Owner Scorecard


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PI, Impinj Inc.

Electronic Components & Instruments asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We design and sell a platform that enables that wireless item-to-cloud connectivity and with which we and our partners innovate IoT solutions.

We have enabled connectivity for more than 150 billion items to date, delivering item visibility, traceability and improved operational efficiencies for retailers, supply chain and logistics, or SC&L providers, restaurants and food-service providers, airlines, automobile manufacturers, healthcare companies and many more.

We and our partner ecosystem build item-visibility solutions using products that we design and either sell or license, including silicon radios, reading systems, tag production systems and intellectual property.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PI · Impinj Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$361M
−1.4% YoY · 21% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $361M 5-yr avg $297M
Gross margin 52% 5-yr avg 52%
Operating margin −1.8% 5-yr avg −8.7%
ROIC −1% 5-yr avg −8%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Endpoint ICs (83%) and Systems (17%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −14% through the cycle on a 52% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −14%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Endpoint ICs is 83% of revenue, with Systems the other meaningful line at 17%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Endpoint ICs83%$300M
  • Systems17%$61M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$112M$125M$123M$153M$139M$190M$258M$308M$366M$361M$361MRevenueRevenue
53%52%48%48%47%52%53%49%52%53%52%Gross marginGross mgn
11%14%18%16%25%19%18%20%14%14%14%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
22%26%28%25%35%34%29%29%27%28%29%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($488K)($17M)($35M)($22M)($47M)($37M)($19M)($43M)($7M)($737K)($6M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−0.4%−13.6%−28.4%−14.2%−33.9%−19.6%−7.6%−14.1%−1.9%−0.2%−1.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($2M)($17M)($35M)($23M)($52M)($51M)($24M)($43M)$41M($11M)($28M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($9M)($36M)($12M)$5M($17M)$6M$641K($49M)$128M$59M$74MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$4M$5M$5M$5M$5M$6M$14M$14M$15M$15MDepreciationDeprec.
($13M)($30M)$8M$4M$5M$13M($24M)($68M)$17M($710K)$29MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4M$7M$6M$2M$3M$16M$12M$19M$17M$13M$13MCapexCapex
3.1%5.2%5.2%1.6%2.2%8.5%4.7%6.0%4.7%3.6%3.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($13M)($40M)($16M)$2M($20M)$2M($5M)($63M)$115M$46M$61MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−11.6%−31.8%−13.3%1.5%−14.4%1.0%−2.1%−20.5%31.3%12.7%16.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($13M)($42M)($18M)$2M($20M)($10M)($11M)($68M)$111M$46M$61MFree cash flowFCF
−11.6%−33.9%−14.8%1.5%−14.4%−5.1%−4.4%−22.1%30.4%12.7%16.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-0%-12%-27%-16%-27%-19%-6%-16%-1%-0%-1%ROICROIC
-1%-15%-36%-18%-48%-156%-127%27%-5%-14%Return on equityROE
−1%−15%−36%−18%−48%−156%−127%27%−5%−14%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$101M$58M$56M$116M$106M$193M$174M$113M$165M$175M$132MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$17M$22M$18M$24M$25M$35M$50M$55M$57M$71M$72MReceivablesReceiv.
$28M$47M$45M$34M$36M$22M$46M$97M$99M$85M$86MInventoryInvent.
$7M$5M$5M$6M$10M$12M$25M$9M$17M$14M$15MAccounts payablePayables
$38M$65M$59M$52M$51M$46M$71M$143M$139M$142M$143MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$149M$130M$121M$177M$171M$256M$275M$270M$326M$339M$299MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$25M$20M$23M$19M$28M$36M$42M$31M$331M$127M$33MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.9×6.5×5.3×9.1×6.2×7.2×6.5×8.7×1.0×2.7×9.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4M$4M$4M$20M$19M$21M$20MGoodwillGoodwill
$168M$152M$145M$215M$208M$316M$350M$359M$489M$545M$503MTotal assetsAssets
$12M$10M$24M$51M$55M$288M$280M$282M$567M$281M$241MTotal debtDebt
($88M)($49M)($33M)($66M)($52M)$95M$106M$169M$402M$106M$110MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.3×-18.7×-24.9×-12.1×-8.7×-14.6×-4.0×-9.0×-1.5×-0.2×-1.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$124M$119M$98M$125M$109M($11M)$16M$34M$150M$209M$204MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.5%5.9%9.2%12.1%18.5%21.3%16.5%15.6%15.4%15.3%15.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
21.6M20.7M21.3M21.8M22.8M24.2M25.5M26.8M29.5M29.3M30.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.21$6.06$5.75$7.00$6.09$7.87$10.09$11.50$12.42$12.33$11.92Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.08$-0.84$-1.65$-1.05$-2.28$-2.12$-0.95$-1.62$1.39$-0.37$-0.91EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.60$-1.93$-0.76$0.10$-0.87$0.08$-0.21$-2.36$3.89$1.57$2.02Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.60$-2.05$-0.85$0.10$-0.87$-0.40$-0.45$-2.54$3.77$1.57$2.02Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.32$0.30$0.11$0.13$0.67$0.47$0.69$0.58$0.44$0.42Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.75$5.75$4.59$5.73$4.78$-0.46$0.61$1.28$5.09$7.15$6.73Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2017 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.0%/yr+15.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.6%/yr+26.7%/yr
Book value / share+2.4%/yr+8.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Systems+1.8%
    “Systems revenue increased $1.1 million due to an increase in shipment volumes.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
29Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
−0%low FY2020
Gross margin
53%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.3×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$46Mowner earningsvs.($11M)net incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $11M loss into $46M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($11M)$41M($43M)($24M)($51M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$15M+$14M+$14M+$6M+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$55M+$57M+$48M+$42M+$40M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$710K+$17M−$68M−$24M+$13M
Cash from operations$59M$128M($49M)$641K$6M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$13M−$14M−$14M−$6M−$5M
Owner earnings$46M$115M($63M)($5M)$2M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$4M−$5M−$6M−$12M
Free cash flow$46M$111M($68M)($11M)($10M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%31%-20%-2%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $55M), owner earnings is nearer ($9M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($737K) ÷ interest expense $4M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $48M + ST investments $127M − debt $281M
    What this means

