Owner Scorecard


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PAYC, Paycom Software

Software asset-light

A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PAYC · Paycom Software
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.1B
+8.9% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Gross margin 83% 5-yr avg 84%
Operating margin 28.3% 5-yr avg 27.9%
ROIC 32% 5-yr avg 34%
Owner-earnings margin 25% 5-yr avg 22%
Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 84% and operating margin about 28% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −17 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 37%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 24% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$329M$433M$566M$738M$841M$1.1B$1.4B$1.7B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1BRevenueRevenue
84%83%84%85%85%85%85%84%82%83%83%Gross marginGross mgn
53%53%53%54%63%61%57%57%49%56%55%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
6%7%8%10%11%11%11%12%13%14%13%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$102M$130M$174M$226M$186M$254M$379M$451M$634M$567M$592MOperating incomeOp. inc.
30.9%30.0%30.7%30.7%22.1%24.0%27.5%26.6%33.7%27.6%28.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$70M$123M$137M$181M$143M$196M$281M$341M$502M$453M$470MNet incomeNet inc.
30%3%22%20%23%23%28%28%23%27%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$99M$130M$185M$224M$227M$319M$365M$485M$534M$679M$710MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$14M$19M$30M$42M$53M$67M$93M$114M$146M$176M$188MDepreciationDeprec.
($6M)($49M)($18M)($46M)($60M)($41M)($104M)($100M)($91M)($70M)($58M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$44M$59M$60M$93M$94M$121M$133M$193M$193M$271M$264MCapexCapex
13.3%13.7%10.6%12.6%11.2%11.4%9.6%11.4%10.2%13.2%12.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$85M$111M$155M$182M$174M$252M$272M$371M$388M$503M$523MOwner earningsOwner earn.
25.9%25.6%27.4%24.7%20.7%23.9%19.8%21.9%20.6%24.5%25.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$55M$71M$125M$131M$133M$199M$232M$292M$341M$408M$446MFree cash flowFCF
16.7%16.3%22.1%17.8%15.8%18.8%16.9%17.3%18.1%19.9%21.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$65M$85M$85M$81MDividends paidDiv. paid
$36M$57M$105M$52M$95M$287M$123M$326MBuybacksBuybacks
40%46%42%42%27%30%34%32%42%30%32%ROICROIC
34%44%41%34%22%22%24%26%32%26%58%Return on equityROE
21%26%21%48%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$60M$46M$46M$134M$152M$278M$401M$294M$402M$370M$154MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1M$2M$3M$9M$9M$9M$23M$16M$39M$45M$51MReceivablesReceiv.
$675K$979K$797K$1M$1M$1M$2M$1M$1M$2M$2MInventoryInvent.
$4M$6M$6M$5M$7M$6M$16M$14M$24M$7M$9MAccounts payablePayables
($2M)($4M)($2M)$5M$3M$5M$8M$4M$17M$40M$43MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$926M$1.2B$1.1B$1.9B$1.9B$2.3B$2.8B$2.8B$4.3B$5.8B$3.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$899M$1.1B$1.0B$1.8B$1.7B$2.0B$2.4B$2.5B$3.9B$5.4B$2.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.0×1.0×1.1×1.1×1.1×1.2×1.1×1.1×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$52M$52M$52M$52M$52M$52M$52M$52M$52M$52M$52MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.6B$1.5B$2.5B$2.6B$3.2B$3.9B$4.2B$5.9B$7.6B$4.8BTotal assetsAssets
$30M$35M$34M$33M$31M$29M$29M$675MTotal debtDebt
($30M)($11M)($11M)($101M)($121M)($249M)($372M)$521MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
98.2×142.4×226.8×240.7×9795.9×181.1×151.5×237.5×186.6×166.8×89.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$206M$281M$335M$527M$656M$894M$1.2B$1.3B$1.6B$1.7B$812MShareholders’ equityEquity
6.3%8.3%6.5%6.4%10.7%9.2%6.9%7.7%−1.2%5.8%5.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
59.0M58.8M58.6M58.4M58.3M58.2M58.2M58.0M56.3M56.1M51.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.58$7.37$9.67$12.63$14.44$18.14$23.64$29.21$33.45$36.56$40.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.19$2.10$2.34$3.09$2.46$3.37$4.84$5.88$8.92$8.08$9.18EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.44$1.88$2.65$3.12$2.98$4.33$4.68$6.40$6.89$8.96$10.21Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.93$1.20$2.13$2.25$2.28$3.41$3.99$5.04$6.06$7.27$8.71Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.12$1.51$1.51$1.59Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.74$1.01$1.02$1.59$1.61$2.07$2.28$3.32$3.43$4.83$5.17Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.49$4.78$5.71$9.02$11.25$15.36$20.33$22.48$27.99$30.86$15.86Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+23.2%/yr+20.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+22.5%/yr+24.6%/yr
EPS+23.7%/yr+26.8%/yr
Dividends / share+16.3%/yr (2-yr)+16.3%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share+23.1%/yr+24.5%/yr
Book value / share+27.4%/yr+22.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
56Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
30%low FY2020
Gross margin
83%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-1.4×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$503Mowner earningsvs.$453Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $503M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $176M it takes just to hold its position. It put $95M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $408M.

