Share count
651Mpeak FY2016
← All companies ← PSNYW Manual PTLE → ← NYT Publishing SCHL →
PSO, Pearson Plc
Revenue is led by Assessments and Qualifications (45%) and Higher Education (22%), with 3 more segments behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
£3.6B
+0.7% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue £3.6B 5-yr avg £3.6B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- An asset-light business: the value sits in intellectual property and people, not plant, so the question is how durable the advantage is, not how high the margin.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 51% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −55% to 15% — on a steadier 51% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −108 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 6 segments, the largest Assessments And Qualifications at 45%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Assessments And Qualifications45%£1.6B
- Higher Education22%£775M
- Virtual Learning14%£511M
- English Language Learning11%£405M
- Enterprise Learning and Skills8%£282M
- Strategic Review0%£0
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| £4.6B | £4.5B | £4.1B | £3.9B | £3.4B | £3.4B | £3.8B | £3.7B | £3.6B | £3.6B | £3.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 54% | 54% | 53% | 52% | 48% | 49% | 47% | 50% | 51% | 52% | 52% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (£2.5B) | £451M | £553M | £275M | £411M | £183M | £271M | £498M | £541M | £507M | £507M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −54.9% | 10.0% | 13.4% | 7.1% | 12.1% | 5.3% | 7.1% | 13.6% | 15.2% | 14.2% | 14.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (£2.3B) | £406M | £588M | £264M | £330M | £177M | £242M | £378M | £434M | £335M | £335M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 3% | — | — | 13% | -1% | 25% | 23% | 15% | 27% | 27% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| £410M | £298M | £462M | £369M | £389M | £326M | £361M | £525M | £627M | £656M | £656M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| £2.8B | £166M | £113M | £163M | £80M | £51M | £56M | £48M | £41M | £42M | £42M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (£22M) | (£274M) | (£239M) | (£58M) | (£21M) | £98M | £63M | £99M | £152M | £279M | £279M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| £88M | £82M | £70M | £55M | £53M | £64M | — | — | — | — | £64M | CapexCapex |
| 1.9% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.9% | — | — | — | — | 1.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| £322M | £216M | £392M | £314M | £336M | £262M | — | — | — | — | £592M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.1% | 4.8% | 9.5% | 8.1% | 9.9% | 7.6% | — | — | — | — | 16.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| £322M | £216M | £392M | £314M | £336M | £262M | — | — | — | — | £592M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.1% | 4.8% | 9.5% | 8.1% | 9.9% | 7.6% | — | — | — | — | 16.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| £424M | £318M | £136M | £147M | £146M | £149M | £156M | £154M | £156M | £160M | £160M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| £27M | — | — | £52M | £6M | — | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -37% | 10% | 12% | 5% | 8% | 4% | 4% | 8% | 9% | 8% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| -54% | 10% | 13% | 6% | 8% | 4% | 5% | 10% | 11% | 9% | 9% | Return on equityROE |
| −64% | 2% | 10% | 3% | 4% | 1% | 2% | 6% | 7% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| £1.5B | £518M | £568M | £437M | £1.1B | £937M | £558M | £312M | £543M | £333M | £333M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| £1.4B | £1.1B | £1.2B | £1.3B | £1.1B | £1.3B | £1.1B | £1.1B | £1.0B | £1.1B | £1.1B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| £235M | £148M | £164M | £169M | £129M | £98M | £105M | £91M | £74M | £66M | £66M | InventoryInvent. |
| £1.6B | £1.3B | £1.4B | £1.3B | £1.2B | £1.3B | £1.3B | £1.3B | £1.1B | £1.0B | £1.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| (£37M) | (£84M) | (£58M) | £166M | £51M | £99M | (£10M) | (£134M) | £50M | £105M | £105M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| £4.1B | £2.5B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | £2.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| £1.9B | £1.6B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | £1.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 1.6× | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| £2.3B | £2.0B | £2.1B | £2.1B | £2.1B | £2.1B | £2.5B | £2.4B | £2.4B | £2.4B | £2.4B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| £10.1B | £7.9B | £7.9B | £7.7B | £7.5B | £7.3B | £7.3B | £6.7B | £6.9B | £6.5B | £6.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| £2.5B | £1.1B | £720M | £1.7B | £1.7B | £1.4B | £1.2B | £1.2B | £1.5B | £1.5B | £1.5B | Total debtDebt |
| £1.0B | £567M | £152M | £1.2B | £554M | £463M | £672M | £849M | £929M | £1.1B | £1.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -25.7× | 4.1× | 6.1× | 3.3× | 3.8× | 2.7× | 3.8× | 6.1× | 4.8× | 5.2× | 5.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| £4.3B | £4.0B | £4.5B | £4.3B | £4.1B | £4.3B | £4.4B | £4.0B | £4.0B | £3.6B | £3.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 815M | 813M | 778M | 777M | 755M | 754M | 738M | 712M | 673M | 651M | 636M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| £5.59 | £5.55 | £5.31 | £4.98 | £4.50 | £4.55 | £5.20 | £5.16 | £5.28 | £5.49 | £5.63 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| £-2.87 | £0.50 | £0.76 | £0.34 | £0.44 | £0.23 | £0.33 | £0.53 | £0.64 | £0.51 | £0.53 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| £0.40 | £0.27 | £0.50 | £0.40 | £0.44 | £0.35 | — | — | — | — | £0.93 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| £0.40 | £0.27 | £0.50 | £0.40 | £0.44 | £0.35 | — | — | — | — | £0.93 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| £0.52 | £0.39 | £0.17 | £0.19 | £0.19 | £0.20 | £0.21 | £0.22 | £0.23 | £0.25 | £0.25 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| £0.11 | £0.10 | £0.09 | £0.07 | £0.07 | £0.08 | — | — | — | — | £0.10 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| £5.33 | £4.93 | £5.80 | £5.55 | £5.46 | £5.66 | £5.96 | £5.59 | £6.00 | £5.60 | £5.74 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −0.2%/yr | +4.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −2.5%/yr (5-yr) | −2.5%/yr |
