Share count
527Mpeak FY2017
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PCAR, PACCAR Inc.
Automobiles capital-intensive
PACCAR builds heavy trucks — the big rigs that haul freight down the highway — and sells them through dealers to trucking fleets and owner-operators under brands long known in the trade, such as Kenworth, Peterbilt, and DAF. It makes money three ways: building and selling the trucks, supplying the replacement parts those trucks need through years of hard use, and financing the dealers and buyers who purchase them.
PACCAR's finance and leasing activities are principally related to PACCAR products and associated equipment.
TRUCKS PACCAR's trucks are marketed under the Kenworth, Peterbilt and DAF nameplates.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$28.4B
−15.5% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $27.8B 5-yr avg $29.9B
Revenue $6.8B −8.9% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $605M yr-ago $505M
Net margin 8.9% yr-ago 6.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- A new truck is close to a commodity — steel, an engine, and a price — so the first test is whether the brands and dealer network earn a premium buyers will pay, and whether the parts and service trailing each truck through its working life throw off steadier, higher-margin cash than the bare metal does. Demand for new trucks swings hard with freight rates and the fleet-replacement cycle, so the cost position that must stay profitable at the bottom of the cycle matters more than the peak. The finance arm carries its own hazards the filing names — buyers who stop paying and used-truck values that erode the worth of leased iron — alongside a civil-litigation tab that landed in Europe. The figures for margin, returns, and the durability of the parts stream sit in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 23%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →46% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- United States54%$15.4B
- Europe24%$6.9B
- Other Countries21%$6.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $17.0B | $19.5B | $23.5B | $25.6B | $18.7B | $23.5B | $28.8B | $35.1B | $33.7B | $28.4B | $27.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 19% | 23% | 23% | 20% | 20% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 3% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 3% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $1.1B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $1.7B | $2.4B | $3.8B | $5.7B | $5.4B | $3.0B | $3.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.6% | 11.2% | 12.0% | 12.1% | 8.9% | 10.2% | 13.4% | 16.3% | 16.0% | 10.6% | 11.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $522M | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $1.3B | $1.9B | $3.0B | $4.6B | $4.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 54% | 23% | 22% | 23% | 22% | 22% | 22% | 20% | 23% | 21% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $2.3B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $2.2B | $3.0B | $4.2B | $4.6B | $4.4B | $4.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $302M | $321M | $338M | $322M | $250M | $270M | $332M | $415M | $398M | $398M | $399M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $1.5B | $719M | $460M | $150M | $1.4B | $51M | ($317M) | ($826M) | $81M | $1.6B | $1.6B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $375M | $423M | $458M | $574M | $550M | $559M | $525M | $695M | $839M | $743M | $725M | CapexCapex |
| 2.2% | 2.2% | 1.9% | 2.2% | 2.9% | 2.4% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 2.6% | 2.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $1.9B | $2.7B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.0B | $4.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.3% | 12.3% | 11.3% | 9.9% | 14.6% | 8.1% | 9.4% | 10.7% | 12.6% | 14.1% | 14.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $1.6B | $2.5B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $3.7B | $3.8B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.3% | 11.8% | 10.8% | 8.9% | 13.0% | 6.9% | 8.7% | 9.9% | 11.3% | 12.9% | 13.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $829M | $558M | $804M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $708M | $1.0B | $1.5B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $1.4B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $71M | — | $354M | $110M | $42M | $2M | $2M | $4M | $5M | $36M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 12% | 29% | 43% | 25% | 12% | 16% | 23% | 29% | 24% | 12% | 15% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 21% | 26% | 25% | 12% | 16% | 23% | 29% | 24% | 12% | 13% | Return on equityROE |
| −5% | 14% | 16% | 13% | 1% | 10% | 15% | 19% | 11% | 1% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.9B | $2.4B | $3.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $3.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $103M | $117M | $112M | $109M | $119M | $111M | $104M | $107M | $101M | $114M | $114M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $20.6B | $23.4B | $25.5B | $28.4B | $28.4B | $29.5B | $33.3B | $40.8B | $43.4B | $44.3B | $43.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $6.8B | $8.1B | $8.6B | $9.7B | $10.5B | $11.6B | $13.2B | $15.9B | $17.5B | $19.3B | $19.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 528M | 529M | 528M | 521M | 521M | 523M | 523M | 525M | 527M | 527M | 527M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $32.28 | $36.76 | $44.52 | $49.11 | $35.93 | $45.00 | $55.06 | $66.91 | $63.93 | $54.00 | $52.67 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.99 | $3.16 | $4.16 | $4.58 | $2.50 | $3.57 | $5.75 | $8.76 | $7.90 | $4.51 | $4.69 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.65 | $4.52 | $5.03 | $4.87 | $5.25 | $3.67 | $5.15 | $7.19 | $8.06 | $7.63 | $7.73 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.65 | $4.33 | $4.80 | $4.39 | $4.68 | $3.11 | $4.78 | $6.66 | $7.22 | $6.97 | $7.11 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.57 | $1.05 | $1.52 | $2.18 | $2.38 | $1.35 | $1.92 | $2.89 | $4.35 | $4.30 | $2.71 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.71 | $0.80 | $0.87 | $1.10 | $1.06 | $1.07 | $1.00 | $1.32 | $1.59 | $1.41 | $1.37 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $12.84 | $15.21 | $16.28 | $18.62 | $20.21 | $22.18 | $25.16 | $30.25 | $33.25 | $36.57 | $37.46 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2020 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.9%/yr | +8.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +8.5%/yr | +7.7%/yr |
