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SCHL, Scholastic Corporation

Publishing consumer brand Cyclical

Scholastic Corporation is the world's largest publisher and distributor of children's books, a leading provider of print and digital instructional materials for grades pre-kindergarten to grade 12 and a producer of entertaining literary and educational children's media.

Scholastic Corporation creates quality print, digital and audio books, learning materials and programs, classroom magazines and other products that, in combination, offer children, families and educators engaging and comprehensive solutions to support children's learning and reading both at home and at school.

Scholastic has operations in the United States and throughout the world including Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and Asia and, through its export business, sells products in approximately 130 international locations.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SCHL · Scholastic Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.6B

+2.3% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.6B 5-yr avg $1.6B

Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 54%

Operating margin 1.1% 5-yr avg 2.5%

ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 4%

Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 53% and operating margin about 1.5% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −6.0% to 6.2% — on a steadier 53% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

24% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States76%$1.2B
International24%$382M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMFeb 2026
											Income statement
$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	RevenueRevenue
54%	53%	54%	53%	52%	52%	53%	54%	56%	56%	56%	Gross marginGross mgn
46%	45%	47%	48%	51%	48%	44%	44%	51%	51%	51%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$72M	$89M	$56M	$25M	($89M)	($23M)	$97M	$106M	$15M	$16M	$17M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%	5.1%	3.4%	1.5%	−6.0%	−1.7%	5.9%	6.2%	0.9%	1.0%	1.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$41M	$52M	($5M)	$16M	($44M)	($11M)	$81M	$86M	$12M	($2M)	$63M	Net incomeNet inc.
38%	40%	—	40%	—	—	10%	23%	25%	—	48%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($79M)	$141M	$142M	$116M	$2M	$71M	$226M	$149M	$155M	$124M	$68M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$37M	$36M	$42M	$53M	$58M	$58M	$55M	$53M	$55M	$55M	$52M	DepreciationDeprec.
($166M)	$43M	$94M	$39M	($16M)	$17M	$83M	($400K)	$77M	$62M	($56M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$36M	$66M	$122M	$95M	$63M	$47M	$42M	$62M	$58M	$52M	$46M	CapexCapex
2.1%	3.8%	7.5%	5.7%	4.2%	3.6%	2.6%	3.6%	3.7%	3.2%	2.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($115M)	$76M	$20M	$21M	($61M)	$24M	$184M	$87M	$96M	$72M	$22M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−6.8%	4.3%	1.2%	1.3%	−4.1%	1.8%	11.2%	5.1%	6.1%	4.4%	1.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($115M)	$76M	$20M	$21M	($61M)	$24M	$184M	$87M	$96M	$72M	$22M	Free cash flowFCF
−6.8%	4.3%	1.2%	1.3%	−4.1%	1.8%	11.2%	5.1%	6.1%	4.4%	1.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$4M	$10M	$4M	$14M	$1M	$0	$0	$11M	$6M	$176M	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$21M	$21M	$21M	$21M	$21M	$21M	$21M	$26M	$25M	$23M	$21M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$14M	$7M	$27M	$9M	$36M	$0	$33M	$132M	$158M	$70M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
5%	6%	—	2%	-7%	-2%	10%	9%	1%	1%	1%	ROICROIC
3%	4%	-0%	1%	-4%	-1%	7%	7%	1%	-0%	7%	Return on equityROE
2%	2%	−2%	−0%	−5%	−3%	5%	5%	−1%	−3%	5%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$400M	$444M	$392M	$334M	$394M	$367M	$317M	$225M	$114M	$124M	$105M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$196M	$199M	$205M	$250M	$240M	$256M	$299M	$278M	$235M	$273M	$248M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$271M	$283M	$295M	$324M	$271M	$270M	$281M	$335M	$264M	$250M	$283M	InventoryInvent.
$138M	$141M	$199M	$195M	$154M	$138M	$162M	$171M	$139M	$157M	$129M	Accounts payablePayables
$329M	$341M	$301M	$379M	$357M	$388M	$419M	$442M	$361M	$366M	$402M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$950M	$971M	$958M	$961M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$996M	$893M	$677M	$725M	$735M	Current assetsCur. assets
$378M	$387M	$446M	$542M	$502M	$696M	$620M	$602M	$535M	$626M	$621M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×	2.5×	2.1×	1.8×	2.1×	1.5×	1.6×	1.5×	1.3×	1.2×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$116M	$119M	$119M	$125M	$125M	$126M	$125M	$133M	$133M	$199M	$200M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$1.8B	Total assetsAssets
$6M	$6M	$8M	$7M	$219M	$190M	$7M	$6M	$6M	$256M	$7M	Total debtDebt
($393M)	($438M)	($384M)	($327M)	($175M)	($176M)	($310M)	($219M)	($108M)	$132M	($98M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
32.6×	37.2×	27.8×	11.4×	-29.5×	-3.7×	33.6×	75.9×	7.6×	0.9×	1.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$947M	$872M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	0.5%	0.3%	0.5%	0.5%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
34.9M	35.4M	35.0M	35.8M	34.6M	34.3M	35.6M	34.7M	30.4M	27.6M	25.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$47.93	$49.20	$46.53	$46.20	$42.98	$37.91	$46.15	$49.11	$52.29	$58.89	$63.80	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.16	$1.48	$-0.14	$0.44	$-1.27	$-0.32	$2.27	$2.49	$0.40	$-0.07	$2.48	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-3.28	$2.14	$0.57	$0.60	$-1.75	$0.69	$5.17	$2.50	$3.16	$2.61	$0.87	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.28	$2.14	$0.57	$0.60	$-1.75	$0.69	$5.17	$2.50	$3.16	$2.61	$0.87	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.59	$0.59	$0.60	$0.59	$0.60	$0.60	$0.58	$0.74	$0.81	$0.82	$0.83	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.02	$1.86	$3.47	$2.65	$1.81	$1.38	$1.18	$1.79	$1.92	$1.89	$1.81	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$36.03	$36.95	$37.74	$35.52	$34.08	$34.43	$34.19	$33.51	$33.49	$34.29	$34.46	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.3%/yr	+6.5%/yr
Dividends / share	+3.8%/yr	+6.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+7.1%/yr	+0.9%/yr
Book value / share	−0.5%/yr	+0.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

