Owner Scorecard


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ONDS, Ondas Inc.

Communications Equipment capital-intensive

Ondas Inc. is a defense, security, and critical infrastructure technology company organized around three business units: Ondas Autonomous Systems Inc.

Through these business units, we develop and commercialize autonomous systems, private wireless networking technologies, and strategic investment and partnership initiatives that support the scaling and adoption of mission-critical solutions for governments and industrial customers.

OAS focuses on autonomous and unmanned aerial and ground systems and integrated mission solutions for defense, homeland security, public safety, and other critical infrastructure and industrial end markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ONDS · Ondas Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$51M
+605.3% YoY · 88% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $97M 5-yr avg $16M
Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 35%
Operating margin −93.9% 5-yr avg −946.8%
ROIC −136% 5-yr avg −349%
Owner-earnings margin −88% 5-yr avg −661%
Free cash flow margin −90% 5-yr avg −664%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Product revenue (68%), Service revenue (20%) and Development revenue (12%).
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −618% through the cycle on a 43% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Inventory runs near 63% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −139%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Product revenue is 68% of revenue, with Service revenue the other meaningful line at 20%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Product revenue68%$35M
  • Service revenue20%$10M
  • Development revenue12%$6M
By geographyIsrael61%Other Countries15%Germany13%United Arab Emirates8%United States3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$274K$190K$320K$2M$3M$2M$16M$7M$51M$97MRevenueRevenue
71%79%75%43%38%52%41%5%40%45%Gross marginGross mgn
395%n/mn/m353%405%n/m137%238%88%85%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
365%n/mn/m166%200%n/m109%173%41%32%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($2M)($8M)($15M)($12M)($18M)($69M)($40M)($35M)($58M)($91M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−872.6%n/mn/m−532.6%−618.3%n/m−253.2%−481.1%−115.1%−93.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($3M)($12M)($19M)($13M)($15M)($73M)($45M)($38M)($132M)$245MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($3M)($9M)($15M)($8M)($17M)($38M)($34M)($33M)($39M)($83M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$13K$55K$143K$118K$2M$4M$5M$602K$946K$1MDepreciationDeprec.
$377K$4M$4M$1M($7M)$25M$5M$3M$77M($364M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$544K$78K$9K$924K$3M$211K$2M$2M$3MCapexCapex
286.4%24.3%0.4%31.8%135.5%1.3%22.7%4.0%3.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($9M)($15M)($8M)($18M)($41M)($34M)($34M)($40M)($85M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
n/mn/m−348.6%−613.0%n/m−218.1%−473.7%−78.2%−87.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($9M)($15M)($8M)($18M)($41M)($34M)($35M)($41M)($87M)Free cash flowFCF
n/mn/m−348.6%−613.0%n/m−218.1%−488.0%−80.4%−89.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$7M$135K$3M$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
-20%-129%-150%-1097%-136%ROICROIC
-89%-13%-126%-135%-229%-30%23%Return on equityROE
−89%−13%−126%−135%−229%−30%23%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$456K$1M$2M$26M$41M$30M$15M$30M$551M$1.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$32K$30K$20K$48K$1M$104K$3M$5M$22M$45MReceivablesReceiv.
$173K$348K$428K$1M$1M$2M$2M$10M$22M$34MInventoryInvent.
$796K$1M$2M$2M$2M$3M$5M$6M$14M$17MAccounts payablePayables
($591K)($734K)($2M)($1M)($20K)($689K)$440K$9M$30M$63MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$705K$2M$3M$28M$45M$36M$24M$48M$686M$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$6M$17M$16M$12M$5M$23M$36M$51M$142M$149MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.1×0.1×0.2×2.2×9.7×1.6×0.7×0.9×4.8×10.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$45M$26M$28M$28M$252M$382MGoodwillGoodwill
$718K$3M$4M$29M$117M$98M$92M$110M$1.1B$2.4BTotal assetsAssets
$3M$300K$540K$907K$300K$14M$3M$16M$4M$19MTotal debtDebt
$2M($830K)($2M)($25M)($41M)($16M)($12M)($14M)($547M)($1.5B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.7×-3.2×-5.2×-5.9×-31.2×-18.5×-9.6×-9.6×-8.9×-29.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($8M)($15M)($12M)$15M$112M$58M$33M$17M$438M$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%292.8%216.1%111.9%275.5%6.7%17.6%31.6%35.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
16.2M28.5M17.6M20.4M34.2M42.2M52.7M69.9M222M462KShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.02$0.01$0.02$0.11$0.09$0.05$0.30$0.10$0.23$209.23Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.19$-0.42$-1.10$-0.66$-0.44$-1.73$-0.85$-0.54$-0.60$529.98EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.30$-0.84$-0.37$-0.52$-0.97$-0.65$-0.49$-0.18$-183.71Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.32$-0.84$-0.37$-0.52$-0.97$-0.65$-0.50$-0.18$-187.52Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02$0.00$0.00$0.03$0.07$0.00$0.02$0.01$6.92Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.49$-0.52$-0.71$0.74$3.28$1.38$0.63$0.24$1.97$2326.16Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.76 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.62 into 2019 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.67 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×3.17 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/480.33 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+38.4%/yr+16.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−9.9%/yr (7-yr)+85.2%/yr
Book value / share+21.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+605.3%
    “Revenues in our OAS segment increased by $44.5 million, primarily due to $26.9 million in revenue generated by companies acquired during the year.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
222Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−1097%low FY2024
Gross margin
40%low FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($40M)owner earningsvs.($132M)net incomelow FY2022

