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NYT, New York Times Company (The)
Revenue is Subscription (69%), Advertising (20%) and Affiliate, licensing and other (11%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- An asset-light business: the value sits in intellectual property and people, not plant, so the question is how durable the advantage is, not how high the margin.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 46% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Subscription is 69% of revenue, with Advertising the other meaningful line at 20%.
- Subscription69%$2.0B
- Advertising20%$566M
- Affiliate, licensing and other11%$308M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 60% | 63% | 46% | 45% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 66% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 47% | 49% | 0% | 0% | 13% | 12% | 13% | 13% | 12% | 12% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | 5% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 9% | 9% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $113M | $177M | $190M | $176M | $176M | $268M | $202M | $276M | $351M | $432M | $464M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 7.2% | 10.5% | 10.9% | 9.7% | 9.9% | 12.9% | 8.7% | 11.4% | 13.6% | 15.3% | 16.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $29M | $4M | $126M | $140M | $100M | $220M | $174M | $232M | $294M | $344M | $382M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 13% | — | 28% | 15% | 13% | 24% | 26% | 23% | 23% | 24% | 21% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $104M | $87M | $157M | $190M | $298M | $269M | $151M | $361M | $411M | $584M | $578M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $62M | $62M | $59M | $61M | $62M | $58M | $83M | $86M | $83M | $85M | $84M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $655K | $6M | ($41M) | ($24M) | $121M | ($31M) | ($141M) | ($13M) | ($34M) | $81M | $35M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $30M | $85M | $77M | $45M | $34M | $35M | $37M | $23M | $29M | $34M | $35M | CapexCapex |
| 1.9% | 5.1% | 4.4% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.2% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $74M | $25M | $98M | $144M | $263M | $234M | $114M | $338M | $381M | $551M | $542M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.7% | 1.5% | 5.6% | 8.0% | 14.8% | 11.3% | 4.9% | 13.9% | 14.7% | 19.5% | 18.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $74M | $2M | $80M | $144M | $263M | $234M | $114M | $338M | $381M | $551M | $542M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 4.7% | 0.1% | 4.6% | 8.0% | 14.8% | 11.3% | 4.9% | 13.9% | 14.7% | 19.5% | 18.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $40M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $33M | $0 | $516M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $26M | $26M | $26M | $32M | $38M | $45M | $57M | $69M | $83M | $110M | $119M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $16M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $105M | $45M | $85M | $165M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 10% | 9% | 13% | 16% | 15% | 17% | 11% | 14% | 16% | 18% | 16% | ROICROIC |
| 3% | 0% | 12% | 12% | 8% | 14% | 11% | 13% | 15% | 17% | 19% | Return on equityROE |
| 0% | −2% | 10% | 9% | 5% | 11% | 7% | 9% | 11% | 11% | 13% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $738M | $733M | $826M | $684M | $882M | $1.1B | $486M | $709M | $912M | $1.2B | $1.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $197M | $185M | $222M | $213M | $184M | $233M | $218M | $242M | $250M | $291M | $235M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $104M | $125M | $112M | $117M | $123M | $127M | $115M | $117M | $124M | $136M | $138M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $93M | $59M | $111M | $97M | $61M | $106M | $103M | $126M | $126M | $155M | $106M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $796M | $750M | $894M | $717M | $836M | $953M | $656M | $782M | $936M | $1.0B | $927M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $399M | $416M | $673M | $438M | $487M | $559M | $571M | $612M | $614M | $667M | $578M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.0× | 1.8× | 1.3× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.1× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 1.5× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $135M | $144M | $140M | $139M | $172M | $166M | $414M | $416M | $412M | $409M | $408M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $2.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $247M | $250M | $254M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $431M | Total debtDebt |
| ($491M) | ($483M) | ($573M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | ($676M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $848M | $897M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 1.1% | 1.5% | 2.3% | 2.6% | 2.6% | 2.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 163M | 164M | 167M | 168M | 168M | 169M | 167M | 166M | 166M | 165M | 164M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.55 | $10.20 | $10.47 | $10.82 | $10.61 | $12.31 | $13.81 | $14.65 | $15.60 | $17.13 | $17.72 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.18 | $0.03 | $0.75 | $0.84 | $0.60 | $1.31 | $1.04 | $1.40 | $1.77 | $2.09 | $2.34 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.45 | $0.15 | $0.59 | $0.86 | $1.57 | $1.39 | $0.68 | $2.04 | $2.30 | $3.34 | $3.31 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.45 | $0.01 | $0.48 | $0.86 | $1.57 | $1.39 | $0.68 | $2.04 | $2.30 | $3.34 | $3.31 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.16 | $0.16 | $0.16 | $0.19 | $0.23 | $0.27 | $0.34 | $0.42 | $0.50 | $0.67 | $0.72 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.18 | $0.52 | $0.46 | $0.27 | $0.21 | $0.21 | $0.22 | $0.14 | $0.18 | $0.21 | $0.22 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $5.21 | $5.46 | $6.23 | $7.00 | $7.89 | $9.13 | $9.56 | $10.64 | $11.62 | $12.38 | $12.23 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.7%/yr | +10.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +24.8%/yr | +16.3%/yr |
