Share count
1.2Bpeak FY2019
← All companies ← RITR Manual RNW → ← PM Tobacco TPB →
RLX, RLX Technology Inc.
A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and the pricing power it commands.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
CN¥4.0B
+44.0% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥4.0B 5-yr avg CN¥4.4B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 1.7% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −31% to 27% — on a steadier 40% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 1 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Hong Kong SAR China at 34%.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- Hong Kong SAR China34%CN¥1.3B
- China31%CN¥1.2B
- Other International Areas24%CN¥933M
- United Kingdom12%CN¥468M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| CN¥133M | CN¥1.5B | CN¥3.8B | CN¥8.5B | CN¥5.3B | CN¥1.6B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥4.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 45% | 37% | 40% | 43% | 44% | 46% | 37% | 39% | 39% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| CN¥2M | CN¥56M | CN¥13M | CN¥2.3B | CN¥1.1B | (CN¥497M) | (CN¥107M) | CN¥329M | CN¥329M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.7% | 3.6% | 0.3% | 27.0% | 19.9% | −31.3% | −3.9% | 8.3% | 8.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (CN¥287K) | CN¥48M | (CN¥128M) | CN¥2.0B | CN¥1.4B | CN¥541M | CN¥564M | CN¥934M | CN¥934M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 35% | — | 24% | 21% | 9% | 14% | 11% | 11% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| (CN¥977K) | CN¥338M | CN¥2.6B | CN¥1.8B | CN¥487M | CN¥199M | CN¥854M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥0 | CN¥2M | CN¥20M | CN¥41M | CN¥76M | CN¥38M | CN¥28M | CN¥31M | CN¥31M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (CN¥690K) | CN¥288M | CN¥2.7B | (CN¥269M) | (CN¥998M) | (CN¥380M) | CN¥262M | CN¥139M | CN¥139M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥29K | CN¥85M | CN¥13M | CN¥131M | CN¥39M | CN¥28M | CN¥10M | CN¥118M | CN¥118M | CapexCapex |
| 0.0% | 5.5% | 0.3% | 1.5% | 0.7% | 1.8% | 0.4% | 3.0% | 3.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (CN¥1M) | CN¥336M | CN¥2.6B | CN¥1.8B | CN¥448M | CN¥170M | CN¥844M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −0.8% | 21.7% | 67.5% | 20.6% | 8.4% | 10.7% | 30.7% | 27.1% | 27.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (CN¥1M) | CN¥253M | CN¥2.6B | CN¥1.7B | CN¥448M | CN¥170M | CN¥844M | CN¥987M | CN¥987M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.8% | 16.3% | 67.5% | 19.6% | 8.4% | 10.7% | 30.7% | 24.9% | 24.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | CN¥36M | — | — | — | CN¥92M | CN¥89M | CN¥91M | CN¥91M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | CN¥128M | CN¥500M | CN¥997M | CN¥589M | CN¥184M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | 2% | 21% | 6% | -3% | -1% | 3% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| -4% | 45% | -8% | 15% | 9% | 3% | 4% | 6% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 11% | — | — | — | 3% | 3% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| CN¥68M | CN¥176M | CN¥2.6B | CN¥8.8B | CN¥3.7B | CN¥5.5B | CN¥6.3B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥7.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | CN¥39M | CN¥15M | CN¥12M | CN¥51M | — | — | — | CN¥51M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | CN¥219M | CN¥329M | CN¥589M | CN¥131M | CN¥145M | CN¥143M | CN¥298M | CN¥298M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | CN¥150M | CN¥536M | CN¥506M | CN¥52M | CN¥109M | CN¥295M | CN¥304M | CN¥304M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | CN¥108M | (CN¥192M) | CN¥95M | CN¥130M | CN¥35M | (CN¥153M) | (CN¥6M) | CN¥46M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | CN¥1.2B | CN¥3.9B | CN¥14.0B | CN¥11.2B | CN¥9.0B | CN¥9.3B | CN¥11.2B | CN¥11.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | CN¥620M | CN¥2.5B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥790M | CN¥669M | CN¥858M | CN¥2.0B | CN¥2.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.9× | 1.5× | 5.1× | 14.2× | 13.4× | 10.8× | 5.7× | 5.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | — | CN¥67M | CN¥60M | CN¥567M | CN¥567M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | CN¥1.4B | CN¥4.1B | CN¥16.4B | CN¥16.4B | CN¥16.3B | CN¥16.9B | CN¥17.9B | CN¥17.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| (CN¥68M) | (CN¥176M) | (CN¥2.6B) | (CN¥8.8B) | (CN¥3.7B) | (CN¥5.5B) | (CN¥6.3B) | (CN¥7.7B) | (CN¥7.7B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | 758.5× | — | -608.8× | 51.4× | 51.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| CN¥7M | CN¥106M | CN¥1.5B | CN¥13.5B | CN¥15.6B | CN¥15.6B | CN¥16.0B | CN¥15.6B | CN¥15.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 1.19B | 1.44B | 1.44B | 1.41B | 1.33B | 1.34B | 1.29B | 1.22B | 1.53B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥0.11 | CN¥1.08 | CN¥2.66 | CN¥6.04 | CN¥4.02 | CN¥1.18 | CN¥2.13 | CN¥3.23 | CN¥2.59 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| CN¥-0.00 | CN¥0.03 | CN¥-0.09 | CN¥1.44 | CN¥1.06 | CN¥0.40 | CN¥0.44 | CN¥0.76 | CN¥0.61 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥-0.00 | CN¥0.23 | CN¥1.79 | CN¥1.25 | CN¥0.34 | CN¥0.13 | CN¥0.66 | CN¥0.88 | CN¥0.70 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| CN¥-0.00 | CN¥0.18 | CN¥1.79 | CN¥1.18 | CN¥0.34 | CN¥0.13 | CN¥0.66 | CN¥0.81 | CN¥0.65 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | CN¥0.03 | — | — | — | CN¥0.07 | CN¥0.07 | CN¥0.07 | CN¥0.06 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| CN¥0.00 | CN¥0.06 | CN¥0.01 | CN¥0.09 | CN¥0.03 | CN¥0.02 | CN¥0.01 | CN¥0.10 | CN¥0.08 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| CN¥0.01 | CN¥0.07 | CN¥1.05 | CN¥9.59 | CN¥11.72 | CN¥11.64 | CN¥12.40 | CN¥12.77 | CN¥10.23 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +61.9%/yr | +4.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −13.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +20.0%/yr (6-yr) | +4.1%/yr (2-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +226.6%/yr | +61.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +202.2%/yr | +64.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