| EPS | +18.4%/yr | +12.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +11.8%/yr | +12.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +7.9%/yr | +6.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +12.3%/yr | +12.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
12%low FY2016
Gross margin
20%low FY2022
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$4.0Bowner earningsvs.$2.4Bnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $4.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $398M it takes just to hold its position. It put $345M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3.7B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $2.4B | $4.2B | $4.6B | $3.0B | $1.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$398M | +$398M | +$415M | +$332M | +$270M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.6B | +$81M | −$826M | −$317M | +$51M |
| Cash from operations | $4.4B | $4.6B | $4.2B | $3.0B | $2.2B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$398M | −$398M | −$415M | −$332M | −$270M |
| Owner earnings | $4.0B | $4.2B | $3.8B | $2.7B | $1.9B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$345M | −$440M | −$280M | −$193M | −$289M |
| Free cash flow | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.5B | $2.5B | $1.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 13% | 11% | 9% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $398M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $345M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $3.4B − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $3.4B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 8%–15%; latest $4.0B = operating cash $4.4B − maintenance capex $398MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $4.4B ÷ net income $2.4B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $2.3B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.0B
What this means
Of $4.0B Owner Earnings, $2.3B (57%) went back to shareholders, $2.3B dividends, $36M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.87×ExpandingCapex $743M ÷ depreciation $398M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $28.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +154%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.05/share (latest year $4.51), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 10% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 14% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 6.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +4.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“The Company is embedding artificial intelligence across its business to drive innovation, profitable growth and enhanced performance for the Company's customers.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $32.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$5.7B · 18%
- Dividends$12.4B · 38%
- Buybacks$625M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)$13.6B · 42%
- Returned to owners$13.0B
45% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $12.4B as dividends and $625M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $625M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−0.1%
The diluted count barely moved (528M to 527M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$4.30/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained15%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($11.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.7B, so each retained $1 added about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | R. P. Feight | $12.8M | $10.1M | $1.9B |
| 2022 | R. P. Feight | $13.3M | $15.9M | $2.7B |
| 2023 | R. P. Feight | $20.9M | $27.2M | $3.8B |
| 2024 | R. P. Feight | $17.4M | $19.9M | $4.2B |
| 2025 | R. P. Feight | $12.6M | $12.6M | $4.0B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio189:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why PACCAR Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Automobiles
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSLATesla Inc. | $94.8B | 19% | 5.5% | 6% | 10% |
| HONHoneywell International Inc. | $37.4B | 35% | 21.5% | 23% | 14% |
| PCARPACCAR Inc. | $28.4B | 21% | 11.6% | 23% | 11% |
| LEALear Corporation | $23.3B | 7% | 3.9% | 11% | 3% |
| APTVAptiv PLC | $20.4B | 19% | 9.1% | 14% | 6% |
| ADNTAdient plc Ordinary Shares | $14.5B | 6% | 0.1% | 0% | 1% |
| BWABorgWarner Inc. | $14.3B | 19% | 8.1% | 9% | 7% |
| OSKOshkosh | $10.4B | 17% | 8.1% | 14% | 5% |
| Group median | — | 19% | 8.1% | 13% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what PACCAR Inc. has delivered.
PACCAR Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, PACCAR Inc. earns about $3.2B on its 11.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $3.8B on 526M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $3.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($725M) runs well above depreciation ($399M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PACCAR Inc. (PCAR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PCAR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← PBYI its page in the Manual PCB →
Industry order: ← OSK the Automobiles chapter PSNY →