buybacks$25.01
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $345M, about $25.01 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $18.65 (2022) to $37.68 (2023); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $28.39 ($142M).
Net change in share count17.2%
The diluted count rose from 42M to 50M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained32%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($700M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $224M, so each retained $1 added about 0.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$137M4% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity8%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $702M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Pate	$3.5M	$4.4M	($57M)
2022	Mr. Pate	$5.1M	$9.5M	$400M
2023	Mr. Pate	$4.3M	$10.9M	$497M
2024	Mr. Monteleone	$9.8M	$3.1M	($52M)
2024	Mr. Pate	$13.6M	$15.6M	($52M)
2025	Mr. Monteleone	$4.4M	$13.8M	$296M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio36:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Par Pacific Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?17.2%
Diluted shares grew 17.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $346M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 24% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $301M to $1.8B while revenue grew 304%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 24% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
EXEExpand Energy Corporation	$12.1B	—	-0.9%	-0%	5%
OVVOvintiv	$8.7B	—	17.7%	12%	17%
EQTEQT Corporation	$8.6B	63%	-3.8%	-1%	18%
PARRPar Pacific Holdings	$7.5B	78%	2.6%	11%	1%
CTRACoterra Energy Inc.	$7.3B	—	34.8%	9%	33%
ARAntero Resources	$5.3B	—	1.1%	0%	23%
CIVICivitas Resources	$5.2B	—	29.6%	9%	60%
PRPermian Resources	$5.1B	—	31.8%	7%	50%
Group median	—	—	10.1%	8%	21%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Par Pacific Holdings has delivered.

Par Pacific Holdings’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Par Pacific Holdings earns about $61M on its 0.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($61M) Net of stock comp (−$17M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−8%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+28%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $255M on 50M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $775M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PARR against another business →

The owners of PARR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Par Pacific Holdings (PARR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PARR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PARA its page in the Manual PATH →

Industry order: ← OXY the Oil & Gas Producers chapter PBR →