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RUN, Sunrun Inc.
Sunrun is the nation's leading provider of clean energy as a subscription service, offering residential solar and storage with no upfront costs.
Sunrun's innovative products and solutions can connect homes to the cleanest energy on earth, providing them with energy security, predictability, and peace of mind.
Sunrun also manages energy services that benefit communities, utilities, and the electric grid while enhancing customer value.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −40% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $477M | $533M | $760M | $859M | $922M | $1.6B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $3.0B | $3.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 50% | 52% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 91% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 19% | 20% | 15% | 15% | 29% | 16% | 8% | 10% | 12% | 9% | 9% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 2% | 3% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($192M) | ($181M) | ($122M) | ($216M) | ($465M) | ($666M) | ($662M) | ($2.0B) | ($3.7B) | ($126M) | ($55M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −40.3% | −34.0% | −16.0% | −25.1% | −50.4% | −41.4% | −28.5% | −87.6% | −181.3% | −4.3% | −1.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $75M | $125M | $27M | $26M | ($173M) | ($79M) | $173M | ($1.6B) | ($2.8B) | $450M | $568M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 43% | 9% | 26% | — | — | — | 1% | — | — | — | -10% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($200M) | ($96M) | ($62M) | ($204M) | ($318M) | ($817M) | ($849M) | ($821M) | ($766M) | ($421M) | ($307M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $19M | $20M | $20M | $23M | $20M | $23M | $27M | $32M | $44M | $38M | $58M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($313M) | ($263M) | ($137M) | ($280M) | ($335M) | ($972M) | ($1.2B) | $640M | $1.9B | ($1.0B) | ($1.0B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $13M | $8M | $5M | $25M | $3M | $9M | $18M | $21M | $2M | — | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 2.6% | 1.5% | 0.7% | 3.0% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.1% | — | 0.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($213M) | ($104M) | ($67M) | ($230M) | ($321M) | ($826M) | ($867M) | ($842M) | ($768M) | — | ($308M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −44.6% | −19.5% | −8.9% | −26.8% | −34.8% | −51.3% | −37.3% | −37.2% | −37.7% | — | −9.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($213M) | ($104M) | ($67M) | ($230M) | ($321M) | ($826M) | ($867M) | ($842M) | ($768M) | — | ($308M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −44.6% | −19.5% | −8.9% | −26.8% | −34.8% | −51.3% | −37.3% | −37.2% | −37.7% | — | −9.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $5M | $0 | $0 | $3M | $0 | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | $0 | $0 | $5M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -8% | -9% | -4% | -8% | -4% | -4% | -5% | -10% | -20% | -1% | -0% | ROICROIC |
| 11% | 14% | 3% | 3% | -3% | -1% | 3% | -31% | -111% | 14% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 14% | 3% | 3% | −3% | −1% | 3% | −31% | −111% | 14% | 17% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $224M | $242M | $304M | $363M | $708M | $850M | $953M | $988M | $947M | $1.2B | $1.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $60M | $60M | $66M | $78M | $95M | $146M | $214M | $172M | $171M | $263M | $233M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $67M | $94M | $79M | $261M | $283M | $507M | $784M | $460M | $402M | $501M | $490M | InventoryInvent. |
| $66M | $115M | $131M | $223M | $207M | $288M | $339M | $231M | $354M | $271M | $343M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $62M | $40M | $15M | $115M | $171M | $365M | $659M | $401M | $219M | $493M | $380M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $369M | $417M | $461M | $734M | $1.1B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $245M | $311M | $372M | $530M | $901M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.4× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 1.8× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.7× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $88M | $88M | $88M | $95M | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $3.1B | $0 | $0 | $0 | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.7B | $5.8B | $14.4B | $16.5B | $19.3B | $20.5B | $19.9B | $22.6B | $22.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $898M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.3B | $4.8B | $6.5B | $8.4B | $10.7B | $12.9B | $14.7B | $14.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $674M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $4.1B | $5.7B | $7.4B | $9.7B | $12.0B | $13.5B | $13.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $673M | $882M | $949M | $965M | $6.1B | $6.3B | $6.7B | $5.2B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 3.9% | 4.1% | 3.7% | 3.1% | 18.5% | 13.1% | 4.8% | 4.9% | 5.5% | 3.7% | 3.