28Mpeak FY2019

ROIC

1%low FY2020

Gross margin

56%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$72Mowner earningsvs.($2M)net incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $2M loss into $72M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($2M)	$12M	$86M	$81M	($11M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$55M	+$55M	+$53M	+$55M	+$58M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$11M	+$11M	+$8M	+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$62M	+$77M	−$400K	+$83M	+$17M
Cash from operations	$124M	$155M	$149M	$226M	$71M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$52M	−$58M	−$62M	−$42M	−$47M
Owner earnings	$72M	$96M	$87M	$184M	$24M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	6%	5%	11%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $63M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.9×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $16M ÷ interest expense $18M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $133M · 8.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $124M − debt $257M

What this means
Netting $124M of cash and short-term investments against $257M of debt leaves $133M owed, about 8.4× a year's operating profit (16.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 109d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 61 + DIO 127 − DPO 80 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 2%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -7%–10%; 1% latest = NOPAT $12M ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $72M = operating cash $124M − maintenance capex $52M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $63M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $124M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($2M) · cash from operations $124M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 129%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $93M ÷ Owner Earnings $72M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $72M of Owner Earnings, $93M (129%) went back to shareholders, $23M dividends, $70M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $9M stock comp, the real buyback was about $61M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.96×

Maintaining

Capex $52M ÷ depreciation $55M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.16×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $257M vs $99M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +10%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.54/share (latest year $-0.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $45.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 3% lately, median 2%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −6.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −2.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“The Company operates in highly competitive markets that are subject to rapid change, including, in particular, changes in customer preferences and changes and advances in relevant technologies, including rapid advances in artificial intelligence ("AI").”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Feb 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$735M

Cash & short-term investments$105M
Receivables$248M
Inventory$283M
Other current assets$100M

Current liabilities$621M

Debt due within a year$7M
Accounts payable$129M
Other current liabilities$486M

Current ratio1.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$114Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$7M due · $105M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Feb 28, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$590Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$286M$279M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$217Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$6M

'27$0

'28$0

'29$0

'30$0

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$6Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$6Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$6Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$6Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Feb 28, 2026$105M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$72M

Together, against $6M due next year28.5×

Cash on hand as of Feb 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $177M against the $6M due in the twelve months after the May 31, 2025 schedule: 28 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s May 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$642M · 61%
Dividends$219M · 21%
Buybacks$486M · 46%

Returned to owners$705M
174% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $219M as dividends and $486M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$300M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $300M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $295M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $486M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
Net change in share count−27.5%
The diluted count fell from 35M to 25M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.82/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$1.6M	$1.5M	$24M
2022	$37k	−$353k	$184M
2022	$5.2M	$5.6M	$184M
2023	$3.3M	$3.8M	$87M
2024	$2.0M	$1.8M	$96M
2025	$3.3M	$2.4M	$72M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio74:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 59% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Scholastic Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $98M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$258M · 16% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Currently, the Company's top five trade customers make up approximately 75% of the Company's U.S. trade business and 16% of the Company's total revenues.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (consumer & brand), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ELFe.l.f. Beauty	$1.6B	65%	10.3%	7%	8%
IARTIntegra Lifesciences Holdings Corp	$1.6B	62%	7.4%	4%	8%
SCHLScholastic Corporation	$1.6B	54%	2.5%	2%	3%
AWIArmstrong World Industries Inc	$1.6B	37%	25.7%	23%	11%
JJSFJ&J Snack Foods	$1.6B	30%	7.2%	10%	7%
SENEASeneca Foods	$1.6B	10%	4.8%	7%	1%
LNTHLantheus Holdings	$1.5B	51%	17.2%	24%	17%
BRCBrady Corporation	$1.5B	50%	14.6%	17%	12%
Group median	—	50%	8.9%	8%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Scholastic Corporation has delivered.

Scholastic Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Scholastic Corporation earns about $50M on its 3.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($50M) Net of stock comp (−$9M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−5%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+32%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $22M on 21M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-02-28; net cash $98M. The if-converted diluted count is 25M, 21% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SCHL against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Scholastic Corporation (SCHL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SCHL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SCCO its page in the Manual SCHW →

Industry order: ← PSO the Publishing chapter TDAY →