    Netting $175M of cash and short-term investments against $281M of debt leaves $106M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 72 + DIO 181 − DPO 29 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -27%–-0%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($582K) ÷ invested capital $442M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $46M = operating cash $59M − maintenance capex $13M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -12%)
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a -12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $55M of SBC) leaves ($9M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($11M) · cash from operations $59M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.86×
    Maintaining
    Capex $13M ÷ depreciation $15M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $361M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.68×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $281M vs $213M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.15/share (latest year $-0.36), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −14% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −14% early to −5% lately, median −14% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −0%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2020 · −33.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our use of open-source software and AI tools may expose us to additional risks and weaken our intellectual property rights.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$299M
  • Cash & short-term investments$132M
  • Receivables$72M
  • Inventory$86M
  • Other current assets$9M
Current liabilities$33M
  • Accounts payable$15M
  • Other current liabilities$17M
Current ratio9.20×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio6.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio4.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$267Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 9.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$175Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$420KGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$265M$24M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $75M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$99M · 131%
  • Source of funding−$23M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $23M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $12M to $241M.

  • Net change in share count40.5%

    The diluted count rose from 22M to 30M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Chris Diorio, Ph.D.$5.9M$19.3M$2M
2022Chris Diorio, Ph.D.$5.5M$11.2M($5M)
2023Chris Diorio, Ph.D.$6.8M$1.3M($63M)
2024Chris Diorio, Ph.D.$11.2M$21.8M$115M
2025Chris Diorio, Ph.D.$7.1M$8.2M$46M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$55M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 15% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Impinj Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?40.5%

    Diluted shares grew 40.5% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$12M → $241M

    Debt rose from $12M to $241M while owner earnings went from about ($23M) to $33M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VREXVarex Imaging Corporation$845M33%7.2%6%7%
MXLMaxLinear Inc.$468M55%-5.3%-3%15%
POWIPower Integrations$444M51%13.4%11%17%
SKYTSkyWater Technology Inc.$442M16%-6.2%-14%-12%
VICRVicor Corporation$408M47%6.3%10%8%
AMBAAmbarella$391M61%-21.4%-15%11%
PIImpinj Inc.$361M52%-13.9%-14%-7%
VPGVishay Precision Group Inc.$307M39%8.7%9%5%
Group median49%0.5%1%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Impinj Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−59%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $61M on 30M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $110M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Impinj Inc. (PI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PHUN its page in the Manual PII →

Industry order: ← OPTX the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter PLUS →