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SAP, SAP SE ADS
SAP makes the enterprise software that runs the back office of much of the corporate world — the systems that handle a large company's finance, supply chain, procurement and people. Once a business runs on SAP, replacing it is so costly and risky that it rarely does, which is the heart of the franchise.
On the other hand, investments in artificial intelligence (AI), including semiconductors, strengthened global trade in technology products.
Overall, economic growth was stronger in emerging market economies in 2025, with India standing out in particular.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Switching costs, the deepest moat in enterprise software. What decides it: whether customers move their installed systems onto SAP's cloud subscriptions and keep renewing; how much of revenue recurs each year rather than riding on one-off licences; and whether it holds its entrenched base against younger cloud-native rivals. The dependence it flags most is that this migration goes to plan, with the litigation and data regulation that come from sitting at the centre of its customers' operations. The figures are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| €22.1B | €23.5B | €24.7B | €27.6B | €27.3B | €27.0B | €29.5B | €31.2B | €34.2B | €36.8B | €36.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| 70% | 70% | 70% | 70% | 71% | 73% | 73% | 72% | 73% | 73% | 73% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| €5.1B | €4.9B | €5.7B | €4.5B | €6.6B | €6.3B | €5.9B | €5.8B | €4.7B | €9.6B | €9.6B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 23.3% | 20.8% | 23.1% | 16.2% | 24.2% | 23.4% | 20.0% | 18.6% | 13.6% | 26.1% | 26.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| €3.6B | €4.0B | €4.1B | €3.3B | €5.1B | €5.3B | €2.3B | €6.1B | €3.1B | €7.2B | €7.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 25% | 20% | 27% | 27% | 27% | 24% | 39% | 22% | 34% | 29% | 29% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| €4.6B | €5.0B | €4.3B | €3.5B | €7.2B | €6.2B | €5.6B | €6.2B | €5.2B | €9.2B | €9.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| €1.3B | €1.3B | €1.4B | €1.9B | €1.8B | €1.5B | €1.6B | €1.4B | €1.3B | €1.3B | €1.3B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (€282M) | (€235M) | (€1.1B) | (€1.7B) | €218M | (€570M) | €1.8B | (€1.3B) | €803M | €684M | €684M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| €1.0B | €1.3B | €1.5B | €817M | €816M | €701M | €877M | €785M | €797M | €739M | €739M | CapexCapex |
| 4.5% | 5.4% | 5.9% | 3.0% | 3.0% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 2.5% | 2.3% | 2.0% | 2.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| €3.6B | €3.8B | €2.8B | €2.7B | €6.4B | €5.5B | €4.8B | €5.5B | €4.4B | €8.4B | €8.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 16.4% | 16.1% | 11.5% | 9.7% | 23.3% | 20.5% | 16.2% | 17.5% | 12.9% | 22.9% | 22.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| €3.6B | €3.8B | €2.8B | €2.7B | €6.4B | €5.5B | €4.8B | €5.5B | €4.4B | €8.4B | €8.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 16.4% | 16.1% | 11.5% | 9.7% | 23.3% | 20.5% | 16.2% | 17.5% | 12.9% | 22.9% | 22.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| €1.4B | €1.5B | €1.7B | €1.8B | €1.9B | €2.2B | €2.9B | €2.4B | €2.6B | €2.7B | €1.8B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| €0 | €500M | €0 | €0 | €1.5B | €0 | €1.5B | €949M | €2.1B | €1.9B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 13% | 15% | 14% | 9% | 13% | 12% | 9% | 11% | 7% | 17% | 16% | ROICROIC |
| 14% | 16% | 14% | 11% | 17% | 14% | 6% | 14% | 7% | 16% | 16% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 10% | 8% | 5% | 11% | 8% | −1% | 9% | 1% | 10% | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| €4.7B | €4.8B | €9.1B | €5.6B | €6.9B | €11.7B | €9.9B | €11.5B | €11.2B | €9.8B | €9.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| €5.9B | €5.9B | €6.4B | €7.9B | €6.6B | €6.4B | €6.2B | €6.3B | €6.8B | €6.7B | €6.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| €1.3B | €1.2B | €1.5B | €1.6B | €1.4B | €1.6B | €2.1B | €1.8B | €2.0B | €2.4B | €2.4B | Accounts payablePayables |
| €4.6B | €4.7B | €4.9B | €6.3B | €5.2B | €4.8B | €4.1B | €4.5B | €4.8B | €4.2B | €4.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| €11.6B | €11.9B | €16.6B | €15.2B | €15.1B | €20.0B | €18.5B | €20.6B | €21.4B | €20.3B | €20.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| €9.7B | €10.2B | €10.5B | €14.5B | €12.8B | €16.1B | €17.5B | €14.6B | €19.1B | €17.4B | €17.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.6× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.4× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| €23.3B | €21.3B | €23.7B | €29.2B | €27.5B | €31.1B | €33.1B | €29.1B | €31.3B | €29.0B | €29.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| €44.3B | €42.5B | €51.5B | €60.2B | €58.5B | €71.2B | €72.2B | €68.3B | €74.2B | €70.4B | €70.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| €6.4B | €5.0B | €10.6B | €11.1B | €11.8B | €9.3B | €7.8B | €6.6B | €7.0B | €4.5B | €5.8B | Total debtDebt |
| €1.7B | €180M | €1.5B | €5.5B | €4.9B | (€2.3B) | (€2.1B) | (€4.9B) | (€4.2B) | (€5.2B) | (€3.2B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 19.8× | 16.9× | 13.6× | 7.6× | 9.5× | 6.7× | 2.7× | 4.4× | 4.5× | 7.0× | 7.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| €26.4B | €25.5B | €28.8B | €30.7B | €29.7B | €38.9B | €40.2B | €43.2B | €45.4B | €44.6B | €44.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.20B | 1.20B | 1.19B | 1.19B | 1.18B | 1.18B | 1.17B | 1.17B | 1.17B | 1.17B | 1.17B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| €18.42 | €19.60 | €20.69 | €23.08 | €23.13 | €22.84 | €25.23 | €26.74 | €29.31 | €31.56 | €31.56 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| €3.04 | €3.35 | €3.42 | €2.78 | €4.35 | €4.45 | €1.95 | €5.26 | €2.68 | €6.14 | €6.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| €3.03 | €3.15 | €2.38 | €2.24 | €5.40 | €4.68 | €4.08 | €4.68 | €3.78 | €7.22 | €7.22 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| €3.03 | €3.15 | €2.38 | €2.24 | €5.40 | €4.68 | €4.08 | €4.68 | €3.78 | €7.22 | €7.22 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| €1.15 | €1.25 | €1.40 | €1.50 | €1.58 | €1.85 | €2.45 | €2.05 | €2.20 | €2.35 | €1.54 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| €0.84 | €1.07 | €1.22 | €0.68 | €0.69 | €0.59 | €0.75 | €0.67 | €0.68 | €0.63 | €0.63 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| €22.02 | €21.29 | €24.15 | €25.75 | €25.14 | €32.93 | €34.35 | €36.98 | €38.97 | €38.24 | €38.24 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.2%/yr | +6.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +10.1%/yr | +6.0%/yr |