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 105M | 108M | 117M | 124M | 140M | 205M | 219M | 217M | 222M | 264M | 272M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.55 | $4.92 | $6.49 | $6.93 | $6.61 | $7.85 | $10.59 | $10.43 | $9.17 | $11.18 | $11.66 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.72 | $1.16 | $0.23 | $0.21 | $-1.24 | $-0.39 | $0.79 | $-7.41 | $-12.81 | $1.70 | $2.08 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-2.03 | $-0.96 | $-0.58 | $-1.86 | $-2.30 | $-4.03 | $-3.96 | $-3.89 | $-3.45 | — | $-1.13 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.03 | $-0.96 | $-0.58 | $-1.86 | $-2.30 | $-4.03 | $-3.96 | $-3.89 | $-3.45 | — | $-1.13 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.12 | $0.07 | $0.04 | $0.20 | $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.08 | $0.10 | $0.01 | — | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.41 | $8.15 | $8.10 | $7.79 | $43.54 | $30.49 | $30.61 | $24.14 | $11.49 | $11.84 | $12.27 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +10.5%/yr | +11.1%/yr |
| EPS | +10.1%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −29.8%/yr (8-yr) | −49.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.1%/yr | −22.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $2.8B loss into ($768M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($2.8B) | ($1.6B) | $173M | ($79M) | ($173M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$44M | +$32M | +$27M | +$23M | +$20M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$113M | +$112M | +$111M | +$211M | +$171M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.9B | +$640M | −$1.2B | −$972M | −$335M |
| Cash from operations | ($766M) | ($821M) | ($849M) | ($817M) | ($318M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$2M | −$21M | −$18M | −$9M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | ($768M) | ($842M) | ($867M) | ($826M) | ($321M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -38% | -37% | -37% | -51% | -35% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $113M), owner earnings is nearer ($881M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $1.2B − debt $14.7B
What this means
Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $14.7B of debt leaves $13.5B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 32 + DIO 720 − DPO 389 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -20%–-1%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($126M) ÷ invested capital $16.6BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -51%–-9%; latest ($423M) = operating cash ($421M) − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -14% of revenue this year, a -37% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $108M of SBC) leaves ($531M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? -0.94×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($421M) ÷ net income $450M
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips on it. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.04×HarvestingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $38M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.66×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $14.7B vs $853M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −1860%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-5.59/share (latest year $1.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.13/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −30% → −91% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (−91%) sits below the early years (−30%), but the latest year (−4%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −40% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −11%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2024 · −181.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
- Receivables$233M
- Inventory$490M
- Other current assets$154M
- Debt due within a year$123M
- Accounts payable$343M
- Other current liabilities$893M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$4.3B written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership3.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio107:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$108M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sunrun Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−37.4% vs −24.3%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −24.3%) and the loss has widened to −37.4% across the last three years, with the latest year at −37.7%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$898M → $14.9B
Debt rose from $898M to $14.9B while owner earnings went from about ($128M) to ($825M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (consumer & brand), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KTBKontoor Brands Inc. Common Stock | $3.2B | 42% | 12.1% | 16% | 12% |
| FFIVF5 Inc. | $3.1B | 81% | 23.1% | 26% | 27% |
| AMRXAmneal Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $3.0B | 37% | 7.9% | 3% | 9% |
| GESGuess | $3.0B | 38% | 5.4% | 14% | 4% |
| GIIIG-III Apparel | $3.0B | 36% | 6.3% | 9% | 4% |
| RUNSunrun Inc. | $3.0B | 91% | -37.1% | -6% | -37% |
| CRICarter's | $2.9B | 43% | 11.0% | 24% | 9% |
| NBIXNeurocrine | $2.9B | 99% | 11.2% | 10% | 21% |
| Group median | — | 42% | 9.4% | 12% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFSunrun Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered20%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← RUMBW its page in the Manual RUSHA →
Industry order: ← POWL the Electrical Equipment chapter SES →