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PENN, PENN Entertainment Inc.

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Revenue is led by Gaming (77%) and Other (13%), with 2 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PENN · PENN Entertainment Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$7.0B

+5.8% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $7.1B 5-yr avg $6.4B

Operating margin −8.8% 5-yr avg 2.7%

ROIC −12% 5-yr avg 3%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin −0% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A hotel and lodging business, earning on rooms filled and the brand that fills them.
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −11% and 18% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Gaming is 77% of revenue, with Other the other meaningful line at 13%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Gaming77%$5.3B
Other13%$912M
Food and beverage6%$446M
Hotel4%$253M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.2B	$3.3B	$3.6B	$5.3B	$3.6B	$5.9B	$6.4B	$6.4B	$6.6B	$7.0B	$7.1B	RevenueRevenue
14%	15%	17%	22%	32%	23%	17%	25%	24%	23%	23%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$543M	$446M	$634M	$572M	($410M)	$1.1B	$974M	($690M)	$73M	($674M)	($619M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
16.9%	13.4%	17.7%	10.8%	−11.5%	17.9%	15.2%	−10.8%	1.1%	−9.7%	−8.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$109M	$473M	$94M	$44M	($670M)	$421M	$222M	($490M)	($312M)	($843M)	($957M)	Net incomeNet inc.
9%	—	-4%	49%	—	22%	—	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$408M	$478M	$353M	$704M	$339M	$896M	$878M	$456M	$359M	$508M	$589M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$271M	$267M	$269M	$414M	$367M	$345M	$568M	$435M	$434M	$447M	$456M	DepreciationDeprec.
$21M	($271M)	($22M)	$231M	$627M	$96M	$31M	$425M	$184M	$844M	$1.0B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$97M	$99M	$93M	$191M	$137M	$244M	$263M	$360M	$483M	$648M	$617M	CapexCapex
3.0%	3.0%	2.6%	3.6%	3.8%	4.1%	4.1%	5.7%	7.3%	9.3%	8.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$311M	$379M	$260M	$513M	$202M	$652M	$615M	$96M	($123M)	$61M	$133M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.7%	11.4%	7.3%	9.7%	5.6%	11.0%	9.6%	1.5%	−1.9%	0.9%	1.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$311M	$379M	$260M	$513M	$202M	$652M	$615M	$96M	($123M)	($140M)	($28M)	Free cash flowFCF
9.7%	11.4%	7.3%	9.7%	5.6%	11.0%	9.6%	1.5%	−1.9%	−2.0%	−0.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$84M	$128M	$1.9B	$1.4B	$3M	$878M	$0	$315M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$25M	$50M	$25M	$0	$0	$601M	$150M	$0	$354M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
75%	—	23%	8%	-10%	16%	20%	-11%	—	-13%	-12%	ROICROIC
—	—	13%	2%	-25%	10%	6%	-15%	-11%	-46%	-52%	Return on equityROE
—	—	13%	2%	−25%	10%	6%	−15%	−11%	−46%	−52%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$230M	$278M	$480M	$437M	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$1.1B	$707M	$687M	$708M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$62M	$63M	$107M	$89M	$96M	$195M	$247M	$319M	$257M	$254M	$241M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$35M	$26M	$31M	$40M	$33M	$53M	$40M	$37M	$51M	$54M	$71M	Accounts payablePayables
$27M	$37M	$76M	$48M	$63M	$142M	$207M	$282M	$206M	$200M	$181M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$399M	$401M	$678M	$643M	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$1.7B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$536M	$530M	$738M	$906M	$860M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	0.8×	0.9×	0.7×	2.4×	2.0×	1.7×	1.1×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$990M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$2.8B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$1.8B	$1.8B	GoodwillGoodwill
$5.0B	$5.2B	$11.0B	$14.2B	$14.7B	$16.9B	$17.5B	$16.1B	$15.3B	$14.3B	$14.1B	Total assetsAssets
$1.4B	$1.3B	$2.5B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$2.9B	Total debtDebt
$1.2B	$1.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$578M	$977M	$1.2B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.2×	1.0×	1.2×	1.1×	-0.8×	1.9×	1.3×	-1.5×	0.1×	-1.5×	-1.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($543M)	($73M)	$731M	$1.9B	$2.7B	$4.1B	$3.6B	$3.2B	$2.9B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%	0.9%	1.4%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$18M	—	$88M	$113M	—	$37M	$30M	$12M	$832M	$832M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
91.4M	93.4M	100M	118M	134M	176M	177M	152M	152M	145M	133M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$35.11	$35.67	$35.77	$45.00	$26.71	$33.65	$36.25	$41.83	$43.25	$48.14	$52.98	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.20	$5.07	$0.93	$0.37	$-5.00	$2.40	$1.26	$-3.22	$-2.05	$-5.83	$-7.18	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.40	$4.05	$2.59	$4.36	$1.51	$3.72	$3.48	$0.63	$-0.81	$0.42	$1.00	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.40	$4.05	$2.59	$4.36	$1.51	$3.72	$3.48	$0.63	$-0.81	$-0.96	$-0.21	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.06	$1.06	$0.92	$1.62	$1.02	$1.39	$1.49	$2.37	$3.17	$4.48	$4.63	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-5.94	$-0.78	$7.29	$15.73	$19.82	$23.35	$20.37	$21.05	$18.82	$12.68	$13.71	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.6%/yr	+12.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−20.7%/yr	−22.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+17.3%/yr	+34.4%/yr
Book value / share	—	−8.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

145Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

−13%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

36.2×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$61Mowner earningsvs.($843M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $61M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $447M it takes just to hold its position. It put $201M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($140M).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($843M)	($312M)	($490M)	$222M	$421M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$447M	+$434M	+$435M	+$568M	+$345M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$61M	+$53M	+$86M	+$58M	+$35M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$844M	+$184M	+$425M	+$31M	+$96M
Cash from operations	$508M	$359M	$456M	$878M	$896M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$447M	−$483M	−$360M	−$263M	−$244M
Owner earnings	$61M	($123M)	$96M	$615M	$652M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$201M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	($140M)	($123M)	$96M	$615M	$652M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	-2%	2%	10%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $447M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $201M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $61M), owner earnings is nearer $400K.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -1.5×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($674M) ÷ interest expense $448M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.2B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $687M − debt $2.9B

What this means
Netting $687M of cash and short-term investments against $2.9B of debt leaves $2.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -13%–75%; -13% latest = NOPAT ($532M) ÷ invested capital $4.1B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -2%–11%; latest $61M = operating cash $508M − maintenance capex $447M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put $201M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($140M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $61M of SBC) leaves $400K.
Are earnings backed by cash? $508M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($843M) · cash from operations $508M

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 578%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $354M ÷ Owner Earnings $61M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $61M of Owner Earnings, $354M (578%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $354M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $61M stock comp, the real buyback was about $294M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.45×

Expanding

Capex $648M ÷ depreciation $447M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.79×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.9B vs ($309M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −343%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-4.10/share (latest year $-6.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 16% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to −6% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −26%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2020 · −11.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +5.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We have begun using artificial intelligence, machine learning, data science and similar technologies in our business, and challenges with properly managing such technologies could result in reputational harm, competitive harm, and legal liability, and adversely affect our results of operations.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B

Cash & short-term investments$708M
Receivables$241M
Inventory$11M
Other current assets$200M

Current liabilities$1.4B

Debt due within a year$38M
Accounts payable$71M
Other current liabilities$1.3B

Current ratio0.82×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.81×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.50×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($256M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$38M due · $708M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($11.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$6.8B$3.9B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $8.9B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$145M

'27$1.4B

'28$11M

'29$1.3B

'30$800K

later$5M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$145Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$1.6Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.4Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$2.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$708M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$61M

Together, against $145M due next year5.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $769M against the $145M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 5.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$807M

'27$805M

'28$803M

'29$783M

'30$787M

later$5.2B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$807Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$9.2Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$6.0Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.9B

Lease obligations (present value)$6.0B

Total fixed claims on the business$8.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $8.9B, of which the leases are 68%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$2.6B · 49%
Buybacks$1.2B · 22%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.6B · 29%

Returned to owners$1.2B
41% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.2B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $478M.
Average price paid for buybacks$25.14
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 48M shares were bought for $1.2B, about $25.14 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $17.64 (2025) to $34.23 (2022), and 2022, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($601M).
Net change in share count45.9%
The diluted count rose from 91M to 133M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.2B22% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity97%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$4.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.6B of capital spent building

$1.1B written down across 7 years (2017, 2019, 2020, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 24% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Snowden	$65.9M	$8.0M	$652M
2022	Mr. Snowden	$14.1M	−$10.1M	$615M
2023	Mr. Snowden	$15.5M	$10.2M	$96M
2024	Mr. Snowden	$26.7M	$13.2M	($123M)
2025	Mr. Snowden	$24.1M	$10.4M	$61M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$61M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why PENN Entertainment Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

All 5 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.2% vs 9.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 9.4% early in the record and 0.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?45.9%
Diluted shares grew 45.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.2B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.4B → $2.9B
Debt rose from $1.4B to $2.9B while owner earnings went from about $316M to $11M — about 4.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 262 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 3% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $62M to $241M while revenue grew 120%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 3% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $3.3B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MGMMGM Resorts International	$17.5B	—	12.1%	13%	8%
LVSLas Vegas Sands Corp.	$13.0B	—	21.9%	16%	16%
CZRCaesars Entertainment Inc.	$11.5B	—	15.7%	5%	5%
WYNNWynn Resorts Limited	$7.1B	—	12.4%	6%	8%
PENNPENN Entertainment Inc.	$7.0B	—	12.1%	12%	8%
BYDBoyd Gaming	$4.1B	—	16.3%	14%	13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts	$2.5B	—	13.0%	4%	8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts	$2.0B	—	24.8%	—	13%
Group median	—	—	14.3%	12%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what PENN Entertainment Inc. has delivered.

PENN Entertainment Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, PENN Entertainment Inc. earns about $587M on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($587M) Net of stock comp (−$59M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($142M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($28M) on 134M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $2.2B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($617M) runs well above depreciation ($456M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $142M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PENN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PENN Entertainment Inc. (PENN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PENN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PENG its page in the Manual PEP →

Industry order: ← OSW the Hotels & Resorts chapter PK →