Reported net income$453M
Owner earnings$503M · 24% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$453M$502M$341M$281M$196M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$176M+$146M+$114M+$93M+$67M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$119M−$23M+$130M+$95M+$98M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$70M−$91M−$100M−$104M−$41M
Cash from operations$679M$534M$485M$365M$319M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$176M−$146M−$114M−$93M−$67M
Owner earnings$503M$388M$371M$272M$252M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$95M−$47M−$79M−$40M−$53M
Free cash flow$408M$341M$292M$232M$199M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue24%21%22%20%24%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $176M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $95M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $119M), owner earnings is nearer $384M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $567M ÷ interest expense $3M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $370M − debt $29M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $341M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 8 + DIO 2 − DPO 7 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 27%–46%; 30% latest = NOPAT $415M ÷ invested capital $1.4B
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 30% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 20%–27%; latest $503M = operating cash $679M − maintenance capex $176M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 10 years. It chose to put $95M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $408M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $119M of SBC) leaves $384M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $679M ÷ net income $453M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $410M ÷ Owner Earnings $503M
    What this means

    Of $503M Owner Earnings, $410M (82%) went back to shareholders, $85M dividends, $326M buybacks. Net of $119M stock comp, the real buyback was about $207M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.54×
    Expanding
    Capex $271M ÷ depreciation $176M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $29M vs $470M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +292%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.07/share (latest year $9.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 31% → 29% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 31% early, 29% lately, median 28%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth +18%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 22.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.

“We believe our strategy of focusing on incorporating artificial intelligence ("AI") and automation across our full solution is an important differentiator for attracting new clients and key to long-term client satisfaction and client retention.”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$154M
  • Receivables$51M
  • Inventory$2M
  • Other current assets$2.9B
Current liabilities$2.8B
  • Accounts payable$9M
  • Other current liabilities$2.8B
Current ratio1.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.08×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$235Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$726Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($936M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$764M$89M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$154Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.3B · 39%
  • Dividends$234M · 7%
  • Buybacks$1.1B · 33%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$674M · 21%
  • Returned to owners$1.3B

    53% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $234M as dividends and $1.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $645M and cash and short-term investments rose $94M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−13.2%

    The diluted count fell from 59M to 51M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.51/sh

    Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained27%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $304M, so each retained $1 added about 0.27 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Chad Richison$3.0M$63.0M$252M
2022Chad Richison$3.1M−$149.5M$272M
2023Chad Richison$3.1M−$110.9M$371M
2024Chad Richison$3.5M−$65.6M$388M
2024Chris G. Thomas$12.1M−$1.0M$388M
2025Chad Richison$22.8M$18.2M$503M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership13.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$119M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Paycom Software is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$30M → $675M

    Debt rose from $30M to $675M while owner earnings went from about $117M to $421M — about 0.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?1% → 3% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $2M to $53M while revenue grew 536%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (1% of revenue then, 3% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TYLTyler Technologies$2.3B47%14.9%10%21%
NETCloudflare Inc.$2.2B77%-19.5%-7%-0%
PAYCPaycom Software$2.1B84%28.8%37%24%
DTDynatrace$2.0B81%8.7%8%27%
MBLYMobileye Global Inc.$1.9B47%-13.1%-1%27%
UUnity Software$1.8B76%-36.8%-15%-6%
ACIWACI Worldwide Inc.$1.8B51%14.8%7%13%
ESTCElastic$1.7B74%-20.9%-54%2%
Group median75%-2.2%3%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Paycom Software has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Paycom Software earns about $496M on its 24.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+22%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $446M on 48M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $521M. The if-converted diluted count is 51M, 7% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($264M) runs well above depreciation ($188M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $534M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Paycom Software (PAYC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PAYC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PAY its page in the Manual PAYO →

Industry order: ← PATH the Software chapter PCOR →