Share count
581Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← PAX Manual PBK → ← PAGP Pipelines & Midstream SMC →
PBA, PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION
Pipelines & Midstream capital-intensive
Revenue is Marketing & New Ventures (52%), Pipelines (43%) and Facilities (5%).
Strategy Pembina will build on its strengths by continuing to invest in and grow the core businesses that provide critical transportation and midstream services to help ensure reliable and secure energy supply.
Pembina will capitalize on exciting opportunities to leverage its assets and expertise into new service offerings that enable the transition to a lower-carbon economy.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
C$7.8B
+5.3% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue C$7.8B 5-yr avg C$8.3B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 32% and operating margin about 27% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.1% to 42% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Marketing & New Ventures at 52%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Marketing & New Ventures52%C$4.1B
- Pipelines43%C$3.3B
- Facilities5%C$357M
- Corporate1%C$46M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| C$4.3B | C$5.4B | C$7.4B | C$6.4B | C$6.0B | C$8.6B | C$11.6B | C$6.3B | C$7.4B | C$7.8B | C$7.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| 25% | 26% | — | 32% | 35% | 29% | — | — | 40% | 38% | 38% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| C$808M | C$1.2B | C$2.0B | C$1.8B | C$4M | C$2.1B | C$3.7B | C$2.7B | C$2.3B | C$2.8B | C$2.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 18.9% | 22.4% | 27.5% | 28.7% | 0.1% | 24.5% | 31.9% | 41.9% | 30.9% | 36.1% | 36.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| C$466M | C$116M | C$411M | C$370M | (C$316M) | C$1.2B | C$3.0B | C$1.8B | C$1.9B | C$1.7B | C$1.7B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 29% | 55% | 53% | 9% | — | 25% | 8% | 19% | -9% | 23% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| C$1.1B | C$1.5B | C$2.3B | C$2.5B | C$2.3B | C$2.6B | C$2.9B | C$2.6B | C$3.2B | C$3.3B | C$3.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| C$293M | C$382M | C$417M | C$507M | C$700M | C$723M | C$683M | C$663M | C$862M | C$987M | C$987M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| C$318M | C$1.0B | C$1.4B | C$1.7B | C$1.9B | C$685M | (C$725M) | C$196M | C$488M | C$620M | C$620M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| C$1.7B | C$1.8B | C$1.2B | C$1.6B | C$1.0B | C$658M | C$605M | C$606M | C$955M | C$784M | C$784M | CapexCapex |
| 40.9% | 34.1% | 16.7% | 25.8% | 17.3% | 7.6% | 5.2% | 9.6% | 12.9% | 10.1% | 10.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| C$784M | C$1.1B | C$1.8B | C$2.0B | C$1.6B | C$2.0B | C$2.3B | C$2.0B | C$2.3B | C$2.5B | C$2.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 18.4% | 20.9% | 25.0% | 31.8% | 26.1% | 23.1% | 20.0% | 32.0% | 30.6% | 32.4% | 32.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (C$668M) | (C$326M) | C$1.0B | C$887M | C$1.2B | C$2.0B | C$2.3B | C$2.0B | C$2.3B | C$2.5B | C$2.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −15.7% | −6.0% | 14.0% | 13.9% | 20.5% | 23.1% | 20.0% | 32.0% | 30.6% | 32.4% | 32.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| C$351M | C$781M | C$1.2B | C$1.3B | C$1.5B | — | — | — | — | — | C$1.5B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | C$0 | C$17M | C$333M | C$50M | C$0 | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | — | — | — | — | 7% | 14% | 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| 6% | 1% | 3% | 3% | -2% | 9% | 19% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 1% | −5% | −6% | −7% | −12% | — | — | — | — | — | 1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| C$35M | C$321M | C$157M | C$129M | C$81M | C$43M | C$107M | C$151M | C$141M | C$106M | C$106M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| C$451M | C$529M | C$604M | C$605M | C$662M | C$812M | C$912M | C$852M | C$1.0B | C$836M | C$836M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| C$181M | C$168M | C$198M | C$198M | C$221M | C$376M | C$269M | C$333M | C$301M | C$284M | C$284M | InventoryInvent. |
