Share count
3.5Bpeak FY2025
← All companies ← TSHA Manual TSN → ← TM Automobiles VFS →
TSLA, Tesla Inc.
Tesla designs, builds, sells and leases electric cars, and sells systems that generate and store electricity. It sells straight to the buyer rather than through dealers, and runs its own retail, service and charging network. Most of the money comes from the cars; energy generation and storage is the smaller piece. The company also frames its future around putting artificial intelligence into the physical world — self-driving software, a robotaxi service, and AI robots.
We emphasize performance, attractive styling and the safety of our users and workforce in the design and manufacture of our products and are continuing to develop full self-driving technology for improved safety.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$94.8B
−2.9% YoY · 25% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $97.9B 5-yr avg $84.9B
Revenue $22.4B +15.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 4.2% yr-ago 2.1%
Net income $491M yr-ago $420M
Net margin 2.2% yr-ago 2.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Automotive (87%) and Energy generation and storage (13%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The first test is the oldest one in the trade: is a car a franchise or a commodity? Watch whether buyers pay Tesla's price without the discounts and incentives that mark a maker forced to move metal, and whether the cost of building each car sits below rivals' — the twin signs of pricing power and a scale advantage, if they are there at all. The bad case is the ordinary one for this industry: a capital-hungry manufacturer that must match competitors on price, leans on single suppliers for parts it cannot make itself, carries debt under covenants, and earns the thin returns that come with it. The wager beyond the cars — autonomy, software, robots — is optionality the buyer pays nothing certain for; the record below shows what the metal earns.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Automotive is 87% of revenue, with Energy generation and storage the other meaningful segment at 13%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Automotive87%$82.1B
- Energy generation and storage13%$12.8B
By geographyUnited States50%Other Countries28%China22%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $7.0B | $11.8B | $21.5B | $24.6B | $31.5B | $53.8B | $81.5B | $96.8B | $97.7B | $94.8B | $97.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 23% | 19% | 19% | 17% | 21% | 25% | 26% | 18% | 18% | 18% | 19% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 20% | 21% | 13% | 11% | 10% | 8% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 12% | 12% | 7% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 7% | 7% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($667M) | ($1.6B) | ($388M) | ($69M) | $2.0B | $6.5B | $13.7B | $8.9B | $7.1B | $4.4B | $4.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −9.5% | −13.9% | −1.8% | −0.3% | 6.3% | 12.1% | 16.8% | 9.2% | 7.2% | 4.6% | 5.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($675M) | ($2.0B) | ($976M) | ($862M) | $721M | $5.5B | $12.6B | $15.0B | $7.1B | $3.8B | $3.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | 29% | 11% | 8% | — | 21% | 27% | 28% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($124M) | ($61M) | $2.1B | $2.4B | $5.9B | $11.5B | $14.7B | $13.3B | $14.9B | $14.7B | $16.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $477M | $769M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $3.3B | $4.1B | $5.0B | $5.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($260M) | $665M | $1.2B | $999M | $1.9B | $1.9B | ($1.8B) | ($6.9B) | $1.7B | $3.1B | $4.2B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.3B | $3.4B | $2.1B | $1.3B | $3.2B | $6.5B | $7.2B | $8.9B | $11.3B | $8.5B | $9.5B | CapexCapex |
| 18.3% | 29.0% | 9.8% | 5.4% | 10.0% | 12.0% | 8.8% | 9.2% | 11.6% | 9.0% | 9.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($601M) | ($830M) | $988M | $1.1B | $4.4B | $9.6B | $12.3B | $9.9B | $10.8B | $9.7B | $11.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −8.6% | −7.1% | 4.6% | 4.4% | 13.9% | 17.8% | 15.1% | 10.3% | 11.1% | 10.2% | 11.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($1.4B) | ($3.5B) | ($3M) | $1.1B | $2.8B | $5.0B | $7.6B | $4.4B | $3.6B | $6.2B | $7.0B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −20.1% | −29.6% | −0.0% | 4.4% | 8.8% | 9.3% | 9.3% | 4.5% | 3.7% | 6.6% | 7.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $115M | $18M | $45M | $13M | $0 | $0 | $64M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| -6% | -12% | -3% | -0% | 11% | 32% | 41% | 17% | 9% | 4% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| -14% | -46% | -20% | -13% | 3% | 18% | 28% | 24% | 10% | 5% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| −14% | −46% | −20% | −13% | 3% | 18% | 28% | 24% | 10% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $6.3B | $19.4B | $17.7B | $22.2B | $29.1B | $36.6B | $44.1B | $44.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $499M | $515M | $949M | $1.3B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $3.0B | $3.5B | $4.4B | $4.6B | $4.