Owner Scorecard


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TPB, Turning Point Brands Inc.

Tobacco consumer brand

Turning Point Brands Inc. is a leading manufacturer, marketer and distributor of branded consumer products.

We sell a wide range of products to adult consumers consisting of staple products with our iconic brands Zig-Zag and Stoker's .

The alternative smoking accessories market is a dynamic market experiencing robust secular growth driven by cannabinoid legalization in the U.S. and Canada, and positively evolving consumer perception and acceptance in North America.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TPB · Turning Point Brands Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$463M
+28.4% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $481M 5-yr avg $383M
Gross margin 57% 5-yr avg 55%
Operating margin 17.6% 5-yr avg 22.4%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 15%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 49% and operating margin about 20% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$206M$286M$333M$362M$405M$445M$321M$325M$361M$463M$481MRevenueRevenue
49%44%43%38%47%49%55%56%56%57%57%Gross marginGross mgn
27%26%28%30%31%29%32%32%34%36%39%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$44M$50M$48M$27M$64M$90M$74M$83M$81M$95M$85MOperating incomeOp. inc.
21.3%17.4%14.6%7.5%15.9%20.3%23.0%25.5%22.4%20.6%17.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$27M$20M$25M$16M$38M$52M$12M$38M$40M$58M$55MNet incomeNet inc.
26%20%15%24%21%49%38%30%20%15%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$9M$30M$13M$38M$44M$68M$30M$67M$67M$57M$18MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1M$2M$3M$4M$5M$5M$5M$6M$7MDepreciationDeprec.
($19M)$6M($17M)$14M($2M)$4M$8M$16M$20M($8M)($53M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M$2M$2M$5M$6M$6M$8M$6M$5M$14M$16MCapexCapex
1.6%0.7%0.7%1.3%1.5%1.4%2.4%1.8%1.3%2.9%3.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$8M$28M$11M$33M$38M$62M$25M$61M$62M$52M$10MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.8%9.7%3.3%9.1%9.3%13.9%7.8%18.8%17.3%11.3%2.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$6M$28M$11M$33M$38M$62M$22M$61M$62M$44M$1MFree cash flowFCF
2.9%9.7%3.3%9.1%9.3%13.9%7.0%18.8%17.3%9.5%0.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$24M$0$19M$8M$39M$16M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$768K$2M$4M$4M$4M$4M$4M$5M$6M$6MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$0$10M$39M$29M$0$5M$0BuybacksBuybacks
19%15%14%8%13%17%13%15%17%15%ROICROIC
79%38%31%15%33%39%10%25%21%16%14%Return on equityROE
79%36%28%12%29%36%7%22%18%14%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3M$3M$3M$95M$42M$128M$106M$118M$49M$223M$192MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2M$3M$3M$7M$9M$6M$8M$10M$10M$26M$27MReceivablesReceiv.
$62M$63M$91M$71M$86M$88M$120M$92M$96M$108M$130MInventoryInvent.
$9M$4M$7M$14M$9M$7M$8M$8M$12M$20M$36MAccounts payablePayables
$55M$63M$87M$64M$86M$87M$120M$94M$94M$113M$121MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$79M$79M$112M$189M$163M$249M$258M$268M$198M$417M$418MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$42M$38M$64M$56M$57M$40M$41M$100M$45M$75M$71MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×2.1×1.8×3.4×2.9×6.2×6.2×2.7×4.4×5.6×5.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$134M$135M$146M$154M$160M$162M$136M$136M$136M$136M$136MGoodwillGoodwill
$285M$282M$339M$447M$496M$602M$572M$569M$493M$764M$772MTotal assetsAssets
$203M$194M$195M$269M$302M$414M$407M$365M$249M$294M$294MTotal debtDebt
$200M$191M$191M$174M$260M$286M$300M$247M$200M$71M$101MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.6×2.9×3.2×3.4×3.9×4.4×3.8×3.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$34M$53M$83M$107M$117M$134M$112M$151M$190M$372M$385MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.3%0.4%1.0%0.6%1.7%1.6%2.0%2.0%1.5%1.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
18.0M19.5M19.8M23.2M22.9M22.4M18.1M20.5M19.4M18.7M19.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$11.45$14.65$16.78$15.58$17.66$19.90$17.79$15.88$18.63$24.72$24.69Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.49$1.04$1.28$0.70$1.67$2.33$0.64$1.88$2.06$3.11$2.85EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.44$1.42$0.55$1.42$1.64$2.77$1.38$2.99$3.22$2.78$0.53Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.33$1.42$0.55$1.42$1.64$2.77$1.24$2.99$3.22$2.34$0.06Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.04$0.12$0.15$0.17$0.18$0.24$0.22$0.25$0.29$0.30Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.18$0.10$0.11$0.21$0.27$0.28$0.43$0.28$0.24$0.72$0.85Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.89$2.73$4.17$4.59$5.12$5.97$6.18$7.38$9.83$19.86$19.79Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.9%/yr+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+22.9%/yr+11.2%/yr
EPS+8.5%/yr+13.3%/yr
Dividends / share+12.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+16.8%/yr+22.0%/yr
Book value / share+29.9%/yr+31.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
19Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
17%low FY2019
Gross margin
57%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.4×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$52Mowner earningsvs.$58Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $52M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $5M it takes just to hold its position. It put $8M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $44M.