| C$638M | C$677M | C$803M | C$796M | C$780M | C$1.1B | C$1.3B | C$1.2B | C$1.2B | C$1.3B | C$1.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| (C$6M) | C$20M | (C$1M) | C$7M | C$103M | C$125M | (C$85M) | C$31M | C$104M | (C$201M) | (C$201M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| C$676M | C$1.0B | C$1.0B | C$1.0B | C$989M | C$1.2B | C$1.4B | C$2.6B | C$1.6B | C$1.3B | C$1.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| C$778M | C$1.1B | C$1.5B | C$1.5B | C$1.8B | C$2.4B | C$2.1B | C$3.2B | C$2.9B | C$2.1B | C$2.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.9× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| C$2.1B | C$3.9B | C$3.9B | C$4.7B | C$4.7B | C$4.7B | C$4.6B | C$4.6B | C$5.0B | C$5.0B | C$5.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| C$15.0B | C$25.6B | C$26.7B | C$26.8B | C$31.4B | C$31.5B | C$31.5B | C$32.6B | C$36.0B | C$35.6B | C$35.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| C$4.0B | C$7.3B | C$7.1B | C$7.0B | C$10.3B | C$9.6B | C$9.4B | C$9.3B | C$10.5B | C$11.1B | C$11.1B | Total debtDebt |
| C$4.0B | C$7.0B | C$6.9B | C$6.9B | C$10.2B | C$9.6B | C$9.3B | C$9.1B | C$10.4B | C$11.0B | C$11.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 5.3× | 6.5× | 7.2× | 6.3× | 0.0× | 4.7× | 7.6× | 5.7× | 4.1× | 4.7× | 4.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| C$8.3B | C$13.8B | C$14.3B | C$14.4B | C$15.0B | C$14.3B | C$15.7B | C$15.8B | C$17.5B | C$16.8B | C$15.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 388M | 426M | 505M | 512M | 550M | 550M | 553M | 550M | 573M | 581M | 581M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| C$10.99 | C$12.68 | C$14.56 | C$12.45 | C$10.82 | C$15.69 | C$21.00 | C$11.51 | C$12.89 | C$13.39 | C$13.39 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| C$1.20 | C$0.27 | C$0.81 | C$0.72 | C$-0.57 | C$2.26 | C$5.37 | C$3.23 | C$3.25 | C$2.92 | C$2.92 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| C$2.02 | C$2.65 | C$3.64 | C$3.96 | C$2.82 | C$3.62 | C$4.20 | C$3.69 | C$3.94 | C$4.33 | C$4.33 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| C$-1.72 | C$-0.77 | C$2.04 | C$1.73 | C$2.22 | C$3.62 | C$4.20 | C$3.69 | C$3.94 | C$4.33 | C$4.33 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| C$0.90 | C$1.83 | C$2.47 | C$2.58 | C$2.78 | — | — | — | — | — | C$2.63 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| C$4.50 | C$4.32 | C$2.43 | C$3.21 | C$1.87 | C$1.20 | C$1.09 | C$1.10 | C$1.67 | C$1.35 | C$1.35 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| C$21.38 | C$32.35 | C$28.40 | C$28.22 | C$27.19 | C$26.01 | C$28.44 | C$28.75 | C$30.56 | C$28.87 | C$27.22 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.2%/yr | +4.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +8.8%/yr | +9.0%/yr |
| EPS | +10.4%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +32.4%/yr (4-yr) | +32.4%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −12.5%/yr | −6.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.4%/yr | +1.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
8%low FY2016
Gross margin
38%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.4×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
C$2.5Bowner earningsvs.C$1.7Bnet incomelow FY2016
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned C$1.7B of profit into C$2.5B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | C$1.7B | C$1.9B | C$1.8B | C$3.0B | C$1.2B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +C$987M | +C$862M | +C$663M | +C$683M | +C$723M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +C$620M | +C$488M | +C$196M | −C$725M | +C$685M |
| Cash from operations | C$3.3B | C$3.2B | C$2.6B | C$2.9B | C$2.6B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −C$784M | −C$955M | −C$606M | −C$605M | −C$658M |
| Owner earnings | C$2.5B | C$2.3B | C$2.0B | C$2.3B | C$2.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 32% | 31% | 32% | 20% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income C$2.8B ÷ interest expense C$602M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? C$11.0B · 3.9× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash C$106M − debt C$11.1B
What this means
Netting C$106M of cash and short-term investments against C$11.1B of debt leaves C$11.0B owed, about 3.9× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 39 + DIO 22 − DPO 101 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range 5%–14%; 8% latest = NOPAT C$2.2B ÷ invested capital C$26.8BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 18%–32%; latest C$2.5B = operating cash C$3.3B − maintenance capex C$784MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 25% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops C$3.3B ÷ net income C$1.7B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks C$1.5B ÷ Owner Earnings C$2.5B
What this means