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2.1B | $2.3B | $3.1B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $5.8B | $12.8B | $13.6B | $12.0B | $12.4B | $14.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| $1.9B | $2.4B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $6.1B | $10.0B | $15.3B | $14.4B | $12.5B | $13.4B | $14.7B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $706M | $389M | $657M | $1.1B | ($64M) | ($2.4B) | $536M | $2.7B | $4.0B | $3.6B | $3.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $6.3B | $6.6B | $8.3B | $12.1B | $26.7B | $27.1B | $40.9B | $49.6B | $58.4B | $68.6B | $69.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $5.8B | $7.7B | $10.0B | $10.7B | $14.2B | $19.7B | $26.7B | $28.7B | $28.8B | $31.7B | $34.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 1.1× | 1.9× | 1.4× | 1.5× | 1.7× | 2.0× | 2.2× | 2.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $60M | $68M | $198M | $207M | $200M | $194M | $253M | $244M | $257M | $257M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $22.7B | $28.7B | $29.7B | $34.3B | $52.1B | $62.1B | $82.3B | $106.6B | $122.1B | $137.8B | $143.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $7.0B | $9.6B | $10.6B | $11.8B | $10.2B | $5.3B | $2.0B | $4.7B | $7.9B | $8.2B | $9.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $3.6B | $6.3B | $6.9B | $5.5B | ($9.2B) | ($12.4B) | ($20.1B) | ($24.4B) | ($28.7B) | ($35.9B) | ($35.3B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -3.4× | -3.5× | -0.6× | -0.1× | 2.7× | 17.6× | 71.5× | 57.0× | 20.2× | 12.9× | 14.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $4.8B | $4.2B | $4.9B | $6.6B | $22.2B | $30.2B | $44.7B | $62.6B | $72.9B | $82.1B | $84.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 4.8% | 4.0% | 3.5% | 3.7% | 5.5% | 3.9% | 1.9% | 1.9% | 2.0% | 3.0% | 3.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 721M | 830M | 853M | 887M | 3.25B | 3.39B | 3.48B | 3.48B | 3.50B | 3.53B | 3.54B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.71 | $14.17 | $25.16 | $27.71 | $9.71 | $15.90 | $23.44 | $27.77 | $27.93 | $26.88 | $27.67 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.94 | $-2.36 | $-1.14 | $-0.97 | $0.22 | $1.63 | $3.61 | $4.30 | $2.03 | $1.08 | $1.09 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.83 | $-1.00 | $1.16 | $1.22 | $1.35 | $2.83 | $3.54 | $2.85 | $3.09 | $2.75 | $3.20 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.95 | $-4.19 | $-0.00 | $1.22 | $0.86 | $1.48 | $2.18 | $1.25 | $1.02 | $1.76 | $1.98 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.78 | $4.11 | $2.46 | $1.50 | $0.97 | $1.91 | $2.06 | $2.55 | $3.24 | $2.42 | $2.69 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.59 | $5.11 | $5.77 | $7.46 | $6.84 | $8.92 | $12.86 | $17.97 | $20.84 | $23.28 | $23.78 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×3.66 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.0%/yr | +22.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +15.4%/yr |
| EPS | — | +37.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.5%/yr | +20.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +15.1%/yr | +27.8%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Net income-46.5%
“In 2025, our net income attributable to common stockholders was $3.79 billion, representing a decrease of $3.30 billion compared to the prior year.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
4%low FY2017
Gross margin
18%low FY2019
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$9.7Bowner earningsvs.$3.8Bnet incomelow FY2017
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $9.7B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $5.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put $3.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $6.2B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $3.8B | $7.1B | $15.0B | $12.6B | $5.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$5.0B | +$4.1B | +$3.3B | +$2.4B | +$1.9B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$2.8B | +$2.0B | +$1.8B | +$1.6B | +$2.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$3.1B | +$1.7B | −$6.9B | −$1.8B | +$1.9B |
| Cash from operations | $14.7B | $14.9B | $13.3B | $14.7B | $11.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$5.0B | −$4.1B | −$3.3B | −$2.4B | −$1.9B |
| Owner earnings | $9.7B | $10.8B | $9.9B | $12.3B | $9.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$3.5B | −$7.2B | −$5.6B | −$4.7B | −$4.6B |
