Owner Scorecard


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POST, Post Holdings

Food Products consumer brand Serial acquirer

We are a consumer packaged goods holding company with businesses operating in the center-of-the-store, refrigerated, foodservice and food ingredient categories.

Recent Strategic Transactions 8th Avenue In October 2018, 8th Avenue was separately capitalized by Post and third parties through a series of transactions (the "8th Avenue Formation Transactions"), and 8th Avenue became the holding company for Post's private brand food products business.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
POST · Post Holdings
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$8.2B
+3.0% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.4B 5-yr avg $6.8B
Gross margin 29% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 10.1% 5-yr avg 9.1%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 58% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 29% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.0B$5.2B$6.3B$5.7B$4.7B$5.0B$5.9B$7.0B$7.9B$8.2B$8.4BRevenueRevenue
31%30%30%32%31%29%25%27%29%29%29%Gross marginGross mgn
17%17%16%16%17%16%15%15%17%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$546M$517M$574M$781M$537M$488M$416M$599M$794M$799M$853MOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.9%9.9%9.2%13.7%11.4%9.8%7.1%8.6%10.0%9.8%10.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($3M)$48M$467M$125M$800K$167M$757M$301M$367M$336M$339MNet incomeNet inc.
35%-3%26%10%25%22%24%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$502M$387M$719M$688M$626M$588M$383M$750M$932M$998M$1.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$303M$323M$398M$380M$345M$367M$380M$407M$477M$524M$569MDepreciationDeprec.
$186M($8M)($178M)$145M$237M$6M($820M)($35M)$4M$57M$14MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$122M$190M$225M$274M$233M$191M$255M$303M$430M$510M$488MCapexCapex
2.4%3.6%3.6%4.8%4.9%3.8%4.4%4.3%5.4%6.3%5.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$381M$196M$494M$414M$393M$397M$127M$447M$502M$488M$517MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.6%3.8%7.9%7.3%8.3%8.0%2.2%6.4%6.3%6.0%6.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$381M$196M$494M$414M$393M$397M$127M$447M$502M$488M$517MFree cash flowFCF
7.6%3.8%7.9%7.3%8.3%8.0%2.2%6.4%6.3%6.0%6.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$94M$1.9B$1.5B$0$20M$290M$25M$715M$248M$920M$796MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$318M$219M$322M$589M$397M$443MBuybacksBuybacks
6%4%4%5%6%5%6%ROICROIC
-0%2%15%4%0%6%23%8%9%9%11%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$1.1B$1.5B$990M$1.1B$1.2B$665M$587M$93M$787M$177M$269MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$385M$481M$462M$445M$442M$452M$544M$512M$583M$735M$729MReceivablesReceiv.
$503M$574M$484M$580M$599M$477M$549M$790M$754M$875M$912MInventoryInvent.
$264M$336M$365M$396M$368M$384M$453M$369M$484M$624M$618MAccounts payablePayables
$624M$718M$581M$629M$673M$545M$641M$934M$853M$986M$1.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.1B$2.6B$2.2B$2.1B$2.3B$2.1B$2.2B$1.5B$2.2B$2.0B$2.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$634M$704M$792M$803M$974M$1.0B$824M$805M$945M$1.2B$1.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×3.7×2.8×2.6×2.3×2.0×2.7×1.8×2.4×1.7×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.1B$4.0B$4.5B$4.4B$4.4B$4.5B$4.3B$4.6B$4.7B$4.8B$4.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$9.4B$11.9B$13.1B$12.0B$12.1B$12.4B$11.3B$11.6B$12.9B$13.5B$13.0BTotal assetsAssets
$4.6B$7.2B$7.3B$7.1B$7.0B$6.4B$6.0B$6.0B$6.8B$7.5B$7.7BTotal debtDebt
$3.5B$5.7B$6.3B$6.1B$5.9B$5.8B$5.4B$6.0B$6.1B$7.3B$7.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.8×1.6×1.5×2.4×1.6×1.5×1.3×2.1×2.5×2.2×2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.0B$2.8B$3.1B$2.9B$2.9B$2.7B$3.3B$3.8B$4.1B$3.8B$3.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.5%0.5%0.7%0.9%1.0%1.1%1.1%1.1%1.0%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$27M$125M$63M$42M$30M$30MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
68.8M69.9M75.9M75.1M68.9M65.3M62.7M67.0M66.9M62.9M56.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$73.06$74.76$82.44$75.65$68.37$76.27$93.32$104.34$118.43$129.70$150.60Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.05$0.69$6.16$1.66$0.01$2.55$12.07$4.50$5.48$5.34$6.03EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.54$2.81$6.50$5.51$5.71$6.08$2.03$6.68$7.51$7.76$9.21Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.54$2.81$6.50$5.51$5.71$6.08$2.03$6.68$7.51$7.76$9.21Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.77$2.72$2.96$3.65$3.37$2.92$4.07$4.52$6.42$8.11$8.71Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$43.73$39.77$40.19$38.96$41.43$42.00$51.90$57.34$61.14$59.67$56.94Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.6%/yr+13.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.8%/yr+6.3%/yr
EPS+240.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+18.5%/yr+19.2%/yr
Book value / share+3.5%/yr+7.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income+0.7%
    “Operating Profit Operating profit increased $5.8 million, or 1%, during the year ended September 30, 2025, when compared to the prior year, primarily driven by higher segment profit within our Foodservice and Refrigerated Retail segments, partially offset by lower segment profit within our Post Consumer Brands and Weetabix segments, a goodwill impairment charge of $29.8 million and higher general corporate expenses.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
63Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
5%low FY2021
Gross margin
29%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
14.9×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$488Mowner earningsvs.$336Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $336M of profit into $488M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$336M
Owner earnings$488M · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$336M$367M$301M$757M$167M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$524M+$477M+$407M+$380M+$367M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$82M+$84M+$77M+$66M+$49M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$57M+$4M−$35M−$820M+$6M
Cash from operations$998M$932M$750M$383M$588M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$510M−$430M−$303M−$255M−$191M
Owner earnings$488M$502M$447M$127M$397M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%6%6%2%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $82M), owner earnings is nearer $407M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $799M ÷ interest expense $361M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.3B · 9.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $177M − debt $7.5B
    What this means