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($40M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $946K it takes just to hold its position. It put $1M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($41M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($132M)($38M)($45M)($73M)($15M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$946K+$602K+$5M+$4M+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$16M+$1M+$1M+$6M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$77M+$3M+$5M+$25M−$7M
Cash from operations($39M)($33M)($34M)($38M)($17M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$946K−$602K−$211K−$3M−$924K
Owner earnings($40M)($34M)($34M)($41M)($18M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$1M−$1M
Free cash flow($41M)($35M)($34M)($41M)($18M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-78%-474%-218%-1921%-613%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $946K, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer ($56M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($58M) ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $551M − debt $16M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $535M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 161 + DIO 262 − DPO 166 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($97M) = debt $16M + equity $438M − cash
    Industry peers: median -29%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -4601%–-78%; latest ($40M) = operating cash ($39M) − maintenance capex $946K
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -78% of revenue this year, a -613% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves ($56M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($132M) · cash from operations ($39M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.15×
    Expanding
    Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $946K
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $51M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.84×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $16M vs $544M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 9 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.14/share (latest year $-0.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −3370% → −283% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −3370% early to −283% lately, median −618% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2019 · −4798.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“The development and use of artificial intelligence technologies presents risks that may affect our business, operations, and competitive position.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.5B
  • Receivables$45M
  • Inventory$34M
  • Other current assets$76M
Current liabilities$149M
  • Accounts payable$17M
  • Other current liabilities$133M
Current ratio10.91×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio10.68×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio9.87×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway17.0 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1079.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 10.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$380Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$270MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$12M$12M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$20Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$389M34% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity58%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$9Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $8M of capital spent building

$19M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Eric Brock$222k$222k($34M)
2024Eric Brock$219k$219k($34M)
2025Eric Brock$426k$426k($40M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 32% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ondas Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3M → $19M

    Debt rose from $3M to $19M while owner earnings went from about ($10M) to ($36M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Communications Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HLITHarmonic Inc.$361M50%3.5%3%2%
NSSCNAPCO Security Technologies Inc.$182M43%13.4%23%9%
CLFDClearfield Inc.$150M40%8.1%9%6%
BKSYBlackSky Technology Inc.$107M-95.8%-36%-64%
MRAMEverspin Technologies Inc.$55M52%-14.1%-29%11%
ONDSOndas Inc.$51M43%-618.3%-139%-543%
SATLSatellogic Inc.$18M-405.6%-194%-318%
UMACUnusual Machines Inc.$11M-224.6%-242%-190%
Group median43%-55.0%-33%-31%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Ondas Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered80%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−90%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ondas Inc. (ONDS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ONDS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ONC its page in the Manual ONIT →

Industry order: ← NTGR the Communications Equipment chapter PL →