Of C$2.5B Owner Earnings, C$1.5B (61%) went back to shareholders, C$1.5B dividends, C$0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.79×HarvestingCapex C$784M ÷ depreciation C$987M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · C$7.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.61×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · C$11.1B vs (C$806M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +437%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are C$3.06/share (latest year C$2.92), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is C$27.21/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 23% → 36% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 23% early to 36% lately, median 27% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 17%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +11%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · 0.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +4.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Artificial Intelligence Pembina's infrastructure, technologies and data may integrate the use of artificial intelligence ("AI"), which presents certain risks, challenges and unintended consequences that could impact Pembina's business and operations.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsC$1.3B
- Cash & short-term investmentsC$106M
- ReceivablesC$836M
- InventoryC$284M
- Other current assetsC$33M
Current liabilitiesC$2.1B
- Accounts payableC$1.3B
- Other current liabilitiesC$744M
Current ratio0.61×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.47×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(C$806M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueC$9.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(C$17.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesC$11.7BC$622M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueC$39Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated C$24.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedC$11.1B · 46%
- DividendsC$5.2B · 21%
- BuybacksC$400M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)C$7.6B · 31%
- Returned to ownersC$5.6B
31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, C$5.2B as dividends and C$400M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose C$7.1B and cash and short-term investments rose C$71M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran C$400M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count49.7%
The diluted count rose from 388M to 581M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend recordC$2.78/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 32% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained20%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (C$5.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew C$1.0B, so each retained C$1 added about 0.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?49.7%
Diluted shares grew 49.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent C$400M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?C$4.0B → C$11.1B
Debt rose from C$4.0B to C$11.1B while owner earnings went from about C$1.3B to C$2.3B — about 3.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈C$778M · 10% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“As of December 31, 2025, one customer accounted for more than 10 percent of Pembina's revenue.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Pipelines & Midstream
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OVVOvintiv | $8.7B | — | 17.7% | 12% | 17% |
| PBAPEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION | C$7.8B | 32% | 28.1% | 8% | 26% |
| PARRPar Pacific Holdings | $7.5B | 78% | 2.6% | 11% | 1% |
| PTENPatterson-UTI Energy | $4.8B | — | -14.6% | -8% | 9% |
| LBRTLiberty Energy | $4.0B | 22% | 7.1% | 2% | 4% |
| RIGTransocean Ltd (Switzerland) | $4.0B | 37% | -13.7% | -2% | 9% |
| HPHelmerich & Payne | $3.7B | — | 0.7% | -1% | 4% |
| NENoble Corporation plc A | $3.3B | — | 16.2% | 7% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 35% | 4.8% | 5% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION's US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at CAD 1 = $0.712 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CAD.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION has delivered.
PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION earns about $1.4B on its 25.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 32.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2018+14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.8B on 581M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $7.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION (PBA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PBA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← PAX its page in the Manual PBK →
Industry order: ← PAGP the Pipelines & Midstream chapter SMC →