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PAG, Penske Automotive
Penske runs franchised auto dealerships. It sells new and used vehicles — mostly passenger cars, and also commercial trucks — and earns alongside each sale by servicing and repairing the vehicles, selling parts, and arranging financing and insurance for buyers. The franchises that let it sell new vehicles are granted by the manufacturers whose brands it carries.
We offer over 40 vehicle brands with 71% of our retail automotive franchised dealership revenue generated from premium brands, such as Audi, BMW, Land Rover, Lexus, Mercedes-Benz, and Porsche, and 23% of revenue generated from volume non-U.S. brands such as Toyota and Honda in 2025.
As of December 31, 2025, we also operated 15 used vehicle dealerships, with six dealerships in the U.S. operating under the brand name CarShop, eight dealerships in the U.K. operating under the brand name Sytner Select, and one dealership in Australia operating under the brand name Penske Select.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Retail Automotive (86%) and Retail Commercial Truck (11%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- A franchised dealer is mostly a pass-through: the manufacturers control the supply and much of the price of new vehicles and grant the franchises that permit the sale, so the test is whether the durable profit sits in the stickier, higher-margin work — servicing cars already on the road, parts, used vehicles, and finance and insurance — rather than the thin spread on a new car. Watch whether owning many dealership locations buys any real cost or purchasing advantage, and whether the returns clear the cost of the capital parked in inventory and real estate. The bad case is plain: a manufacturer that tightens its grip or stumbles, or a recession that empties the showroom, set against a balance sheet that carries debt. The figures for margin, return on capital, and leverage are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Retail Automotive is 86% of revenue, with Retail Commercial Truck the other meaningful segment at 11%.
- Retail Automotive86%$27.5B
- Retail Commercial Truck11%$3.4B
- Commercial vehicle distribution and other3%$923M
- Other3%$923M
- Non-Automotive Investments0%$0
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $20.1B | $21.4B | $22.8B | $23.2B | $20.4B | $25.6B | $27.8B | $30.9B | $31.9B | $31.8B | $31.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 15% | 15% | 15% | 15% | 16% | 17% | 17% | 17% | 16% | 16% | 16% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 11% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 12% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $575M | $611M | $665M | $653M | $705M | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 2.9% | 2.9% | 2.9% | 2.8% | 3.4% | 5.3% | 5.3% | 4.6% | 4.3% | 4.0% | 3.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $343M | $613M | $471M | $436M | $544M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $969M | $935M | $912M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 32% | — | 22% | 26% | 23% | 26% | 26% | 25% | 25% | 26% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $371M | $623M | $614M | $518M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $975M | $899M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $90M | $95M | $104M | $110M | $116M | $122M | $127M | $144M | $161M | $172M | $177M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($61M) | ($85M) | $40M | ($27M) | $542M | ($17M) | ($75M) | ($135M) | $71M | ($163M) | ($220M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $203M | $247M | $306M | $245M | $186M | $249M | $283M | $386M | $378M | $325M | $303M | CapexCapex |
| 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.3% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.0% | 1.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $282M | $528M | $511M | $409M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $803M | $723M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.4% | 2.5% | 2.2% | 1.8% | 5.3% | 4.6% | 4.8% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 2.5% | 2.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $168M | $376M | $309M | $273M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $759M | $853M | $651M | $597M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.8% | 1.8% | 1.4% | 1.2% | 5.0% | 4.1% | 4.2% | 2.5% | 2.7% | 2.0% | 1.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $141M | $450M | $309M | $327M | $0 | $432M | $393M | $215M | $786M | $22M | $691M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $95M | $108M | $121M | $131M | $68M | $143M | $154M | $189M | $274M | $344M | $355M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $174M | $19M | $69M | $169M | $29M | $281M | $869M | $359M | $59M | $159M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 11% | 14% | 11% | 9% | 11% | 18% | 20% | 17% | 14% | 12% | 11% | ROICROIC |
| 20% | 26% | 18% | 16% | 16% | 29% | 33% | 23% | 18% | 17% | 16% | Return on equityROE |
| 14% | 21% | 13% | 11% | 14% | 26% | 30% | 19% | 13% | 11% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $24M | $46M | $39M | $28M | $50M | $101M | $107M | $96M | $84M | $65M | $84M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $879M | $955M | $929M | $960M | $807M | $734M | $907M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3.4B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.3B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $4.3B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $4.9B | InventoryInvent. |
| $497M | $642M | $598M | $639M | $675M | $767M | $854M | $867M | $859M | $900M | $937M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $3.8B | $4.3B | $4.4B | $4.6B | $3.6B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $5.0B | $5.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $4.4B | $5.0B | $5.1B | $5.3B | $4.4B | $4.1B | $4.7B | $5.7B | $6.0B | $6.2B | $6.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $4.2B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $4.7B | $4.3B | $4.7B | $5.7B | $6.6B | $6.3B | $6.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $8.8B | $10.5B | $10.9B | $13.9B | $13.2B | $13.5B | $14.1B | $15.7B | $17.1B | $17.6B | $18.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $1.8B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.7B | $5.4B | $5.6B | $5.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 86.0M | 85.9M | 85.2M | 82.5M | 80.6M | 79.7M | 74.4M | 68.0M | 66.9M | 66.2M | 65.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $233.93 | $249.04 | $267.54 | $280.98 | $253.66 | $320.45 | $373.88 | $454.90 | $476.43 | $480.50 | $482.10 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.99 | $7.14 | $5.53 | $5.28 | $6.74 | $14.89 | $18.55 | $16.31 | $14.49 | $14.13 | $13.86 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.27 | $6.15 | $5.99 | $4.95 | $13.47 | $14.68 | $17.90 | $14.74 | $15.99 | $12.13 | $10.98 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.96 | $4.38 | $3.62 | $3.31 | $12.60 | $13.08 | $15.81 | $11.17 | $12.75 | $9.83 | $9.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.11 | $1.26 | $1.42 | $1.59 | $0.84 | $1.79 | $2.07 | $2.78 | $4.10 | $5.19 | $5.39 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.36 | $2.88 | $3.59 | $2.97 | $2.31 | $3.12 | $3.80 | $5.68 | $5.65 | $4.90 | $4.60 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $20.36 | $27.89 | $30.64 | $33.86 | $40.98 | $51.04 | $55.76 | $69.54 | $80.75 | $84.03 | $86.08 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.3%/yr | +13.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +15.7%/yr | −2.1%/yr |