| EPS | +31.4%/yr | +28.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +17.3%/yr | +23.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.2%/yr | +0.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +10.1%/yr | +9.4%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Subscription+9.1%
“Subscription revenues increased $162.6 million, or 9.1%, in 2025 compared with 2024, primarily due to an increase in digital-only subscription revenues of $179.8 million, or 14.3%, partially offset by a decrease in print subscription revenues of $17.2 million, or 3.2%.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $344M of profit into $551M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $344M | $294M | $232M | $174M | $220M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$85M | +$83M | +$86M | +$83M | +$58M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$74M | +$67M | +$55M | +$35M | +$22M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$81M | −$34M | −$13M | −$141M | −$31M |
| Cash from operations | $584M | $411M | $361M | $151M | $269M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$34M | −$29M | −$23M | −$37M | −$35M |
| Owner earnings | $551M | $381M | $338M | $114M | $234M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 15% | 14% | 5% | 11% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $74M), owner earnings is nearer $476M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $255M + ST investments $387M − debt $431M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $211M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $526M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $737M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 38 + DIO 3 − DPO 50 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 9%–18%; 15% latest = NOPAT $329M ÷ invested capital $2.2BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 1%–19%; latest $551M = operating cash $584M − maintenance capex $34MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $74M of SBC) leaves $476M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $584M ÷ net income $344M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $276M ÷ Owner Earnings $551M
What this means
Of $551M Owner Earnings, $276M (50%) went back to shareholders, $110M dividends, $165M buybacks. Net of $74M stock comp, the real buyback was about $91M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.40×HarvestingCapex $34M ÷ depreciation $85M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.54×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $431M vs $361M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +447%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.79/share (latest year $2.12), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 10% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 13% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +28%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 28% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 7.2% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Several companies with competing products control how content is discovered, displayed and monetized, including search engines, digital marketplaces, AI platforms and chatbots and mobile app stores with rankings and user experiences based on algorithms that are changed frequently, without notice or explanation.…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$595M
- Receivables$235M
- Inventory$9M
- Other current assets$89M
- Debt due within a year$164K
- Accounts payable$138M
- Other current liabilities$440M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$430M · 16%
- Dividends$513M · 20%
- Buybacks$416M · 16%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 48%
- Returned to owners$929M
42% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $513M as dividends and $416M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$40.71
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $416M, about $40.71 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $13.30 (2016) to $54.99 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($165M).
- Net change in share count0.5%
The diluted count barely moved (163M to 164M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.67/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 17% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained49%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($734M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $358M, so each retained $1 added about 0.49 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Ms. Kopit Levien | $5.8M | $6.2M | $234M |
| 2022 | Ms. Kopit Levien | $7.6M | $2.8M | $114M |
| 2023 | Ms. Kopit Levien | $10.3M | $15.9M | $338M |
| 2024 | Ms. Kopit Levien | $7.8M | $10.8M | $381M |
| 2025 | Ms. Kopit Levien | $8.9M | $24.3M | $551M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio49:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$74M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 17% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why New York Times Company (The) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OKTAOkta Inc. | $2.9B | 72% | -30.8% | -8% | 7% |
| ETSYEtsy Inc. | $2.9B | 70% | 10.5% | 24% | 26% |
| NYTNew York Times Company (The) | $2.8B | 53% | 10.7% | 15% | 10% |
| PLTKPlaytika Holding Corp. | $2.8B | 72% | 18.8% | 34% | 19% |
| BHEBenchmark Electronics Inc. | $2.7B | 12% | 2.9% | 5% | 4% |
| PTCPTC Inc. | $2.7B | 79% | 21.1% | 10% | 19% |
| DLXDeluxe Corporation | $2.1B | 58% | 8.3% | 6% | 11% |
| WLYJohn Wiley & Sons Inc. | $1.7B | 69% | 11.4% | 9% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 70% | 10.6% | 9% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what New York Times Company (The) has delivered.
New York Times Company (The)’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, New York Times Company (The) earns about $272M on its 9.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $542M on 162M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $676M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← NXTT its page in the Manual O →
Industry order: ← NWSA the Publishing chapter PSO →