Owner Scorecard


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PAG, Penske Automotive

Penske runs franchised auto dealerships. It sells new and used vehicles — mostly passenger cars, and also commercial trucks — and earns alongside each sale by servicing and repairing the vehicles, selling parts, and arranging financing and insurance for buyers. The franchises that let it sell new vehicles are granted by the manufacturers whose brands it carries.

We offer over 40 vehicle brands with 71% of our retail automotive franchised dealership revenue generated from premium brands, such as Audi, BMW, Land Rover, Lexus, Mercedes-Benz, and Porsche, and 23% of revenue generated from volume non-U.S. brands such as Toyota and Honda in 2025.

As of December 31, 2025, we also operated 15 used vehicle dealerships, with six dealerships in the U.S. operating under the brand name CarShop, eight dealerships in the U.K. operating under the brand name Sytner Select, and one dealership in Australia operating under the brand name Penske Select.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PAG · Penske Automotive
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$31.8B
−0.2% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $31.7B 5-yr avg $29.6B
Gross margin 16% 5-yr avg 17%
Operating margin 3.9% 5-yr avg 4.7%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 16%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Retail Automotive (86%) and Retail Commercial Truck (11%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
A franchised dealer is mostly a pass-through: the manufacturers control the supply and much of the price of new vehicles and grant the franchises that permit the sale, so the test is whether the durable profit sits in the stickier, higher-margin work — servicing cars already on the road, parts, used vehicles, and finance and insurance — rather than the thin spread on a new car. Watch whether owning many dealership locations buys any real cost or purchasing advantage, and whether the returns clear the cost of the capital parked in inventory and real estate. The bad case is plain: a manufacturer that tightens its grip or stumbles, or a recession that empties the showroom, set against a balance sheet that carries debt. The figures for margin, return on capital, and leverage are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Retail Automotive is 86% of revenue, with Retail Commercial Truck the other meaningful segment at 11%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Retail Automotive86%$27.5B
  • Retail Commercial Truck11%$3.4B
  • Commercial vehicle distribution and other3%$923M
  • Other3%$923M
  • Non-Automotive Investments0%$0
By geographyUnited States62%United Kingdom26%Non-US and Non-UK12%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$20.1B$21.4B$22.8B$23.2B$20.4B$25.6B$27.8B$30.9B$31.9B$31.8B$31.7BRevenueRevenue
15%15%15%15%16%17%17%17%16%16%16%Gross marginGross mgn
11%12%12%12%12%12%12%11%12%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$575M$611M$665M$653M$705M$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.9%2.9%2.9%2.8%3.4%5.3%5.3%4.6%4.3%4.0%3.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$343M$613M$471M$436M$544M$1.2B$1.4B$1.1B$969M$935M$912MNet incomeNet inc.
32%22%26%23%26%26%25%25%26%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$371M$623M$614M$518M$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.1B$1.2B$975M$899MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$90M$95M$104M$110M$116M$122M$127M$144M$161M$172M$177MDepreciationDeprec.
($61M)($85M)$40M($27M)$542M($17M)($75M)($135M)$71M($163M)($220M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$203M$247M$306M$245M$186M$249M$283M$386M$378M$325M$303MCapexCapex
1.0%1.2%1.3%1.1%0.9%1.0%1.0%1.2%1.2%1.0%1.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$282M$528M$511M$409M$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.0B$1.1B$803M$723MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.4%2.5%2.2%1.8%5.3%4.6%4.8%3.2%3.4%2.5%2.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$168M$376M$309M$273M$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$759M$853M$651M$597MFree cash flowFCF
0.8%1.8%1.4%1.2%5.0%4.1%4.2%2.5%2.7%2.0%1.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$141M$450M$309M$327M$0$432M$393M$215M$786M$22M$691MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$95M$108M$121M$131M$68M$143M$154M$189M$274M$344M$355MDividends paidDiv. paid
$174M$19M$69M$169M$29M$281M$869M$359M$59M$159MBuybacksBuybacks
11%14%11%9%11%18%20%17%14%12%11%ROICROIC
20%26%18%16%16%29%33%23%18%17%16%Return on equityROE
14%21%13%11%14%26%30%19%13%11%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$24M$46M$39M$28M$50M$101M$107M$96M$84M$65M$84MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$879M$955M$929M$960M$807M$734M$907M$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1BReceivablesReceiv.
$3.4B$3.9B$4.0B$4.3B$3.4B$3.1B$3.5B$4.3B$4.7B$4.8B$4.9BInventoryInvent.
$497M$642M$598M$639M$675M$767M$854M$867M$859M$900M$937MAccounts payablePayables
$3.8B$4.3B$4.4B$4.6B$3.6B$3.1B$3.6B$4.5B$4.9B$5.0B$5.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$4.4B$5.0B$5.1B$5.3B$4.4B$4.1B$4.7B$5.7B$6.0B$6.2B$6.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$4.2B$5.0B$5.0B$5.5B$4.7B$4.3B$4.7B$5.7B$6.6B$6.3B$6.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.0×1.0×1.0×0.9×1.0×1.0×1.0×0.9×1.0×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.3B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$2.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.4B$2.4B$2.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$8.8B$10.5B$10.9B$13.9B$13.2B$13.5B$14.1B$15.7B$17.1B$17.6B$18.3BTotal assetsAssets
$1.9B$2.2B$2.2B$2.4B$1.7B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.9B$2.2B$2.6BTotal debtDebt
$1.9B$2.1B$2.2B$2.3B$1.6B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$2.1B$2.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.8B$2.4B$2.6B$2.8B$3.3B$4.1B$4.1B$4.7B$5.4B$5.6B$5.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
86.0M85.9M85.2M82.5M80.6M79.7M74.4M68.0M66.9M66.2M65.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$233.93$249.04$267.54$280.98$253.66$320.45$373.88$454.90$476.43$480.50$482.10Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.99$7.14$5.53$5.28$6.74$14.89$18.55$16.31$14.49$14.13$13.86EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.27$6.15$5.99$4.95$13.47$14.68$17.90$14.74$15.99$12.13$10.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.96$4.38$3.62$3.31$12.60$13.08$15.81$11.17$12.75$9.83$9.07Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.11$1.26$1.42$1.59$0.84$1.79$2.07$2.78$4.10$5.19$5.39Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.36$2.88$3.59$2.97$2.31$3.12$3.80$5.68$5.65$4.90$4.60Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$20.36$27.89$30.64$33.86$40.98$51.04$55.76$69.54$80.75$84.03$86.08Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.3%/yr+13.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+15.7%/yr−2.1%/yr
EPS+15.1%/yr+15.9%/yr
Dividends / share+18.8%/yr+43.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.5%/yr+16.3%/yr
Book value / share+17.1%/yr+15.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-0.2%
    “Revenues New vehicle sales revenue decreased from 2024 to 2025 due to a $53.5 million decrease from net dealership dispositions, coupled with a $51.7 million, or 0.4%, decrease in same-store revenues.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
66Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
12%low FY2019
Gross margin
16%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.6×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$803Mowner earningsvs.$935Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $803M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $172M it takes just to hold its position. It put $152M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $651M.

