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HES, Hess Corporation

Refining & Marketing capital-intensive Cyclical

An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K

HES · Hess Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024

$12.9B

+22.7% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $12.5B 5-yr avg $9.4B

Operating margin 28.8% 5-yr avg 4.2%

ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 29% 5-yr avg 13%

Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 2.6% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −107% and 33% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 36% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2015’15	2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	TTMTTMMar 2025
											Income statement
$6.6B	$4.8B	$5.4B	$6.5B	$6.5B	$4.1B	$7.7B	$11.9B	$10.5B	$12.9B	$12.5B	RevenueRevenue
8%	9%	8%	7%	6%	9%	4%	4%	5%	4%	5%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($4.3B)	($3.9B)	($5.8B)	$212M	$167M	($3.6B)	$1.6B	$3.8B	$2.3B	$4.2B	$3.6B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−64.9%	−79.6%	−107.2%	3.3%	2.6%	−87.0%	20.7%	32.4%	22.2%	32.8%	28.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($3.1B)	($6.1B)	($4.1B)	($282M)	($408M)	($3.1B)	$559M	$2.1B	$1.4B	$2.8B	$2.2B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	—	52%	34%	35%	30%	33%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$2.0B	$795M	$945M	$1.9B	$1.6B	$1.3B	$2.9B	$3.9B	$3.9B	$5.6B	$6.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4.0B	$3.2B	$2.9B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.5B	$2.5B	DepreciationDeprec.
$985M	$3.6B	$2.0B	$266M	($157M)	$2.3B	$726M	$62M	$427M	$244M	$1.2B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4.0B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.4B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$2.5B	$3.9B	$4.6B	$4.7B	CapexCapex
60.2%	40.8%	33.2%	28.7%	37.7%	46.3%	20.6%	21.0%	37.0%	36.0%	37.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($2.0B)	($1.2B)	($843M)	$85M	($791M)	($563M)	$1.3B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$3.1B	$3.6B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−30.0%	−24.4%	−15.6%	1.3%	−12.3%	−13.8%	17.0%	18.9%	18.0%	24.1%	28.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($2.0B)	($1.2B)	($843M)	$85M	($791M)	($563M)	$1.3B	$1.5B	$58M	$960M	$1.4B	Free cash flowFCF
−30.0%	−24.4%	−15.6%	1.3%	−12.3%	−13.8%	17.0%	12.3%	0.6%	7.4%	11.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$287M	$350M	$363M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$363M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$142M	$0	$110M	$1.4B	$25M	$0	$0	$630M	$20M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-14%	-16%	-35%	1%	1%	-24%	7%	18%	10%	16%	13%	ROICROIC
-16%	-42%	-37%	-3%	-5%	-58%	9%	27%	15%	25%	19%	Return on equityROE
−17%	−45%	−40%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2.7B	$2.7B	$4.8B	$2.7B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$2.7B	$2.5B	$1.7B	$1.2B	$1.3B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$847M	$940M	$957M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$784M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$399M	$323M	$232M	$245M	$261M	$378M	$223M	$217M	$304M	$419M	$472M	InventoryInvent.
$457M	$433M	$435M	$495M	$411M	$200M	$220M	$285M	$402M	$417M	$437M	Accounts payablePayables
$789M	$830M	$754M	($250M)	($150M)	$178M	$3M	($68M)	($98M)	$2M	$819M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$4.4B	$4.3B	$6.2B	$4.5B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$4.3B	$3.9B	$3.4B	$3.2B	$3.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.6B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$1.6B	$3.1B	$2.4B	$3.3B	$2.8B	$2.9B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.9×	2.5×	2.0×	1.3×	1.9×	1.4×	1.6×	1.0×	1.1×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$375M	$375M	$360M	$360M	$360M	$360M	$360M	$360M	$360M	$360M	$360M	GoodwillGoodwill
$34.2B	$28.6B	$23.1B	$21.4B	$21.8B	$18.8B	$20.5B	$21.7B	$24.0B	$26.6B	$27.1B	Total assetsAssets
$6.6B	$6.8B	$7.0B	$6.7B	$7.1B	$8.3B	$8.5B	$8.3B	$8.6B	$8.6B	$8.7B	Total debtDebt
$3.9B	$4.1B	$2.1B	$4.0B	$5.6B	$6.6B	$5.7B	$5.8B	$6.9B	$7.4B	$7.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-12.5×	-11.4×	-17.8×	0.5×	0.4×	-7.6×	3.3×	7.8×	4.9×	10.3×	9.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$19.4B	$14.5B	$11.1B	$9.6B	$8.7B	$5.4B	$6.3B	$7.9B	$9.0B	$11.2B	$11.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%	1.5%	1.6%	1.1%	1.3%	1.9%	1.0%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
284M	310M	314M	298M	301M	305M	309M	310M	308M	308M	309M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$23.13	$15.61	$17.16	$21.66	$21.43	$13.43	$24.84	$38.32	$34.17	$41.83	$40.50	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-10.78	$-19.79	$-12.97	$-0.95	$-1.35	$-10.15	$1.81	$6.77	$4.49	$8.98	$7.22	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-6.95	$-3.80	$-2.68	$0.29	$-2.63	$-1.85	$4.22	$7.24	$6.16	$10.10	$11.56	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-6.95	$-3.80	$-2.68	$0.29	$-2.63	$-1.85	$4.22	$4.71	$0.19	$3.11	$4.58	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.01	$1.13	$1.16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1.18	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$13.94	$6.37	$5.69	$6.22	$8.08	$6.22	$5.12	$8.03	$12.63	$15.05	$15.24	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$68.36	$46.90	$35.18	$32.29	$28.99	$17.60	$20.37	$25.37	$29.21	$36.38	$37.33	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.8%/yr	+14.3%/yr
Dividends / share	+6.9%/yr (2-yr)	+6.9%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share	+0.9%/yr	+13.3%/yr
Book value / share	−6.8%/yr	+4.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

308Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

16%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.4×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.1Bowner earningsvs.$2.8Bnet incomelow FY2015

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2015FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2024cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business earned $3.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.2B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $960M.

Reported net income$2.8B

Owner earnings$3.1B · 24% of revenue

	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020
Reported net income	$2.8B	$1.4B	$2.1B	$559M	($3.1B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2.5B	+$2.0B	+$1.7B	+$1.5B	+$2.1B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$100M	+$87M	+$83M	+$77M	+$79M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$244M	+$427M	+$62M	+$726M	+$2.3B
Cash from operations	$5.6B	$3.9B	$3.9B	$2.9B	$1.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$2.5B	−$2.0B	−$1.7B	−$1.6B	−$1.9B
Owner earnings	$3.1B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$1.3B	($563M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$2.2B	−$1.8B	−$784M	—	—
Free cash flow	$960M	$58M	$1.5B	$1.3B	($563M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	24%	18%	19%	17%	-14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.2B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $100M), owner earnings is nearer $3.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 10.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $4.2B ÷ interest expense $412M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.4B · 1.8× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $1.2B − debt $8.6B

What this means
Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $8.6B of debt leaves $7.4B owed, about 1.8× a year's operating profit (2.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 1%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -35%–18%; 16% latest = NOPAT $3.0B ÷ invested capital $18.6B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 24%

High, recently turned positive

latest $3.1B = operating cash $5.6B − maintenance capex $2.5B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -12%)

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a -12% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.2B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $960M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $100M of SBC) leaves $3.0B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.02×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $5.6B ÷ net income $2.8B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 12%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $363M ÷ Owner Earnings $3.1B

What this means
Of $3.1B Owner Earnings, $363M (12%) went back to shareholders, $363M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.87×

Expanding

Capex $4.6B ÷ depreciation $2.5B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.12×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $8.6B vs $347M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.73/share (latest year $8.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −84% → 29% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −84% early to 29% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2017 · −107.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.9%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.1B

Cash & short-term investments$1.3B
Receivables$784M
Inventory$472M
Other current assets$496M

Current liabilities$2.9B

Debt due within a year$25M
Accounts payable$437M
Other current liabilities$2.4B

Current ratio1.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.91×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.46×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$226Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$25M due · $1.3B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2025 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−12.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$11.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($11.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$9.3B$668M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2024

Over the record, the business generated $25.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$26.5B · 106%
Dividends$1.0B · 4%
Buybacks$2.3B · 9%

Returned to owners$3.3B
100% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.0B as dividends and $2.3B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$4.8B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $4.8B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $6.6B to $8.7B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $1.4B.
Average price paid for buybacks$64.85
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 35M shares were bought for $2.2B, about $64.85 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $42.31 (2017) to $116.67 (2022); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $54.17 ($1.4B).
Net change in share count8.8%
The diluted count rose from 284M to 309M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.16/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$360M1% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity3%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $26.5B of capital spent building

$1.5B written down across 1 year (2015): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2020	John Hess	$11.1M	$4.9M	($563M)
2021	John Hess	$12.4M	$19.4M	$1.3B
2022	John Hess	$14.0M	$53.3M	$2.2B
2023	John Hess	$16.8M	$17.1M	$1.9B
2024	John Hess	$18.0M	$15.3M	$3.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$100M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Hess Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.8%
Diluted shares grew 8.8% over 2015–2024, even as the company spent $2.3B on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$6.6B → $8.7B
Debt rose from $6.6B to $8.7B while owner earnings went from about ($1.3B) to $2.4B: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
COPConocoPhillips	$51.8B	57%	29.3%	13%	14%
PBFPBF Energy	$29.3B	4%	2.4%	9%	2%
SUNSunoco LP Common	$25.2B	8%	2.8%	—	2%
SUNCSunocoCorp LLC Common	$25.2B	9%	3.5%	—	2%
HESHess Corporation	$12.9B	—	2.9%	1%	-5%
DKDelek US Holdings	$10.7B	4%	1.9%	7%	2%
IEPIcahn Enterprises L.P.	$9.7B	—	-5.4%	2%	3%
CVICVR Energy Inc.	$7.2B	5%	2.5%	9%	3%
Group median	—	—	2.6%	8%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hess Corporation has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($825M) Net of stock comp (−$104M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($3.6B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+61%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021−10%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.4B on 309M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-03-31; net debt $7.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4.7B) runs well above depreciation ($2.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh HES against another business →

The owners of HES: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hess Corporation (HES), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HES, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HELE its page in the Manual HESM →

Industry order: ← GLP the Refining & Marketing chapter IEP →