| EPS | +15.1%/yr | +15.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +18.8%/yr | +43.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +8.5%/yr | +16.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +17.1%/yr | +15.4%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-0.2%
“Revenues New vehicle sales revenue decreased from 2024 to 2025 due to a $53.5 million decrease from net dealership dispositions, coupled with a $51.7 million, or 0.4%, decrease in same-store revenues.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $803M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $172M it takes just to hold its position. It put $152M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $651M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $935M | $969M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.2B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$172M | +$161M | +$144M | +$127M | +$122M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$30M | +$29M | +$28M | +$27M | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$163M | +$71M | −$135M | −$75M | −$17M |
| Cash from operations | $975M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.3B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$172M | −$161M | −$144M | −$127M | −$122M |
| Owner earnings | $803M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.2B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$152M | −$217M | −$242M | −$155M | −$127M |
| Free cash flow | $651M | $853M | $759M | $1.2B | $1.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 3% | 3% | 5% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $172M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $152M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer $773M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 28.4×ComfortableOperating income $1.3B ÷ interest expense $45M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 1.6× operating profitModest net debtCash $65M − debt $2.2B
What this means
Netting $65M of cash and short-term investments against $2.2B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 1.6× a year's operating profit (1.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 12 + DIO 66 − DPO 12 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 9%–20%; 12% latest = NOPAT $950M ÷ invested capital $7.7BIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 1%–5%; latest $803M = operating cash $975M − maintenance capex $172MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves $773M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $975M ÷ net income $935M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $503M ÷ Owner Earnings $803M
What this means
Of $803M Owner Earnings, $503M (63%) went back to shareholders, $344M dividends, $159M buybacks. Net of $30M stock comp, the real buyback was about $129M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.88×ExpandingCapex $325M ÷ depreciation $172M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $31.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.99×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.2B vs ($87M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +111%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $15.28/share (latest year $14.23), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $84.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 4% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 19%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2019 · 2.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Additionally, our AI-driven service scheduling and reception system at certain of our dealerships enhances the customer experience by providing instant support, reducing wait times, and offering 24/7 assistance, enabling seamless service even outside regular hours.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$84M
- Receivables$1.1B
- Inventory$4.9B
- Other current assets$259M
- Debt due within a year$423M
- Accounts payable$937M
- Other current liabilities$5.2B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $887M against the $355M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.5 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.7B, of which the leases are 54%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $9.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2.8B · 30%
- Dividends$1.6B · 17%
- Buybacks$2.2B · 23%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.8B · 30%
- Returned to owners$3.8B
47% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.6B as dividends and $2.2B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−23.5%
The diluted count fell from 86M to 66M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$5.19/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 19% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained12%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($4.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $518M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$41M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Penske | $7.0M | $26.8M | $1.2B |
| 2022 | Mr. Penske | $7.3M | $14.6M | $1.3B |
| 2023 | Mr. Penske | $7.4M | $21.8M | $1.0B |
| 2024 | Mr. Penske | $8.8M | $5.6M | $1.1B |
| 2025 | Mr. Penske | $8.8M | $10.0M | $803M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Penske Automotive is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Auto Dealers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LADLithia Motors | $37.6B | 15% | 4.3% | 12% | 1% |
| PAGPenske Automotive | $31.8B | 16% | 3.7% | 13% | 3% |
| ANAutoNation | $27.6B | 18% | 4.3% | 14% | 2% |
| KMXCarMax | $25.9B | 12% | 5.3% | 4% | 0% |
| GPIGroup 1 Automotive | $22.6B | 16% | 3.9% | 13% | 3% |
| CVNACarvana | $20.3B | 14% | -0.7% | -3% | -17% |
| MUSAMurphy USA | $19.4B | 90% | 3.6% | 20% | 3% |
| ABGAsbury Automotive Group Inc | $18.0B | 17% | 4.8% | 14% | 4% |
| Group median | — | 16% | 4.1% | 13% | 2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Penske Automotive has delivered.
Through the cycle, Penske Automotive earns about $917M on its 2.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $597M on 66M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net debt $2.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($303M) runs well above depreciation ($177M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $727M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← PACS its page in the Manual PAGP →
Industry order: ← ORLY the Auto Dealers & Services chapter R →