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PAR, PAR Technology Corporation

Technology Hardware consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

PAR is a leading foodservice technology company providing omnichannel cloud-based software and hardware solutions to the restaurant industry in three major restaurant categories quick service, fast casual, and table service and to the retail industry, including convenience and fuel retailers.

Our product and service offerings include point-of-sale, customer engagement and loyalty, digital ordering and delivery, operational intelligence, payment processing, hardware, and related technologies, solutions, and services.

Our omnichannel solutions are used in more than 150,000 active restaurants and retail locations across the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PAR · PAR Technology Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$456M

+30.2% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $476M 5-yr avg $325M

Gross margin 43% 5-yr avg 34%

Operating margin −14.1% 5-yr avg −21.8%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg −7%

Owner-earnings margin −6% 5-yr avg −12%

Free cash flow margin −6% 5-yr avg −12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Subscription service (64%), Hardware (23%) and Professional service (13%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 80% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 9 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −15% through the cycle on a 22% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 5.1% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Subscription service is 64% of revenue, with Hardware the other meaningful line at 23%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Subscription service64%$291M
Hardware23%$106M
Professional service13%$58M

By geographyUnited States83%International17%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$233M	$201M	$187M	$214M	$283M	$262M	$277M	$350M	$456M	$476M	RevenueRevenue
22%	19%	20%	18%	22%	31%	32%	42%	43%	43%	Gross marginGross mgn
16%	18%	20%	22%	30%	39%	26%	31%	27%	26%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%	6%	7%	9%	12%	19%	21%	19%	18%	18%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($121K)	($10M)	($14M)	($24M)	($54M)	($69M)	($72M)	($79M)	($69M)	($67M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−0.1%	−5.1%	−7.6%	−11.2%	−19.0%	−26.3%	−25.9%	−22.6%	−15.1%	−14.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($3M)	($24M)	($16M)	($37M)	($76M)	($69M)	($70M)	($5M)	($84M)	($76M)	Net incomeNet inc.
										Cash flow & returns
$314K	($4M)	($16M)	($20M)	($53M)	($43M)	($17M)	($25M)	($27M)	($27M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4M	$5M	$5M	$10M	$21M	$26M	$27M	$38M	$49M	$49M	DepreciationDeprec.
($984K)	$15M	($8M)	$2M	($13M)	($13M)	$11M	($83M)	($22M)	($30M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$5M	$4M	$2M	$1M	$1M	$1M	$5M	$970K	$3M	$3M	CapexCapex
2.2%	2.0%	1.3%	0.6%	0.5%	0.4%	1.8%	0.3%	0.7%	0.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($4M)	($8M)	($19M)	($22M)	($55M)	($44M)	($22M)	($26M)	($30M)	($30M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−1.6%	−3.9%	−9.9%	−10.1%	−19.3%	−16.9%	−8.0%	−7.5%	−6.7%	−6.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($5M)	($8M)	($19M)	($22M)	($55M)	($44M)	($22M)	($26M)	($30M)	($30M)	Free cash flowFCF
−2.0%	−3.9%	−9.9%	−10.1%	−19.3%	−16.9%	−8.0%	−7.5%	−6.7%	−6.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$0	$20M	$0	$375M	$19M	$2M	$309M	$4M	$275K	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$544K	$297K	$5M	$3M	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-0%	-19%	-10%	-17%	-7%	-8%	-8%	-6%	-5%	-5%	ROICROIC
-5%	-53%	-21%	-19%	-15%	-18%	-21%	-1%	-10%	-9%	Return on equityROE
−5%	−53%	−21%	−19%	−15%	−18%	−21%	−1%	−10%	−9%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$7M	$3M	$28M	$181M	$188M	$111M	$74M	$109M	$80M	$78M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$30M	$26M	$42M	$43M	$50M	$60M	$43M	$60M	$82M	$88M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$22M	$23M	$19M	$22M	$35M	$38M	$24M	$22M	$27M	$31M	InventoryInvent.
$14M	$13M	$16M	$13M	$21M	$23M	$26M	$35M	$39M	$37M	Accounts payablePayables
$37M	$36M	$45M	$52M	$64M	$74M	$41M	$47M	$70M	$82M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$63M	$56M	$94M	$249M	$283M	$224M	$181M	$218M	$233M	$240M	Current assetsCur. assets
$36M	$41M	$42M	$40M	$61M	$68M	$80M	$112M	$141M	$114M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.4×	2.2×	6.2×	4.7×	3.3×	2.3×	1.9×	1.7×	2.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$11M	$11M	$41M	$41M	$457M	$486M	$489M	$887M	$898M	$897M	GoodwillGoodwill
$115M	$95M	$190M	$344M	$888M	$855M	$803M	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	Total assetsAssets
$400K	$0	$63M	$107M	$307M	$389M	$378M	$368M	$394M	$425M	Total debtDebt
($6M)	($3M)	$35M	($74M)	$118M	$279M	$303M	$260M	$314M	$347M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$69M	$46M	$73M	$188M	$504M	$375M	$333M	$872M	$825M	$826M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.5%	1.4%	2.0%	5.2%	5.1%	5.2%	7.0%	6.7%	6.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
15.9M	16.0M	16.2M	19.0M	25.1M	27.2M	27.6M	34.2M	40.5M	41.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$14.58	$12.55	$11.54	$11.24	$11.28	$9.66	$10.04	$10.25	$11.26	$11.60	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.21	$-1.50	$-0.96	$-1.92	$-3.02	$-2.55	$-2.53	$-0.15	$-2.09	$-1.86	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.23	$-0.49	$-1.15	$-1.13	$-2.18	$-1.63	$-0.80	$-0.77	$-0.75	$-0.73	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.30	$-0.49	$-1.15	$-1.13	$-2.18	$-1.63	$-0.80	$-0.77	$-0.75	$-0.73	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.32	$0.25	$0.15	$0.07	$0.06	$0.04	$0.18	$0.03	$0.08	$0.08	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.33	$2.86	$4.49	$9.91	$20.10	$13.82	$12.09	$25.52	$20.39	$20.16	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−3.2%/yr	+0.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−15.6%/yr	+3.7%/yr
Book value / share	+21.4%/yr	+15.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Subscription service+40.4%
“Subscription service margin as a percentage of subscription service revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025, increased to 54.7% as compared to 53.5% for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was substantially driven by operating efficiencies in hosting and customer support costs relative to the growth in subscription service revenues for both Engagement Cloud and Operator Cloud, as well as improved margin contributions stemming from post-acquisition operations of the Delaget product line and the inclusion of approximately…”
✓ direction matches the filed record
Hardware+22.3%
“Hardware revenues were $106.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, an increase of $19.4 million or 22.3% compared to $87.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was substantially driven by increased revenues from sales of peripherals (scanners, printers, and components) of $5.0 million, terminals of $4.9 million, kiosks of $2.4 million, kitchen display systems of $2.1 million, and an increase in international sales of $3.4 million.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

40Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−5%low FY2018

Gross margin

43%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($30M)owner earningsvs.($84M)net incomelow FY2021

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $84M loss into ($30M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($84M)	($5M)	($70M)	($69M)	($76M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$49M	+$38M	+$27M	+$26M	+$21M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$31M	+$24M	+$14M	+$13M	+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$22M	−$83M	+$11M	−$13M	−$13M
Cash from operations	($27M)	($25M)	($17M)	($43M)	($53M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$3M	−$970K	−$5M	−$1M	−$1M
Owner earnings	($30M)	($26M)	($22M)	($44M)	($55M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-7%	-7%	-8%	-17%	-19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $31M), owner earnings is nearer ($61M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -223.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($69M) ÷ interest expense $308K

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $314M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $80M + ST investments $579K − debt $394M

What this means
Netting $80M of cash and short-term investments against $394M of debt leaves $314M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 49d

Tight

DSO 65 + DIO 39 − DPO 56 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -8%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -19%–-0%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($54M) ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -8%

Consumes cash through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -19%–-2%; latest ($30M) = operating cash ($27M) − maintenance capex $3M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -7% of revenue this year, a -8% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $31M of SBC) leaves ($61M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($27M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($84M) · cash from operations ($27M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.07×

Harvesting

Capex $3M ÷ depreciation $49M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $456M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.66×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $394M vs $92M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.29/share (latest year $-2.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −4% → −21% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −4% early to −21% lately, median −15% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −6%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2022 · −26.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“However, several factors can affect our ability to successfully compete, including rapid adoption of new technologies such as AI in product development and as a component of products and services, the constant introduction of new product and service offerings, and aggressive pricing strategies.…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$240M

Cash & short-term investments$78M
Receivables$88M
Inventory$31M
Other current assets$43M

Current liabilities$114M

Debt due within a year$3M
Accounts payable$37M
Other current liabilities$74M

Current ratio2.10×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.83×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.68×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$126Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $78M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway2.6 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.1× → 2.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($290M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($325M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$434M$9M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$34Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.1B80% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$729Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $25M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Savneet Singh	$1.1M	$1.9M	($55M)
2022	Savneet Singh	$2.2M	−$7.8M	($44M)
2023	Savneet Singh	$9.7M	$15.2M	($22M)
2024	Savneet Singh	$15.4M	$30.9M	($26M)
2025	Savneet Singh	$14.2M	−$8.6M	($30M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio156:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$31M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why PAR Technology Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$400K → $425M
Debt rose from $400K to $425M while owner earnings went from about ($10M) to ($26M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$100M · 21% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“Aggregate sales of hardware, subscription services, and professional services to the one customer and their respective franchisees accounted for 21% of our consolidated revenues for the year ended December 31, 2025.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Technology Hardware

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OMCLOmnicell	$1.2B	46%	2.3%	2%	11%
EXTRExtreme Networks Inc.	$1.1B	56%	-0.2%	-0%	8%
NTGRNETGEAR Inc.	$700M	30%	3.1%	4%	3%
PARPAR Technology Corporation	$456M	22%	-15.1%	-8%	-8%
DGIIDigi International Inc.	$430M	53%	6.7%	5%	11%
ATENA10 Networks Inc.	$291M	78%	10.6%	38%	16%
QMCOQuantum Corporation	$280M	41%	-2.6%	—	-4%
MITKMitek Systems Inc.	$180M	—	7.3%	4%	20%
Group median	—	46%	2.7%	4%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

PAR Technology Corporation is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered14%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−6%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh PAR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PAR Technology Corporation (PAR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PAR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PANW its page in the Manual PARA →

Industry order: ← PANW the Technology Hardware chapter PSTG →