Owner Scorecard


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PAM, Pampa Energia S.A.

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityRevenue in runoff

Pampa Energia S.A. is the fifth-largest gas producer with 9% of the country's gas output and the third-largest shale gas producer with 10% market share.

CTEB, Transener and TGS are affiliates, which under IFRS are not consolidated in the financial statements. 1) Average 2025 production. 2) It includes 1.1 kbbl of crude oil produced in El Tordillo and La Tapera-Puesto Quiroga, assigned in October 2025. 3) It includes 848 MW at CTEB, co-operated by Pampa.

We are engaged in the oil and gas business through the exploration and exploitation of direct interests in blocks located in Argentina, with operations in 9 production blocks, 2 exploratory blocks and 470 productive wells.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · 1 ADS = 25 ordinary shares
PAM · Pampa Energia S.A.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$1.9B
+8.3% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.9B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Gross margin 32% 5-yr avg 36%
Operating margin 23.5% 5-yr avg 28.7%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Revenue in runoff. Revenue has shrunk about 2% a year across the record while operations still generate cash.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 24% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 17% to 43% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 23% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). By owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMDec 2024
Income statement
$2.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.1B$1.5B$1.8B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9BRevenueRevenue
28%42%39%38%38%36%32%32%Gross marginGross mgn
$368M$618M$462M$243M$579M$631M$424M$440M$440MOperating incomeOp. inc.
16.9%43.0%34.5%22.6%38.4%34.5%24.5%23.5%23.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$286M$224M$692M($367M)$273M$456M$302M$619M$619MNet incomeNet inc.
-10%22%21%51%34%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$439M$610M$802M$693M$729M$619M$575M$435M$435MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$205M$165M$186M$205M$205M$212M$267M$342M$342MDepreciationDeprec.
($52M)$221M($76M)$855M$251M($49M)$6M($526M)($526M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$485M$455M$426M$124M$206M$416M$758M$447M$447MCapexCapex
22.3%31.7%31.8%11.6%13.7%22.7%43.8%23.8%23.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($46M)$155M$376M$569M$523M$203M($183M)($12M)($12M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−2.1%10.8%28.1%53.0%34.7%11.1%−10.6%−0.6%−0.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($46M)$155M$376M$569M$523M$203M($183M)($12M)($12M)Free cash flowFCF
−2.1%10.8%28.1%53.0%34.7%11.1%−10.6%−0.6%−0.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$19M$75M$34M$9M$8M$1M$8MDividends paidDiv. paid
13%15%13%6%8%6%ROICROIC
15%16%36%-26%15%20%13%19%19%Return on equityROE
15%15%32%−28%15%20%13%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$31M$241M$225M$141M$110M$106M$171M$738M$738MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$703M$561M$341M$256M$305M$314M$341MReceivablesReceiv.
$113M$137M$153M$116M$155M$173M$205M$223M$223MInventoryInvent.
$657M$454M$116M$238M$253M$253MAccounts payablePayables
$113M$183M$260M$341M$411M$478M$281M($30M)$311MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.5B$1.4B$948M$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$2.4B$2.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.2B$854M$448M$342M$631M$521M$1.3B$1.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.6×2.1×3.3×2.1×2.6×1.8×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.7B$5.7B$5.7B$4.9B$3.9B$4.7B$4.7B$6.3B$6.3BTotal assetsAssets
$2.2B$1.9B$1.6B$1.4B$1.6B$1.4B$2.1B$2.1BTotal debtDebt
$1.9B$1.7B$1.5B$1.3B$1.5B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.6×3.4×2.5×1.4×3.1×2.9×1.2×2.4×2.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.0B$1.4B$1.9B$1.4B$1.8B$2.3B$2.4B$3.3B$3.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
0K0K2.70B2.36B2.11B2.07B2.05B2.04B2.08BShares out (diluted)Shares
$28431372.55$18410256.41$0.50$0.46$0.72$0.88$0.85$0.92$0.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3738562.09$2871794.87$0.26$-0.16$0.13$0.22$0.15$0.30$0.30EPS (diluted)EPS
$-601307.19$1987179.49$0.14$0.24$0.25$0.10$-0.09$-0.01$-0.01Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-601307.19$1987179.49$0.14$0.24$0.25$0.10$-0.09$-0.01$-0.01Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$243589.74$0.03$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6339869.28$5833333.33$0.16$0.05$0.10$0.20$0.37$0.22$0.21Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$25738562.09$17512820.51$0.71$0.61$0.85$1.10$1.17$1.61$1.58Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×34596153.85 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−91.5%/yr+13.1%/yr
EPS−90.3%/yr+3.4%/yr
Dividends / share−98.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−91.4%/yr+6.8%/yr
Book value / share−90.6%/yr+17.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.4Bpeak FY2019
ROIC
8%low FY2023
Gross margin
32%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.4×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($12M)owner earningsvs.$619Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business reported $619M of profit but ($12M) of owner earnings: $631M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$619M$302M$456M$273M($367M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$342M+$267M+$212M+$205M+$205M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$526M+$6M−$49M+$251M+$855M
Cash from operations$435M$575M$619M$729M$693M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$447M−$758M−$416M−$206M−$124M
Owner earnings($12M)($183M)$203M$523M$569M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-1%-11%11%35%53%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Much of fiscal 2024's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $440M ÷ interest expense $185M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 3.0× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $738M − debt $2.1B
    What this means