Reported net income$58M
Owner earnings$52M · 11% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$58M$40M$38M$12M$52M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$6M+$5M+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$7M+$7M+$7M+$5M+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$8M+$20M+$16M+$8M+$4M
Cash from operations$57M$67M$67M$30M$68M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$5M−$5M−$6M−$5M−$6M
Owner earnings$52M$62M$61M$25M$62M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$8M−$3M
Free cash flow$44M$62M$61M$22M$62M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%17%19%8%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $5M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $8M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $45M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“Management previously identified a material weakness in internal control related to ineffective information technology general controls in the areas of user access and program change management over certain information technology systems that support the…”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $95M ÷ interest expense $25M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $71M · 0.7× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $223M − debt $294M
    What this means

    Netting $223M of cash and short-term investments against $294M of debt leaves $71M owed, about 0.7× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 20 + DIO 198 − DPO 38 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 8%–19%; 17% latest = NOPAT $76M ÷ invested capital $443M
    Industry peers: median 0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–19%; latest $51M = operating cash $57M − maintenance capex $6M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put $7M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $44M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $44M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $57M ÷ net income $58M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $6M ÷ Owner Earnings $51M
    What this means

    Of $51M Owner Earnings, $6M (11%) went back to shareholders, $6M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.13×
    Expanding
    Capex $14M ÷ depreciation $6M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $463M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.56×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $294M vs $342M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Near
    Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +88%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.35/share (latest year $3.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $19.21/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 18% early to 23% lately, median 20% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 7.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We also expect our competitors to continue to improve their technology infrastructure, including with the use of artificial intelligence ("AI") and machine learning solutions, to interact with clients, suppliers and other third-parties to sell their products, utilize (and even monetize) their data and support and grow …”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$418M
  • Cash & short-term investments$192M
  • Receivables$27M
  • Inventory$130M
  • Other current assets$69M
Current liabilities$71M
  • Accounts payable$36M
  • Other current liabilities$35M
Current ratio5.87×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.05×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$347Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 5.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$186Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$32MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$302M$8M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $423M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$56M · 13%
  • Dividends$34M · 8%
  • Buybacks$83M · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$250M · 59%
  • Returned to owners$117M

    31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $34M as dividends and $83M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $91M and cash and short-term investments rose $190M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$35.20

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $73M, about $35.20 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $28.62 (2022) to $43.13 (2021), and 2021, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($39M).

  • Net change in share count8.1%

    The diluted count rose from 18M to 19M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.29/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained21%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($210M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $43M, so each retained $1 added about 0.21 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$200M26% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity37%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$107Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $56M of capital spent building

$26M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 24% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership5.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio39:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$7M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Turning Point Brands Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.1%

    Diluted shares grew 8.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $83M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (consumer & brand), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LOCOEl Pollo Loco Holdings Inc.$490M8.5%8%6%
NATRNature's Sunshine Products Inc.$480M73%4.3%12%4%
KRTKarat Packaging Inc.$468M34%8.9%24%7%
TPBTurning Point Brands Inc.$463M49%20.4%15%9%
RHLDResolute Holdings Management, Inc.$462M56%31.0%41%
ZLABZai Lab Limited$457M65%-338.0%-103%-281%
PARPAR Technology Corporation$456M22%-15.1%-8%-8%
TARSTarsus Pharmaceuticals Inc.$451M-65.9%-41%-46%
Group median53%6.4%8%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Turning Point Brands Inc. has delivered.

Turning Point Brands Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Turning Point Brands Inc. earns about $44M on its 9.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1M on 19M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $101M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($16M) runs well above depreciation ($7M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $11M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Turning Point Brands Inc. (TPB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TPB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TOST its page in the Manual TPC →

Industry order: ← RLX the Tobacco chapter