| EPS | +8.1%/yr | +7.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +8.3%/yr | +8.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −3.0%/yr | −1.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.3%/yr | +8.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned €7.2B of profit into €8.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | €7.2B | €3.1B | €6.1B | €2.3B | €5.3B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +€1.3B | +€1.3B | +€1.4B | +€1.6B | +€1.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +€684M | +€803M | −€1.3B | +€1.8B | −€570M |
| Cash from operations | €9.2B | €5.2B | €6.2B | €5.6B | €6.2B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −€739M | −€797M | −€785M | −€877M | −€701M |
| Owner earnings | €8.4B | €4.4B | €5.5B | €4.8B | €5.5B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 23% | 13% | 17% | 16% | 20% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income €9.6B ÷ interest expense €1.4B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash €8.2B + ST investments €774M − debt €5.8B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by €3.2B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 66 + DIO 0 − DPO 89 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 7%–17%; 16% latest = NOPAT €6.8B ÷ invested capital €42.2BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 10%–23%; latest €8.4B = operating cash €9.2B − maintenance capex €739MIndustry peers: median 22%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops €9.2B ÷ net income €7.2B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks €3.7B ÷ Owner Earnings €8.4B
What this means
Of €8.4B Owner Earnings, €3.7B (44%) went back to shareholders, €1.8B dividends, €1.9B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.56×HarvestingCapex €739M ÷ depreciation €1.3B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €36.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.16×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · €5.8B vs €2.8B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +40%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €4.46/share (latest year €5.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €36.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 22% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (19%) sits below the early years (22%), but the latest year (26%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 21% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 13.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.3%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“According to IDC, "IDC's May 2025 SaaS Path Survey finds 44% of organizations plan to invest in AI-powered ERP applications, while 22% plan to replace their current applications if generative AI (GenAI) is not included in the next release." 2 These shifts reflect growing demand for business systems that deliver real-ti…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments€9.0B
- Receivables€6.7B
- Other current assets€4.6B
- Debt due within a year€1.3B
- Accounts payable€2.4B
- Other current liabilities€13.7B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated €57.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested€9.3B · 16%
- Dividends€21.0B · 37%
- Buybacks€8.5B · 15%
- Retained (debt / cash)€18.4B · 32%
- Returned to owners€29.4B
61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €21.0B as dividends and €8.5B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran €8.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−2.7%
The diluted count fell from 1198M to 1166M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record€2.35/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained18%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (€14.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew €2.7B, so each retained €1 added about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why SAP SE ADS is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRMSalesforce Inc. | $41.5B | 74% | 3.7% | 3% | 22% |
| SAPSAP SE ADS | €36.8B | 72% | 21.9% | 13% | 16% |
| XYZBlock Inc. | $24.2B | 34% | -0.7% | -1% | 4% |
| ADBEAdobe Inc. | $23.8B | 87% | 32.2% | 33% | 39% |
| CTSHCognizant | $21.1B | — | 15.3% | 18% | 12% |
| INTUIntuit Inc. | $18.8B | 99% | 26.0% | 35% | 32% |
| NOWServiceNow Inc. | $13.3B | 77% | 4.4% | 6% | 30% |
| SHOPShopify Inc. | $11.6B | 49% | -1.3% | -0% | 15% |
| Group median | — | 74% | 9.8% | 9% | 19% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each Representing one Ordinary”; SAP SE ADS reports in EUR, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at EUR 1 = $1.145 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in EUR.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what SAP SE ADS has delivered.
SAP SE ADS’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, SAP SE ADS earns about $6.9B on its 16.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 22.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $9.6B on 1229M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $3.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SANG its page in the Manual SB →
Industry order: ← SANG the Software chapter SHOP →