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PSNY, Polestar Automotive Holding UK PLC
Polestar is a pure play, premium electric car brand headquartered in Sweden, designing performance cars engineered to excite consumers and drive change.
Polestar was established as a premium electric car brand by Volvo Cars and Geely in 2017.
Polestar benefits from the technological, engineering and manufacturing capabilities of these established global car manufacturers.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −71% through the cycle on a 0.8% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 39% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $610M | $1.3B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.0B | $2.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 9% | 1% | 4% | −17% | −43% | −61% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($437M) | ($961M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.5B) | ($1.8B) | ($2.4B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −71.7% | −71.5% | −52.7% | −62.1% | −89.1% | −95.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($485M) | ($970M) | ($479M) | ($1.2B) | ($2.0B) | ($2.7B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| ($57M) | ($324M) | ($1.1B) | ($1.9B) | ($991M) | ($1.2B) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $216M | $212M | $141M | $115M | $56M | $65M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $212M | $434M | ($743M) | ($827M) | $1.0B | $1.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $50M | $25M | $32M | $137M | $148M | $152M | CapexCapex |
| 8.1% | 1.8% | 1.3% | 5.8% | 7.3% | 6.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($107M) | ($349M) | ($1.1B) | ($2.0B) | ($1.0B) | ($1.3B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −17.5% | −26.0% | −45.6% | −85.8% | −51.5% | −50.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($107M) | ($349M) | ($1.1B) | ($2.0B) | ($1.1B) | ($1.4B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −17.5% | −26.0% | −45.6% | −85.8% | −56.0% | −53.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $316M | $757M | $974M | $768M | $739M | $719M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $158M | $241M | $127M | $152M | $259M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $546M | $630M | $928M | $1.1B | $806M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $703M | $872M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $4.7B | $5.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.5× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $3.3B | $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.1B | $3.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| -12.8× | -21.2× | -11.9× | -6.9× | -4.6× | -6.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($603M) | ($184M) | ($90M) | ($1.3B) | ($3.3B) | ($4.3B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 1.68B | 1.91B | 2.03B | 2.11B | 2.11B | 2.11B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.36 | $0.70 | $1.20 | $1.12 | $0.96 | $1.20 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.29 | $-0.51 | $-0.24 | $-0.56 | $-0.97 | $-1.28 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.06 | $-0.18 | $-0.55 | $-0.96 | $-0.50 | $-0.61 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.06 | $-0.18 | $-0.55 | $-0.96 | $-0.54 | $-0.65 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.07 | $0.07 | $0.07 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.36 | $-0.10 | $-0.04 | $-0.59 | $-1.58 | $-2.02 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +27.7%/yr | +27.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +24.2%/yr | +24.2%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2020–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business earned ($1.0B) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $56M it takes just to hold its position. It put $92M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.1B).
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($2.0B) | ($1.2B) | ($479M) | ($970M) | ($485M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$56M | +$115M | +$141M | +$212M | +$216M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.0B | −$827M | −$743M | +$434M | +$212M |
| Cash from operations | ($991M) | ($1.9B) | ($1.1B) | ($324M) | ($57M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$56M | −$137M | −$32M | −$25M | −$50M |
| Owner earnings | ($1.0B) | ($2.0B) | ($1.1B) | ($349M) | ($107M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$92M | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ($1.1B) | ($2.0B) | ($1.1B) | ($349M) | ($107M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -51% | -86% | -46% | -26% | -17% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $56M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $92M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -6.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($2.4B) ÷ interest expense $380M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Consumes cash through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -86%–-17%; latest ($1.3B) = operating cash ($1.2B) − maintenance capex $65MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -51% of revenue this year, a -46% median across 5 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($1.2B)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($2.7B) · cash from operations ($1.2B)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.32×ExpandingCapex $152M ÷ depreciation $65M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.43×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.58/share (latest year $-1.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.02/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −72% → −76% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −72% early to −76% lately, median −71% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Worst year 2024 · −89.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Serving as the AI brain, NVIDIA's high-performance automotive platform processes data from the car's multiple sensors and cameras to enable advanced driver-assistance safety features and driver monitoring.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$719M
- Receivables$259M
- Inventory$806M
- Other current assets$430M
- Other current liabilities$5.2B
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Automobiles
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MODModine Manufacturing Company | $3.2B | 17% | 5.4% | 12% | 3% |
| ALSNAllison Transmission Holdings Inc. | $3.0B | 48% | 29.0% | 21% | 23% |
| WGOWinnebago Industries | $2.8B | 15% | 7.9% | 14% | 6% |
| CPSCooper-Standard Holdings Inc. | $2.7B | 12% | 3.2% | 7% | 1% |
| PSNYPolestar Automotive Holding UK PLC | $2.5B | 1% | -71.5% | — | -46% |
| GNTXGentex | $2.5B | 36% | 23.7% | 22% | 21% |
| FSSFederal Signal Corporation | $2.2B | 26% | 11.4% | 13% | 7% |
| DORMDorman Products Inc. | $2.1B | 37% | 13.4% | 14% | 7% |
| Group median | — | 21% | 9.6% | — | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Polestar Automotive Holding UK PLC reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Polestar Automotive Holding UK PLC is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered35%/yr’20→’24
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← PSIG its page in the Manual PSNYW →
Industry order: ← PCAR the Automobiles chapter PSNYW →