Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← PKOH Manual PLAB → ← ONDS Communications Equipment QCOM →

PL, Planet Labs PBC

Communications Equipment capital-intensive UnprofitableCapital build-out

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
PL · Planet Labs PBC
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$308M
+25.9% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $336M 5-yr avg $219M
Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 50%
Operating margin −31.9% 5-yr avg −69.0%
ROIC −112% 5-yr avg −40%
Owner-earnings margin 27% 5-yr avg −24%
Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg −26%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 25% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −77% through the cycle on a 49% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −40%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$96M$113M$131M$191M$221M$244M$308M$336MRevenueRevenue
−7%23%37%49%51%57%56%56%Gross marginGross mgn
28%28%43%42%36%32%29%29%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
40%39%51%58%53%41%35%35%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($106M)($87M)($128M)($176M)($170M)($116M)($95M)($107M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−111.2%−77.3%−97.6%−91.9%−76.9%−47.5%−30.9%−31.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($124M)($127M)($137M)($162M)($141M)($123M)($247M)($373M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($34M)($4M)($42M)($74M)($51M)($14M)$134M$132MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$78M$62M$45M$43M$48M$46M$42M$42MDepreciationDeprec.
$7M$47M$8M($31M)($15M)$15M$284M$405MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$17M$26M$10M$10M$38M$44M$77M$86MCapexCapex
17.4%23.1%7.9%5.5%17.2%18.1%24.9%25.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($50M)($30M)($53M)($84M)($89M)($59M)$93M$91MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−52.6%−26.6%−40.0%−44.1%−40.2%−24.0%30.1%27.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($50M)($30M)($53M)($84M)($89M)($59M)$58M$47MFree cash flowFCF
−52.6%−26.6%−40.0%−44.1%−40.2%−24.0%18.7%13.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M$0$10M$4M$8M$1M$5M$5MAcquisitionsAcquis.
-44%-53%-64%-35%-31%-28%-112%ROICROIC
-57%-118%-21%-28%-27%-28%-131%-84%Return on equityROE
−57%−118%−21%−28%−27%−28%−131%−84%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$28M$71M$491M$182M$84M$118M$229M$368MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$47M$44M$39M$43M$56M$84M$62MReceivablesReceiv.
$0$6M$9MInventoryInvent.
$1M$3M$7M$3M$3M$11M$9MAccounts payablePayables
$46M$42M$32M$41M$53M$79M$62MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$125M$552M$476M$370M$302M$775M$849MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$109M$132M$122M$137M$142M$469M$303MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×4.2×3.9×2.7×2.1×1.7×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$88M$88M$103M$113M$136M$136M$143M$143MGoodwillGoodwill
$399M$821M$753M$702M$634M$1.1B$1.3BTotal assetsAssets
$93M$0$0Total debtDebt
$22M($491M)($368M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-15.3×-9.3×-14.6×-139.6×-27.7×-24.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$218M$108M$648M$576M$518M$441M$188M$444MShareholders’ equityEquity
5.3%12.4%32.0%39.5%25.9%19.8%17.9%17.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
42.9M44.2M79.6M267M280M292M308M346MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.23$2.56$1.65$0.72$0.79$0.84$1.00$0.97Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.89$-2.87$-1.72$-0.61$-0.50$-0.42$-0.80$-1.08EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.17$-0.68$-0.66$-0.32$-0.32$-0.20$0.30$0.26Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.17$-0.68$-0.66$-0.32$-0.32$-0.20$0.19$0.13Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.39$0.59$0.13$0.04$0.14$0.15$0.25$0.25Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.08$2.43$8.14$2.16$1.85$1.51$0.61$1.28Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.8 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×3.36 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−12.5%/yr−17.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−7.1%/yr−15.8%/yr
Book value / share−29.7%/yr−24.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
308Mpeak FY2026
ROIC
−28%low FY2022
Gross margin
56%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$93Mowner earningsvs.($247M)net incomelow FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $93M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $42M it takes just to hold its position. It put $35M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $58M.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($247M)($123M)($141M)($162M)($137M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$42M+$46M+$48M+$43M+$45M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$55M+$48M+$57M+$76M+$42M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$284M+$15M−$15M−$31M+$8M
Cash from operations$134M($14M)($51M)($74M)($42M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$42M−$44M−$38M−$10M−$10M
Owner earnings$93M($59M)($89M)($84M)($53M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$35M
Free cash flow$58M($59M)($89M)($84M)($53M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue30%-24%-40%-44%-40%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $42M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $35M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $55M), owner earnings is nearer $38M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($95M) ÷ interest expense $3M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $229M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $229M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 99 + DIO 17 − DPO 29 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($41M) = debt $0 + equity $188M − cash
    Industry peers: median -8%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $93M = operating cash $134M − maintenance capex $42M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -40%)
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 30% of revenue this year, a -40% median across 7 years. It chose to put $35M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $58M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $55M of SBC) leaves $38M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($247M) · cash from operations $134M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.83×
    Expanding
    Capex $77M ÷ depreciation $42M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $308M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.65×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $306M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.49/share (latest year $-0.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −95% → −52% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −95% early to −52% lately, median −77% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −111.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“As we expand our offerings to include more integrated downstream and AI-enabled solutions, we may increasingly compete with our own strategic partners and resellers who offer similar solutions, which could create actual or perceived conflicts of interest, potentially leading such partners to reduce their reliance on ou…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$849M
  • Cash & short-term investments$368M
  • Receivables$62M
  • Inventory$9M
  • Other current assets$410M
Current liabilities$303M
  • Accounts payable$9M
  • Other current liabilities$294M
Current ratio2.81×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.78×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.22×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$546Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+42.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 2.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$275Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$41MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$40M$40M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$247Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022William Marshall$10.9M$6.9M($53M)
2023William Marshall$610k−$352k($84M)
2024William Marshall$6.3M−$39k($89M)
2025William Marshall$4.7M$14.1M($59M)
2026William Marshall$4.6M$58.3M$93M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership10.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$55M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 18% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$44M · 13% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2026, two customers accounted for 13% and 12% of revenue.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Communications Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AIOTPowerFleet Inc.$444M50%-7.1%-8%-2%
HLITHarmonic Inc.$361M50%3.5%3%2%
SITMSiTime$327M53%-8.3%-8%8%
PLPlanet Labs PBC$308M49%-77.3%-40%-40%
AMSCAmerican Superconductor Corporation$299M15%-23.0%-31%-15%
NSSCNAPCO Security Technologies Inc.$182M43%13.4%23%9%
CLFDClearfield Inc.$150M40%8.1%9%6%
BKSYBlackSky Technology Inc.$107M-95.8%-36%-64%
Group median49%-7.7%-8%-0%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Planet Labs PBC has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $47M on 346M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $368M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($86M) runs well above depreciation ($42M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $91M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Planet Labs PBC (PL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PKOH its page in the Manual PLAB →

Industry order: ← ONDS the Communications Equipment chapter QCOM →