    Netting $177M of cash and short-term investments against $7.5B of debt leaves $7.3B owed, about 9.1× a year's operating profit (9.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 33 + DIO 55 − DPO 39 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range 4%–6%; 5% latest = NOPAT $604M ÷ invested capital $11.0B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–8%; latest $488M = operating cash $998M − maintenance capex $510M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $82M of SBC) leaves $407M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $998M ÷ net income $336M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $457M ÷ Owner Earnings $488M
    What this means

    Of $488M Owner Earnings, $457M (94%) went back to shareholders, $14M dividends, $443M buybacks. Net of $82M stock comp, the real buyback was about $361M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.97×
    Maintaining
    Capex $510M ÷ depreciation $524M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.67×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $7.5B vs $812M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +96%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.38/share (latest year $7.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $82.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 10% early, 9% lately, median 10%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 7.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$269M
  • Receivables$729M
  • Inventory$912M
  • Other current assets$142M
Current liabilities$1.1B
  • Debt due within a year$1M
  • Accounts payable$618M
  • Other current liabilities$487M
Current ratio1.85×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.03×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$945Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1M due · $269M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($4.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($7.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$7.9B$278M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.7B · 42%
  • Dividends$14M · 0%
  • Buybacks$2.3B · 35%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.5B · 23%
  • Returned to owners$2.3B

    60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $14M as dividends and $2.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.1B and cash and short-term investments fell $874M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−18.5%

    The diluted count fell from 69M to 56M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.21/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained47%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($263M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $122M, so each retained $1 added about 0.47 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$7.9B58% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$5.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.7B of capital spent building

$287M written down across 5 years (2017, 2018, 2019, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Robert V. Vitale$14.3M$23.6M$397M
2022Robert V. Vitale$15.5M$19.3M$127M
2023Robert V. Vitale$17.4M$20.7M$447M
2024Jeff A. Zadoks$7.0M$14.5M$502M
2024Robert V. Vitale$22.0M$44.6M$502M
2025Robert V. Vitale$16.6M$15.0M$488M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership13.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio175:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$82M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Post Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $287M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$1.5B · 17% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “Our largest customer, Walmart, accounted for 17.4% of our consolidated net sales in fiscal 2025.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Food Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GISGeneral Mills Inc.$18.4B35%16.9%12%13%
KKellanova$12.7B35%11.5%13%7%
STZConstellation Brands Inc.$9.1B50%29.9%9%25%
SJMThe J.M. Smucker Company$9.1B38%13.5%6%12%
MNSTMonster Beverage Corp.$8.3B58%32.9%28%24%
POSTPost Holdings$8.2B29%9.8%5%7%
COKECoca-Cola Consolidated$7.2B35%7.9%32%6%
INGRIngredion$7.2B22%11.5%13%9%
Group median35%12.5%13%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Post Holdings has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Post Holdings earns about $558M on its 6.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $517M on 45M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $7.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 56M, 24% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Post Holdings (POST), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/POST, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← POR its page in the Manual POWI →

Industry order: ← PLAG the Food Products chapter PPC →