Owner Scorecard


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SBUX, Starbucks Corporation

Restaurants consumer brand

Starbucks sells coffee, tea, and other drinks, along with food and packaged goods, through stores it runs itself and stores that other operators license to carry its brands. It buys green coffee beans, roasts them, and sells the finished cup for well above what the beans cost. The money arrives as a great many small daily purchases across a wide store base spread across much of the world.

We purchase and roast high-quality coffees that we sell, along with handcrafted coffee, tea, and other beverages and a variety of high-quality food items through company-operated stores ("stores" or "coffeehouses").

Our primary objective is to maintain Starbucks standing as one of the most recognized and respected brands in the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SBUX · Starbucks Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$37.2B
+2.8% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $38.5B 5-yr avg $34.1B
Operating margin 7.6% 5-yr avg 14.1%
ROIC 35% 5-yr avg 98%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
The question that governs this business is whether the gap between a bean and a cup rests on a brand people will pay extra for, or on a drink anyone can pour. Both the premium and the commodity price of green coffee turn on supply and demand at the moment of purchase, and the company depends on a limited set of suppliers for some of what it sells; whatever markup the name commands must still clear rent, wages, and bean cost before an owner sees a dollar, and the distance between the gross margin and what survives to operating profit is where that toll shows up. So watch the tests of a franchise: whether the name carries real pricing power, whether returns on each dollar put back into stores hold up, and whether the firm reaches for debt to fund it. The figures are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 96%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

27% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States73%$27.1B
  • International19%$6.9B
  • China9%$3.2B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$21.3B$22.4B$24.7B$26.5B$23.5B$29.1B$32.3B$36.0B$36.2B$37.2B$38.5BRevenueRevenue
60%68%68%68%78%Gross marginGross mgn
7%6%7%7%7%7%6%7%7%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$4.2B$4.1B$3.9B$4.1B$1.6B$4.9B$4.6B$5.9B$5.4B$2.9B$2.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
19.6%18.5%15.7%15.4%6.6%16.8%14.3%16.3%15.0%7.9%7.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.8B$2.9B$4.5B$3.6B$928M$4.2B$3.3B$4.1B$3.8B$1.9B$1.5BNet incomeNet inc.
33%33%22%19%21%22%22%24%24%26%40%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$4.7B$4.3B$11.9B$5.0B$1.6B$6.0B$4.4B$6.0B$6.1B$4.7B$4.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.0B$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$1.7BDepreciationDeprec.
$632M$124M$5.9B($310M)($1.1B)($53M)($685M)$131M$434M$801M$766MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$1.4B$1.5B$2.0B$1.8B$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$2.3B$2.8B$2.3B$1.6BCapexCapex
6.8%6.8%8.0%6.8%6.3%5.1%5.7%6.5%7.7%6.2%4.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3.7B$3.2B$10.6B$3.2B$114M$4.5B$2.6B$4.6B$4.5B$3.0B$2.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
17.2%14.2%43.0%12.2%0.5%15.6%7.9%12.7%12.4%8.0%7.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3.3B$2.7B$10.0B$3.2B$114M$4.5B$2.6B$3.7B$3.3B$2.4B$2.7BFree cash flowFCF
15.3%12.2%40.3%12.2%0.5%15.6%7.9%10.2%9.2%6.6%7.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$1.3B$0$0$0$0$177M$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.3B$2.4B$2.6B$2.8B$2.8BDividends paidDiv. paid
$2.0B$2.0B$7.1B$10.2B$1.7B$0$4.0B$984M$1.3B$0BuybacksBuybacks
38%40%164%146%33%135%107%117%85%46%35%ROICROIC
48%53%386%Return on equityROE
28%26%237%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3.4B$3.2B$9.2B$3.0B$4.8B$6.9B$3.2B$4.0B$3.5B$3.5B$2.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$769M$870M$693M$879M$883M$940M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$2.2B$1.8B$1.8B$2.2B$2.2BInventoryInvent.
$731M$783M$1.2B$1.2B$998M$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.9B$1.7BAccounts payablePayables
$1.4B$1.5B$914M$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.9B$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.8BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$4.8B$5.3B$12.5B$5.7B$7.8B$9.8B$7.0B$7.3B$6.8B$7.4B$10.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$4.5B$4.2B$5.7B$6.2B$7.3B$8.2B$9.2B$9.3B$9.1B$10.2B$11.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.3×2.2×0.9×1.1×1.2×0.8×0.8×0.8×0.7×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.7B$1.5B$3.5B$3.5B$3.6B$3.7B$3.3B$3.2B$3.3B$3.4B$1.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$14.3B$14.4B$24.2B$19.2B$29.4B$31.4B$28.0B$29.4B$31.3B$32.0B$30.6BTotal assetsAssets
$3.6B$3.9B$9.4B$11.2B$15.9B$14.6B$14.9B$15.4B$15.6B$16.1B$15.1BTotal debtDebt
$180M$699M$235M$8.2B$11.1B$7.7B$11.7B$11.4B$12.0B$12.6B$13.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
51.3×44.7×22.8×12.3×3.6×10.4×9.6×10.7×9.6×5.4×5.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.9B$5.5B$1.2B($6.2B)($7.8B)($5.3B)($8.7B)($8.0B)($7.4B)($8.1B)($8.5B)Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%0.8%1.0%1.2%1.1%1.1%0.8%0.8%0.9%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$87M$38M$11MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
1.49B1.46B1.39B1.23B1.18B1.19B1.16B1.15B1.14B1.14B1.14BShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.34$15.32$17.73$21.50$19.90$24.51$27.84$31.25$31.81$32.62$33.67Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.90$1.97$3.24$2.92$0.79$3.54$2.83$3.58$3.31$1.63$1.31EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.47$2.18$7.62$2.63$0.10$3.81$2.21$3.96$3.96$2.61$2.39Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.19$1.87$7.14$2.63$0.10$3.81$2.21$3.19$2.92$2.14$2.39Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.79$0.99$1.25$1.43$1.63$1.79$1.95$2.11$2.27$2.43$2.45Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.97$1.04$1.42$1.46$1.26$1.24$1.59$2.03$2.44$2.02$1.42Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.96$3.73$0.84$-5.05$-6.60$-4.49$-7.52$-6.94$-6.55$-7.10$-7.41Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.6%/yr+10.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+0.6%/yr+93.3%/yr
EPS−1.7%/yr+15.7%/yr
Dividends / share+13.3%/yr+8.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.5%/yr+10.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.1Bpeak FY2016
ROIC
46%low FY2020
Gross margin
68%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.2×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.0Bowner earningsvs.$1.9Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $3.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put $534M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $2.4B.