    Netting $738M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 3.0× a year's operating profit (4.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 66 + DIO 64 − DPO 72 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    5-yr median, range 6%–15%; 6% latest = NOPAT $291M ÷ invested capital $4.6B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -11%–53%; latest ($12M) = operating cash $435M − maintenance capex $447M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 8 years.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $435M ÷ net income $619M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.31×
    Expanding
    Capex $447M ÷ depreciation $342M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.83×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs $1.1B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +15%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $337500.00/share (latest year $455147.06), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2416176.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 31% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 31% early to 27% lately, median 24% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2017 · 16.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 6 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$738M
  • Receivables$341M
  • Inventory$223M
  • Other current assets$1.1B
Current liabilities$1.3B
  • Debt due within a year$706M
  • Accounts payable$253M
  • Other current liabilities$343M
Current ratio1.83×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.57×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$706M due · $738M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2024 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($670M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.1B$15M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2024

Over the record, the business generated $4.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$3.3B · 68%
  • Dividends$146M · 3%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.4B · 29%
  • Returned to owners$146M

    9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $146M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count2719203186.3%

    The diluted count rose from 0M to 2080M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $159M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Pampa Energia S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2024.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.0% vs 12.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.2% early in the record and −0.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?2719203186.3%

    Diluted shares grew 2719203186.3% over 2017–2024. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?5% → 12% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $113M to $223M while revenue grew −14%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (5% of revenue then, 12% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OGEOGE Energy$3.2B61%23.5%6%15%
HEHawaiian Electric Industries Inc.$3.1B11.9%6%7%
TLNTalen Energy Corporation$2.6B3.5%2%4%
BKHBlack Hills$2.3B23.0%6%17%
PNMPNM Resources$2.1B18.3%5%11%
PAMPampa Energia S.A.$1.9B38%29.5%13%11%
CWENClearway Energy Inc.$1.4B67%21.6%2%36%
OTTROtter Tail$1.3B18.8%10%13%
Group median61%20.2%6%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing 25 shares of common”; Pampa Energia S.A. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Pampa Energia S.A. has delivered.

Pampa Energia S.A.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Pampa Energia S.A. earns about $205M on its 10.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($12M) on 0M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $1.3B. The if-converted diluted count is 83M, 152955085% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Pampa Energia S.A. (PAM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PAM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PAGS its page in the Manual PAX →

Industry order: ← OTTR the Electric Utilities chapter PNM →