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ONIT, Onity Group Inc.
We are a financial services company that services and originates both forward and reverse mortgage loans, through our primary brands, PHH Mortgage and Liberty Reverse Mortgage.
Our core competencies revolve around our Servicing business with an Originations platform to replenish and pursue growth of our servicing portfolio.
Our servicing operations and customer interactions do not differentiate whether loans are serviced or subserviced.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 40% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from 12% to 61% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $961M | $1.1B | $954M | $1.1B | $976M | $1.1B | $1.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| $164M | $249M | $284M | $449M | $385M | $441M | $422M | $655M | $540M | $575M | $76M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 11.8% | 20.8% | 26.7% | 40.0% | 40.1% | 42.0% | 44.2% | 61.4% | 55.3% | 53.9% | 6.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($200M) | ($128M) | ($71M) | ($142M) | ($40M) | $18M | $26M | ($64M) | $34M | $190M | $175M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $421M | $409M | $273M | $152M | $261M | ($468M) | $173M | $10M | ($574M) | ($748M) | ($2.2B) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $25M | $27M | $27M | $32M | $19M | $10M | $11M | $7M | $5M | $4M | $4M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $590M | $504M | $314M | $259M | $280M | ($502M) | $132M | $57M | ($621M) | ($950M) | ($2.4B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $34M | $9M | $9M | $2M | $4M | $3M | $6M | $2M | $800K | $3M | $3M | CapexCapex |
| 2.4% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.6% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $388M | $400M | $264M | $150M | $257M | ($472M) | $168M | $8M | ($575M) | ($751M) | ($2.2B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 27.9% | 33.5% | 24.8% | 13.4% | 26.7% | −44.9% | 17.6% | 0.8% | −58.9% | −70.4% | −197.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $388M | $400M | $264M | $150M | $257M | ($472M) | $168M | $8M | ($575M) | ($751M) | ($2.2B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 27.9% | 33.5% | 24.8% | 13.4% | 26.7% | −44.9% | 17.6% | 0.8% | −58.9% | −70.4% | −197.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $33M | $0 | $0 | $5M | — | — | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $6M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $5M | $0 | $50M | $0 | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -31% | -23% | -13% | -34% | -10% | 4% | 6% | -16% | 8% | 30% | 28% | Return on equityROE |
| −31% | −23% | −13% | −34% | −10% | 4% | 6% | −16% | 8% | 30% | 28% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $257M | $260M | $329M | $428M | $285M | $193M | $208M | $202M | $185M | $181M | $183M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $7.7B | $8.4B | $9.4B | $10.4B | $10.7B | $12.1B | $12.4B | $12.5B | $16.4B | $16.2B | $17.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $347M | $347M | $449M | $311M | $312M | $615M | $600M | $596M | $487M | $490M | $2.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $90M | $88M | $120M | ($117M) | $27M | $422M | $392M | $394M | $303M | $309M | $2.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.4× | 2.0× | 2.7× | 3.9× | 3.5× | 3.1× | 2.3× | 2.4× | 1.9× | 1.9× | 0.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $653M | $545M | $555M | $412M | $415M | $477M | $457M | $402M | $443M | $628M | $629M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 124M | 127M | 8.9M | 9.0M | 8.7M | 9.4M | 9.0M | 7.6M | 8.1M | 8.6M | 9.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $11.19 | $9.40 | $119.26 | $125.34 | $109.83 | $111.92 | $106.02 | $139.70 | $120.68 | $123.50 | $123.71 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.61 | $-1.01 | $-7.94 | $-15.86 | $-4.59 | $1.93 | $2.86 | $-8.34 | $4.19 | $21.94 | $19.48 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.13 | $3.15 | $29.57 | $16.73 | $29.36 | $-50.27 | $18.64 | $1.07 | $-71.05 | $-86.94 | $-244.10 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.13 | $3.15 | $29.57 | $16.73 | $29.36 | $-50.27 | $18.64 | $1.07 | $-71.05 | $-86.94 | $-244.10 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.27 | $0.07 | $1.01 | $0.22 | $0.47 | $0.35 | $0.61 | $0.29 | $0.10 | $0.34 | $0.30 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $5.27 | $4.29 | $62.23 | $45.98 | $47.48 | $50.81 | $50.76 | $52.62 | $54.76 | $72.70 | $70.05 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/14.26 into 2018 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +30.6%/yr | +2.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +2.4%/yr | −6.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +33.9%/yr | +8.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $190M of profit but ($751M) of owner earnings: $940M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $190M | $34M | ($64M) | $26M | $18M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$4M | +$5M | +$7M | +$11M | +$10M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$8M | +$8M | +$10M | +$5M | +$5M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$950M | −$621M | +$57M | +$132M | −$502M |
| Cash from operations | ($748M) | ($574M) | $10M | $173M | ($468M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$3M | −$800K | −$2M | −$6M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | ($751M) | ($575M) | $8M | $168M | ($472M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -70% | -59% | 1% | 18% | -45% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer ($759M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $76M ÷ interest expense $309M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.5B · 33.3× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $181M − debt $2.7B
What this means
Netting $181M of cash and short-term investments against $2.7B of debt leaves $2.5B owed, about 33.3× a year's operating profit (35.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT $76M ÷ invested capital $3.2B (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -70%–33%; latest ($751M) = operating cash ($748M) − maintenance capex $3MIndustry peers: median 29%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -70% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves ($759M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? -3.95×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($748M) ÷ net income $190M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.66×HarvestingCapex $3M ÷ depreciation $4M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.31/share (latest year $22.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $74.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 20% → 57% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 20% early to 57% lately, median 40% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2016 · 11.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“If we are unable to use generative AI, it could make our business less efficient and result in competitive disadvantages.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Glen Messina | $6.6M | $10.7M | ($472M) |
| 2022 | Glen Messina | $6.0M | $2.7M | $168M |
| 2023 | Glen Messina | $8.2M | $4.8M | $8M |
| 2024 | Glen Messina | $8.4M | $8.7M | ($575M) |
| 2025 | Glen Messina | $7.6M | $14.7M | ($751M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership10.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Does management own its misses?1 plain admission in this year's filing
“On April 30, 2025, the USVI filed an additional lawsuit against us alleging that we did not meet the conditions for receiving benefits under our Economic Development Commission Certificate.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Mortgage & Specialty Finance
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UWMCUWM Holdings Corporation | $3.2B | — | 13.9% | 4% | -86% |
| PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd. | $1.3B | 41% | -1.3% | 4% | 3% |
| PRAAPRA Group Inc. | $1.2B | — | 570.9% | 6% | 124% |
| ONITOnity Group Inc. | $1.1B | — | 41.0% | 2% | 15% |
| PWPPerella Weinberg Partners | $751M | — | -7.6% | — | 15% |
| RMRegional Management Corp. | $646M | — | 21.6% | 6% | 43% |
| WRLDWorld Acceptance Corporation | $585M | — | 16.9% | 8% | 44% |
| FIGRFigure Technology Solutions Inc. | $507M | — | 2.7% | 4% | — |
| Group median | — | — | 15.4% | 4% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Onity Group Inc. has delivered.
Onity Group Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Onity Group Inc. earns about $165M on its 15.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −70.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($2.2B) on 8M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $2.5B. The if-converted diluted count is 9M, 7% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ONDS its page in the Manual ONMD →
Industry order: ← HASI the Mortgage & Specialty Finance chapter PFSI →