Reported net income$1.9B
Owner earnings$3.0B · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.9B$3.8B$4.1B$3.3B$4.2B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.8B+$1.6B+$1.5B+$1.5B+$1.5B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$318M+$308M+$303M+$272M+$319M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$801M+$434M+$131M−$685M−$53M
Cash from operations$4.7B$6.1B$6.0B$4.4B$6.0B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$1.8B−$1.6B−$1.5B−$1.8B−$1.5B
Owner earnings$3.0B$4.5B$4.6B$2.6B$4.5B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$534M−$1.2B−$883M
Free cash flow$2.4B$3.3B$3.7B$2.6B$4.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%12%13%8%16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $534M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $318M), owner earnings is nearer $2.7B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $2.9B ÷ interest expense $543M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $12.6B · 4.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $3.2B + ST investments $247M − debt $16.1B
    What this means

    Netting $3.5B of cash and short-term investments against $16.1B of debt leaves $12.6B owed, about 4.3× a year's operating profit (5.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $282M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $12.3B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 13 + DIO 94 − DPO 79 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 33%–164%; 46% latest = NOPAT $2.2B ÷ invested capital $4.8B
    Industry peers: median 27%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 46% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–43%; latest $3.0B = operating cash $4.7B − maintenance capex $1.8B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. It chose to put $534M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $2.4B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $318M of SBC) leaves $2.7B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $4.7B ÷ net income $1.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $2.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.0B
    What this means

    Of $3.0B Owner Earnings, $2.8B (93%) went back to shareholders, $2.8B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.30×
    Expanding
    Capex $2.3B ÷ depreciation $1.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $37.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.72×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $16.1B vs ($2.8B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −5%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.85/share (latest year $1.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-7.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to 13% lately, median 15% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 6.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$10.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.7B
  • Receivables$1.3B
  • Inventory$2.2B
  • Other current assets$5.4B
Current liabilities$11.4B
  • Debt due within a year$2.0B
  • Accounts payable$1.7B
  • Other current liabilities$7.8B
Current ratio0.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($890M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.0B due · $1.7B cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($9.9B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($28.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$24.4B$9.3B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $26.6B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$7.5Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.5B
'27$1.5B
'28$1.4B
'29$1.8B
'30$1.3B
later$8.8B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.5Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$3.0Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.8Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$16.2Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 29, 2026$1.7B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.0B
Together, against $1.5B due next year3.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 29, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $4.7B against the $1.5B due in the twelve months after the Sep 28, 2025 schedule: 3.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$1.9B
'27$1.8B
'28$1.5B
'29$1.4B
'30$1.2B
later$4.6B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$1.9Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$12.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$10.5Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$16.1B
Lease obligations (present value)$10.5B
Total fixed claims on the business$26.6B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $26.6B, of which the leases are 40%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Sep 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $54.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$19.0B · 35%
  • Dividends$20.2B · 37%
  • Buybacks$29.4B · 54%
  • Returned to owners$49.6B

    124% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $20.2B as dividends and $29.4B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$13.8B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $13.8B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $3.6B to $15.1B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$62.28

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 344M shares were bought for $21.4B, about $62.28 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $54.25 (2018) to $73.23 (2019), and 2019, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($10.2B).

  • Net change in share count−23.1%

    The diluted count fell from 1487M to 1143M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.43/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.5B11% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $19.0B of capital spent building

$135M written down across 3 years (2017, 2018, 2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$318M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Starbucks Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.0% vs 24.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 24.8% early in the record and 11.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.6B → $15.1B

    Debt rose from $3.6B to $15.1B while owner earnings went from about $5.8B to $4.0B — about 0.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $512M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SBUXStarbucks Corporation$37.2B68%15.5%96%13%
MCDMcDonald's Corporation$26.9B42.2%27%33%
ARMKAramark$18.5B11%4.2%7%2%
DRIDarden Restaurants Inc.$12.1B59%9.6%27%9%
CMGChipotle Mexican Grill Inc.$11.9B9.3%36%11%
YUMCYum China Holdings Inc.$11.8B51%10.3%18%8%
QSRRestaurant Brands International Inc.$9.4B66%31.0%11%21%
YUMYum! Brands Inc.$8.2B73%32.2%75%20%
Group median62%12.9%27%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Starbucks Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Starbucks Corporation earns about $4.7B on its 12.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.7B on 1140M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $13.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Starbucks Corporation (SBUX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SBUX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SBSI its page in the Manual SCCD →

Industry order: ← QSR the Restaurants chapter SG →