Reported net income$935M
Owner earnings$803M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$935M$969M$1.1B$1.4B$1.2B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$172M+$161M+$144M+$127M+$122M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$30M+$29M+$28M+$27M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$163M+$71M−$135M−$75M−$17M
Cash from operations$975M$1.2B$1.1B$1.5B$1.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$172M−$161M−$144M−$127M−$122M
Owner earnings$803M$1.1B$1.0B$1.3B$1.2B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$152M−$217M−$242M−$155M−$127M
Free cash flow$651M$853M$759M$1.2B$1.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%3%3%5%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $172M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $152M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer $773M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.3B ÷ interest expense $45M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 1.6× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $65M − debt $2.2B
    What this means

    Netting $65M of cash and short-term investments against $2.2B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 1.6× a year's operating profit (1.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 12 + DIO 66 − DPO 12 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 9%–20%; 12% latest = NOPAT $950M ÷ invested capital $7.7B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–5%; latest $803M = operating cash $975M − maintenance capex $172M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves $773M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $975M ÷ net income $935M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $503M ÷ Owner Earnings $803M
    What this means

    Of $803M Owner Earnings, $503M (63%) went back to shareholders, $344M dividends, $159M buybacks. Net of $30M stock comp, the real buyback was about $129M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.88×
    Expanding
    Capex $325M ÷ depreciation $172M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $31.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.99×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.2B vs ($87M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +111%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $15.28/share (latest year $14.23), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $84.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 4% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 19%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 2.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Additionally, our AI-driven service scheduling and reception system at certain of our dealerships enhances the customer experience by providing instant support, reducing wait times, and offering 24/7 assistance, enabling seamless service even outside regular hours.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$6.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$84M
  • Receivables$1.1B
  • Inventory$4.9B
  • Other current assets$259M
Current liabilities$6.6B
  • Debt due within a year$423M
  • Accounts payable$937M
  • Other current liabilities$5.2B
Current ratio0.96×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($235M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$423M due · $84M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($6.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.2B$2.5B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.7B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$299Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$355M
'27$92M
'28$939M
'29$525M
'30$117M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$355Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$447Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$939Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$2.0Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $2.2B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$84M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$803M
Together, against $355M due next year2.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $887M against the $355M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.5 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$274M
'27$263M
'28$260M
'29$252M
'30$246M
later$4.2B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$274Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$5.5Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$2.6Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.2B
Lease obligations (present value)$2.6B
Total fixed claims on the business$4.7B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.7B, of which the leases are 54%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.8B · 30%
  • Dividends$1.6B · 17%
  • Buybacks$2.2B · 23%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.8B · 30%
  • Returned to owners$3.8B

    47% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.6B as dividends and $2.2B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−23.5%

    The diluted count fell from 86M to 66M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$5.19/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 19% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained12%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($4.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $518M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$2.4B14% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity44%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.8B of capital spent building

$41M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Penske$7.0M$26.8M$1.2B
2022Mr. Penske$7.3M$14.6M$1.3B
2023Mr. Penske$7.4M$21.8M$1.0B
2024Mr. Penske$8.8M$5.6M$1.1B
2025Mr. Penske$8.8M$10.0M$803M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$30M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Penske Automotive is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LADLithia Motors$37.6B15%4.3%12%1%
PAGPenske Automotive$31.8B16%3.7%13%3%
ANAutoNation$27.6B18%4.3%14%2%
KMXCarMax$25.9B12%5.3%4%0%
GPIGroup 1 Automotive$22.6B16%3.9%13%3%
CVNACarvana$20.3B14%-0.7%-3%-17%
MUSAMurphy USA$19.4B90%3.6%20%3%
ABGAsbury Automotive Group Inc$18.0B17%4.8%14%4%
Group median16%4.1%13%2%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Penske Automotive has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Penske Automotive earns about $917M on its 2.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $597M on 66M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net debt $2.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($303M) runs well above depreciation ($177M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $727M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Penske Automotive (PAG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PAG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PACS its page in the Manual PAGP →

Industry order: ← ORLY the Auto Dealers & Services chapter R →