3%low FY2023
Gross margin
39%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
CN¥1.1Bowner earningsvs.CN¥934Mnet incomelow FY2018
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned CN¥1.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥31M it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥87M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was CN¥987M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | CN¥934M | CN¥564M | CN¥541M | CN¥1.4B | CN¥2.0B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥31M | +CN¥28M | +CN¥38M | +CN¥76M | +CN¥41M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +CN¥139M | +CN¥262M | −CN¥380M | −CN¥998M | −CN¥269M |
| Cash from operations | CN¥1.1B | CN¥854M | CN¥199M | CN¥487M | CN¥1.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −CN¥31M | −CN¥10M | −CN¥28M | −CN¥39M | −CN¥41M |
| Owner earnings | CN¥1.1B | CN¥844M | CN¥170M | CN¥448M | CN¥1.8B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −CN¥87M | — | — | — | −CN¥90M |
| Free cash flow | CN¥987M | CN¥844M | CN¥170M | CN¥448M | CN¥1.7B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 27% | 31% | 11% | 8% | 21% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥31M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥87M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 51.4×ComfortableOperating income CN¥329M ÷ interest expense CN¥6M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥7.7BNet cash, debt-freeCash CN¥5.4B + ST investments CN¥2.3B − debt CN¥0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥7.7B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 5 + DIO 45 − DPO 46 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 38%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- High through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -1%–67%; latest CN¥1.1B = operating cash CN¥1.1B − maintenance capex CN¥31MIndustry peers: median 29%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 27% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 8 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops CN¥1.1B ÷ net income CN¥934M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks CN¥275M ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥1.1B
What this means
Of CN¥1.1B Owner Earnings, CN¥275M (26%) went back to shareholders, CN¥91M dividends, CN¥184M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.81×ExpandingCapex CN¥118M ÷ depreciation CN¥31M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥4.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 5.70×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥0.44/share (latest year CN¥0.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥10.09/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 2% → −9% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (−9%) sits below the early years (2%), but the latest year (8%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 2% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Owner earnings growth +28%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 28% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · −31.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.4%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsCN¥11.2B
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥7.7B
- ReceivablesCN¥51M
- InventoryCN¥298M
- Other current assetsCN¥3.2B
Current liabilitiesCN¥2.0B
- Accounts payableCN¥304M
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥1.7B
Current ratio5.70×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio5.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.92×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalCN¥9.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueCN¥15.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueCN¥9.0BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesCN¥29MCN¥29M of it operating leases
Deferred revenueCN¥84Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2025
Over the record, the business generated CN¥7.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedCN¥423M · 6%
- DividendsCN¥309M · 4%
- BuybacksCN¥2.4B · 33%
- Retained (debt / cash)CN¥4.2B · 58%
- Returned to ownersCN¥2.7B
38% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥309M as dividends and CN¥2.4B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose CN¥7.6B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran CN¥2.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count28.0%
The diluted count rose from 1194M to 1528M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend recordCN¥0.07/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 44% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (CN¥2.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell CN¥274M, so each retained CN¥1 gave back about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why RLX Technology Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?28.0%
Diluted shares grew 28.0% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent CN¥2.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Tobacco
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PMPhilip Morris International Inc | $40.6B | 65% | 38.5% | 58% | 29% |
| MOAltria Group Inc. | $23.3B | 72% | 42.0% | 38% | 32% |
| RLXRLX Technology Inc. | CN¥4.0B | 42% | 2.7% | 2% | 21% |
| TPBTurning Point Brands Inc. | $463M | 49% | 20.4% | 15% | 9% |
| Group median | — | 57% | 29.5% | 26% | 25% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing one Class”; RLX Technology Inc. reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what RLX Technology Inc. has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+33%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+28%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $146M on 1549M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2026-03-31; net cash $1.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($17M) runs well above depreciation ($5M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $158M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "RLX Technology Inc. (RLX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RLX, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← RITR its page in the Manual RNW →
Industry order: ← PM the Tobacco chapter TPB →