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PCOR, Procore Technologies

Software asset-light Unprofitable

We are the leading global provider of construction management software, and are helping transform one of the oldest, largest, and least digitized industries in the world.

We focus exclusively on connecting and empowering the construction industry's key stakeholders, such as owners, general contractors, and specialty contractors, to collaborate and access our capabilities from any location on any connected device.

Our products, services, and platform help our customers increase productivity and efficiency, reduce rework and costly delays, improve safety and compliance, and enhance financial transparency and accountability.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PCOR · Procore Technologies

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.3B

+14.8% YoY · 27% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $932M

Gross margin 80% 5-yr avg 81%

Operating margin −7.6% 5-yr avg −28.0%

ROIC −10% 5-yr avg −22%

Owner-earnings margin 21% 5-yr avg 10%

Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −23% through the cycle on a 82% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 18% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −21%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$289M	$400M	$515M	$720M	$950M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	RevenueRevenue
82%	82%	81%	79%	82%	82%	80%	80%	Gross marginGross mgn
20%	18%	30%	23%	21%	19%	18%	18%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
30%	31%	46%	38%	32%	27%	27%	26%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($83M)	($59M)	($286M)	($290M)	($216M)	($136M)	($124M)	($104M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−28.6%	−14.6%	−55.5%	−40.3%	−22.7%	−11.8%	−9.4%	−7.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($83M)	($96M)	($265M)	($287M)	($190M)	($106M)	($101M)	($77M)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
($7M)	$22M	$37M	$13M	$92M	$196M	$300M	$311M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$15M	$26M	$36M	$63M	$72M	$90M	$111M	$113M	DepreciationDeprec.
$42M	$48M	$38M	$74M	$35M	$25M	$52M	$28M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$13M	$7M	$12M	$16M	$10M	$19M	$18M	$17M	CapexCapex
4.5%	1.8%	2.4%	2.2%	1.1%	1.7%	1.4%	1.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($20M)	$15M	$24M	($3M)	$82M	$177M	$282M	$294M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−6.9%	3.7%	4.7%	−0.4%	8.6%	15.4%	21.3%	21.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($20M)	$15M	$24M	($3M)	$82M	$177M	$282M	$294M	Free cash flowFCF
−6.9%	3.7%	4.7%	−0.4%	8.6%	15.4%	21.3%	21.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$39M	$15M	$510M	$0	$0	$26M	$42M	$159M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$129M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-37%	-28%	-21%	-13%	-13%	-10%	ROICROIC
—	—	-22%	-26%	-16%	-8%	-8%	-6%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−22%	−26%	−16%	−8%	−8%	−6%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$118M	$380M	$586M	$582M	$678M	$821M	$811M	$592M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$78M	$114M	$149M	$207M	$246M	$288M	$185M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$9M	$15M	$14M	$13M	$33M	$25M	$18M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$69M	$98M	$134M	$193M	$213M	$263M	$166M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$488M	$752M	$799M	$956M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$901M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$262M	$404M	$532M	$642M	$728M	$885M	$807M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.9×	1.9×	1.5×	1.5×	1.5×	1.3×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$115M	$126M	$541M	$539M	$539M	$550M	$574M	$689M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$821M	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.1B	Total assetsAssets
($118M)	($380M)	($586M)	($582M)	($678M)	($821M)	($811M)	($592M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-88.8×	-24.9×	-122.8×	-136.0×	-110.2×	-71.8×	-107.8×	-91.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($254M)	($272M)	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
6.7%	11.0%	44.1%	22.6%	18.4%	16.2%	18.0%	18.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
24.4M	27.9M	92.7M	137M	142M	147M	150M	151M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$11.87	$14.35	$5.56	$5.28	$6.69	$7.81	$8.80	$9.08	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.41	$-3.45	$-2.86	$-2.10	$-1.34	$-0.72	$-0.67	$-0.51	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.82	$0.53	$0.26	$-0.02	$0.58	$1.20	$1.88	$1.95	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.82	$0.53	$0.26	$-0.02	$0.58	$1.20	$1.88	$1.95	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.54	$0.26	$0.13	$0.12	$0.07	$0.13	$0.12	$0.11	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-10.42	$-9.75	$12.83	$8.18	$8.14	$8.74	$8.40	$7.95	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.32 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−4.9%/yr	−9.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+29.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−22.0%/yr	−14.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

150Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−13%low FY2021

Gross margin

80%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$282Mowner earningsvs.($101M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $101M loss into $282M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($101M)	($106M)	($190M)	($287M)	($265M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$111M	+$90M	+$72M	+$63M	+$36M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$238M	+$187M	+$175M	+$163M	+$227M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$52M	+$25M	+$35M	+$74M	+$38M
Cash from operations	$300M	$196M	$92M	$13M	$37M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$18M	−$19M	−$10M	−$16M	−$12M
Owner earnings	$282M	$177M	$82M	($3M)	$24M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	21%	15%	9%	0%	5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $238M), owner earnings is nearer $44M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -107.8×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($124M) ÷ interest expense $1M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$768M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $481M + ST investments $288M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $768M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $43M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $811M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 46d

Tight

DSO 79 + DIO 0 − DPO 34 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -4%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 21%

High, recently turned positive

latest $282M = operating cash $300M − maintenance capex $18M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 5%)

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $238M of SBC) leaves $44M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $300M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($101M) · cash from operations $300M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 46%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $129M ÷ Owner Earnings $282M

What this means
Of $282M Owner Earnings, $129M (46%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $129M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($238M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.16×

Harvesting

Capex $18M ÷ depreciation $111M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.32×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.88/share (latest year $-0.67), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −33% → −15% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −33% early to −15% lately, median −23% — pricing power intact or improving.
Worst year 2021 · −55.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We may also face greater competition from general purpose AI solutions that rely on generic large language models, generative AI, and general purpose AI agents to address a broad range of business needs.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$901M

Cash & short-term investments$592M
Receivables$185M
Other current assets$125M

Current liabilities$807M

Accounts payable$18M
Other current liabilities$789M

Current ratio1.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.12×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.73×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$94Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$361Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($7M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$65M$65M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$661Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $653M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$96M · 15%
Buybacks$129M · 20%
Retained (debt / cash)$428M · 66%

Returned to owners$129M
23% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $129M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $473M.
Average price paid for buybacks$67.67
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $129M, about $67.67 each.
Net change in share count519.6%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 151M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$679M30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity45%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$631Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $96M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Courtemanche	$10.6M	$76.8M	$24M
2022	Mr. Courtemanche	$13.9M	−$9.6M	($3M)
2023	Mr. Courtemanche	$12.9M	$25.3M	$82M
2024	Mr. Courtemanche	$16.1M	$13.7M	$177M
2025	Dr. Gopal	$77.4M	$80.5M	$282M
2025	Mr. Courtemanche	$20.8M	$17.7M	$282M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio518:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$238M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 18% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PCTYPaylocity	$1.5B	66%	11.0%	22%	19%
BILLBILL Holdings	$1.5B	76%	-17.6%	-4%	-2%
PCORProcore Technologies	$1.3B	82%	-22.7%	-21%	5%
RBRKRubrik Inc.	$1.3B	73%	-46.2%	-118%	1%
ZETAZeta Global Holdings Corp.	$1.3B	62%	-6.8%	-82%	10%
KVYOKlaviyo Inc. Series A	$1.2B	75%	-11.6%	-44%	17%
GWREGuidewire Software	$1.2B	55%	-2.8%	-1%	16%
CVLTCommvault Systems	$1.2B	83%	0.3%	-1%	18%
Group median	—	74%	-9.2%	-13%	13%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Procore Technologies has delivered.

Procore Technologies’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Procore Technologies earns about $63M on its 4.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($63M) Net of stock comp (−$247M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+116%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+86%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $294M on 151M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $592M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PCOR against another business →

The owners of PCOR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Procore Technologies (PCOR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PCOR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PCG its page in the Manual PCRX →

Industry order: ← PAYC the Software chapter PCTY →