Share count
33Mpeak FY2025
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SANG, Sangoma Technologies Corporation
Revenue is Services (82%) and Products (18%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$237M
−4.3% YoY · 16% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $237M 5-yr avg $218M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −1.2% through the cycle on a 68% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −5 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Services is 82% of revenue, with Products the other meaningful line at 18%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Services82%$195M
- Products18%$42M
By geographyUnited States95%Others5%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $131M | $224M | $253M | $247M | $237M | $237M | RevenueRevenue |
| 68% | 70% | 68% | 70% | 68% | 68% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $6M | ($101M) | ($25M) | ($3M) | ($2M) | ($2M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.8% | −44.8% | −10.0% | −1.2% | −1.0% | −1.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $282K | ($111M) | ($29M) | ($9M) | ($5M) | ($5M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $19M | $21M | $26M | $44M | $42M | $42M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $18M | $132M | $56M | $53M | $47M | $47M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1M | $2M | $4M | $4M | $2M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 0.9% | 0.8% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.0% | 1.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $17M | $19M | $22M | $40M | $39M | $39M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 13.2% | 8.6% | 8.9% | 16.2% | 16.6% | 16.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $17M | $19M | $22M | $40M | $39M | $39M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 13.2% | 8.6% | 8.9% | 16.2% | 16.6% | 16.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| 1% | -21% | -6% | -1% | -1% | -1% | ROICROIC |
| 0% | -38% | -11% | -3% | -2% | -2% | Return on equityROE |
| 0% | −38% | −11% | −3% | −2% | −2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $22M | $13M | $11M | $16M | $13M | $13M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $15M | $24M | $22M | $19M | $15M | $15M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $12M | $17M | $18M | $15M | $8M | $8M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | $24M | $21M | $16M | $16M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $27M | $41M | $16M | $12M | $8M | $8M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $53M | $60M | $62M | $57M | $43M | $43M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $55M | $78M | $63M | $60M | $49M | $49M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 0.8× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $267M | $210M | $188M | $188M | $187M | $187M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $499M | $443M | $401M | $347M | $347M | Total assetsAssets |
| $75M | $105M | $101M | $78M | $48M | $48M | Total debtDebt |
| $53M | $92M | $90M | $62M | $34M | $34M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.3× | -26.0× | -3.7× | -0.4× | -0.6× | -0.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $376M | $294M | $266M | $260M | $254M | $254M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 28.9M | 31.5M | 33.1M | 33.2M | 33.5M | 33.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.54 | $7.13 | $7.62 | $7.44 | $7.07 | $7.12 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.01 | $-3.52 | $-0.88 | $-0.26 | $-0.15 | $-0.15 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.60 | $0.61 | $0.68 | $1.21 | $1.18 | $1.18 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.60 | $0.61 | $0.68 | $1.21 | $1.18 | $1.18 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.06 | $0.12 | $0.12 | $0.07 | $0.07 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $13.00 | $9.33 | $8.04 | $7.81 | $7.59 | $7.64 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +11.7%/yr | +11.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +18.3%/yr | +18.3%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +16.2%/yr | +16.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −12.6%/yr | −12.6%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−1%low FY2022
Gross margin
68%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.9×peak FY2022
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$39Mowner earningsvs.($5M)net incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2021FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $5M loss into $39M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($5M) | ($9M) | ($29M) | ($111M) | $282K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$47M | +$53M | +$56M | +$132M | +$18M |
| Cash from operations | $42M | $44M | $26M | $21M | $19M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$2M | −$4M | −$4M | −$2M | −$1M |
| Owner earnings | $39M | $40M | $22M | $19M | $17M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 17% | 16% | 9% | 9% | 13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.6×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($2M) ÷ interest expense $4M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $13M − debt $48M
What this means
Netting $13M of cash and short-term investments against $48M of debt leaves $34M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 23 + DIO 40 − DPO 76 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -21%–1%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($2M) ÷ invested capital $289MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median margin, range 9%–17%; latest $39M = operating cash $42M − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 5 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($5M) · cash from operations $42M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $39M
What this means
Of $39M Owner Earnings, $3M (7%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $3M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $237M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $48M vs ($7M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.43/share (latest year $-0.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −20% → −1% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −20% early to −1% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · −44.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If the AI that we use is deficient, inaccurate or controversial, we could incur operational inefficiencies, competitive harm, legal and regulatory action, brand or reputational harm, or other adverse impacts on our business and financial results.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$43M
- Cash & short-term investments$13M
- Receivables$15M
- Inventory$8M
- Other current assets$6M
Current liabilities$49M
- Debt due within a year$21M
- Accounts payable$16M
- Other current liabilities$13M
Current ratio0.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.70×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($7M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$21M due · $13M cash
cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Jun 30, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($24M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($50M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$56M$8M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$7Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $152M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$14M · 9%
- Buybacks$3M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)$136M · 89%
- Returned to owners$3M
2% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $27M and cash and short-term investments fell $9M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count14.9%
The diluted count rose from 29M to 33M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$278M80% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity74%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 5 years buying other businesses, against $14M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sangoma Technologies Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?14.9%
Diluted shares grew 14.9% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent $3M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZIPZipRecruiter Inc. | $449M | 89% | 0.3% | 10% | 14% |
| GRNDGrindr Inc. | $440M | — | 21.4% | 22% | 26% |
| DSPViant Technology Inc. | $344M | 46% | 1.2% | -8% | 13% |
| HSTMHealthStream Inc. | $304M | 86% | 5.8% | 4% | 18% |
| PUBMPubMatic Inc. | $283M | 68% | 7.5% | 8% | 25% |
| NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc. | $258M | 83% | -55.8% | -24% | -28% |
| WEAVWeave Communications Inc. | $239M | 63% | -35.0% | -111% | -10% |
| SANGSangoma Technologies Corporation | $237M | 68% | -1.2% | -1% | 13% |
| Group median | — | 68% | 0.7% | 2% | 14% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Sangoma Technologies Corporation's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Sangoma Technologies Corporation has delivered.
Sangoma Technologies Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Sangoma Technologies Corporation earns about $31M on its 13.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $39M on 33M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-06-30; net debt $34M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sangoma Technologies Corporation (SANG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SANG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SAIH its page in the Manual SAP →
Industry order: ← SAIL the Software chapter SAP →