| EPS | — | +3.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −8.0%/yr | +4.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −4.7%/yr (5-yr) | −4.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +0.5%/yr | +0.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
8%low FY2016
Gross margin
52%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.8×peak FY2019
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
£262Mowner earningsvs.£177Mnet incomelow FY2017
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2021 the business turned £177M of profit into £262M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | FY2017 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | £177M | £330M | £264M | £588M | £406M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +£51M | +£80M | +£163M | +£113M | +£166M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +£98M | −£21M | −£58M | −£239M | −£274M |
| Cash from operations | £326M | £389M | £369M | £462M | £298M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −£64M | −£53M | −£55M | −£70M | −£82M |
| Owner earnings | £262M | £336M | £314M | £392M | £216M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 10% | 8% | 9% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income £507M ÷ interest expense £98M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? £1.1B · 2.3× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash £333M − debt £1.5B
What this means
Netting £333M of cash and short-term investments against £1.5B of debt leaves £1.1B owed, about 2.3× a year's operating profit (2.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 110 + DIO 14 − DPO 222 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -37%–12%; 8% latest = NOPAT £372M ÷ invested capital £4.8BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle6-yr median margin, range 5%–10%; latest £592M = operating cash £656M − maintenance capex £64MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 6 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops £656M ÷ net income £335M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks £160M ÷ Owner Earnings £592M
What this means
Of £592M Owner Earnings, £160M (27%) went back to shareholders, £160M dividends, £0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.52×ExpandingCapex £64M ÷ depreciation £42M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · £3.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · £1.5B vs £908M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are £0.60/share (latest year £0.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is £5.74/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −10% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −10% early to 14% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · −54.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −2.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“As with any benchmarking exercise, a degree of judgment is required but we firmly believe that these companies, being predominantly US-based technology companies at the forefront of AI adoption, as well as B2B services companies, most accurately reflect the market in which Pearson must be able to compete for the skills…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2017Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets£2.5B
- Cash & short-term investments£333M
- Receivables£1.1B
- Inventory£66M
- Other current assets£1.0B
Current liabilities£1.6B
- Debt due within a year£62M
- Accounts payable£1.0B
- Other current liabilities£512M
Current ratio1.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.52×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.21×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital£908Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash£62M due · £333M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2017 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value£1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(£270M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases£2.0B£478M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2021
Over the record, the business generated £2.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested£412M · 18%
- Dividends£1.3B · 59%
- Buybacks£85M · 4%
- Retained (debt / cash)£437M · 19%
- Returned to owners£1.4B
76% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, £1.3B as dividends and £85M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell £987M and cash and short-term investments fell £1.1B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran £85M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−22.0%
The diluted count fell from 815M to 636M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record£0.20/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 18% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill£2.4B38% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity66%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring£0over 10 years buying other businesses, against £412M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Pearson Plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Publishing
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSOPearson Plc | £3.6B | 51% | 11.0% | 8% | 8% |
| NYTNew York Times Company (The) | $2.8B | 53% | 10.7% | 15% | 10% |
| DLXDeluxe Corporation | $2.1B | 58% | 8.3% | 6% | 11% |
| WLYJohn Wiley & Sons Inc. | $1.7B | 69% | 11.4% | 9% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 55% | 10.9% | 8% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares , each New York Stock Exchange Representing One Ordinary”; Pearson Plc reports in GBP, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at GBP 1 = $1.349 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in GBP.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Pearson Plc has delivered.
Pearson Plc’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Pearson Plc earns about $392M on its 8.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’21−0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’21+2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’21+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $798M on 636M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $1.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Pearson Plc (PSO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PSO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← PSNYW its page in the Manual PTLE →
Industry order: ← NYT the Publishing chapter SCHL →