| Free cash flow | $6.2B | $3.6B | $4.4B | $7.6B | $5.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 10% | 11% | 10% | 15% | 18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $5.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $3.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2.8B), owner earnings is nearer $6.9B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 12.9×ComfortableOperating income $4.4B ÷ interest expense $338M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $16.5B + ST investments $27.5B − debt $9.4B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $34.7B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 18 + DIO 58 − DPO 63 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -12%–41%; 4% latest = NOPAT $3.2B ÷ invested capital $75.0BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -9%–18%; latest $9.7B = operating cash $14.7B − maintenance capex $5.0BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. It chose to put $3.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $6.2B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2.8B of SBC) leaves $6.9B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $14.7B ÷ net income $3.8B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.70×ExpandingCapex $8.5B ÷ depreciation $5.0B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $94.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.16×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $9.4B vs $36.9B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.30/share (latest year $1.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $21.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −8% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −8% early to 7% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2017 · −13.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our success will depend on various factors, including our ability to successfully apply our artificial neural network training experience to autonomous robots, to either source or custom develop the necessary technology and components, and the product's cost-effectiveness, utility and competitive positioning relative t…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$69.7B
- Cash & short-term investments$44.7B
- Receivables$4.0B
- Inventory$14.4B
- Other current assets$6.6B
Current liabilities$34.1B
- Debt due within a year$1.4B
- Accounts payable$14.7B
- Other current liabilities$18.1B
Current ratio2.04×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.62×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.31×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$35.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.4B due · $44.7B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$83.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$10.8BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$15.7B$6.7B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $16.0B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$7.3Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$1.3Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$8.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$6.6Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$9.4B
Lease obligations (present value)$6.6B
Total fixed claims on the business$16.0B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $16.0B, of which the leases are 41%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $79.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$53.7B · 68%
- Retained (debt / cash)$25.7B · 32%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.4B and cash and short-term investments rose $41.4B.
- Net change in share count390.7%
The diluted count rose from 721M to 3538M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained26%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($40.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $10.3B, so each retained $1 added about 0.26 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership19.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$2.8B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 65% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Tesla Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?390.7%
Diluted shares grew 390.7% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Automobiles
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FFord Motor Company | $187.3B | 15% | 3.0% | — | 7% |
| GMGeneral Motors Company | $168.0B | 11% | 5.9% | 4% | 6% |
| TSLATesla Inc. | $94.8B | 19% | 5.5% | 6% | 10% |
| BABoeing Company (The) | $89.5B | 6% | -1.8% | -8% | 1% |
| RTXRTX Corporation | $88.6B | 65% | 8.2% | 5% | 8% |
| LMTLockheed Martin Corporation | $75.0B | 13% | 12.9% | 34% | 9% |
| GDGeneral Dynamics Corporation | $52.5B | 19% | 10.9% | 14% | 8% |
| PCARPACCAR Inc. | $28.4B | 21% | 11.6% | 23% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 17% | 7.1% | 6% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tesla Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Tesla Inc. earns about $9.7B on its 10.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+34%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2018+39%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $7.0B on 3756M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net cash $35.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($9.5B) runs well above depreciation ($5.2B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $11.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Tesla Inc. (TSLA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TSLA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TSHA its page in the Manual TSN →
Industry order: ← TM the Automobiles chapter VFS →