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SG, Sweetgreen Inc.

Restaurants consumer brand

Sweetgreen, Inc. is a mission-driven, next generation restaurant and lifestyle brand that serves healthy food at scale.

We have designed our menu to be delicious, customizable, and convenient to empower our customers to make healthier choices for both lunch and dinner.

Personalized Experience Increase customer frequency and average check through targeted digital engagement, personalized messaging, and relevant offers. 4.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SG · Sweetgreen Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$679M

+0.4% YoY · 25% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $675M 5-yr avg $550M

Operating margin −21.5% 5-yr avg −27.3%

ROIC −40% 5-yr avg −50%

Owner-earnings margin −13% 5-yr avg −14%

Free cash flow margin −18% 5-yr avg −22%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −40% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 16% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −43%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
							Income statement
$221M	$340M	$470M	$584M	$677M	$679M	$675M	RevenueRevenue
45%	37%	40%	25%	22%	21%	20%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
—	—	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($142M)	($134M)	($193M)	($122M)	($96M)	($139M)	($145M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−64.2%	−39.5%	−41.1%	−20.9%	−14.1%	−20.5%	−21.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($141M)	($153M)	($190M)	($113M)	($90M)	($134M)	$17M	Net incomeNet inc.
							Cash flow & returns
($90M)	($65M)	($43M)	$26M	$43M	($13M)	($17M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$27M	$36M	$46M	$59M	$67M	$72M	$73M	DepreciationDeprec.
$19M	$24M	$22M	$31M	$27M	$13M	($139M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$48M	$85M	$97M	$90M	$84M	$106M	$102M	CapexCapex
21.8%	24.9%	20.6%	15.4%	12.5%	15.7%	15.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($117M)	($100M)	($90M)	($33M)	($24M)	($84M)	($90M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−53.1%	−29.4%	−19.1%	−5.7%	−3.5%	−12.4%	−13.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($138M)	($149M)	($140M)	($63M)	($41M)	($119M)	($119M)	Free cash flowFCF
−62.8%	−43.9%	−29.8%	−10.8%	−6.1%	−17.5%	−17.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$791K	$3M	$0	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	-59%	-73%	-43%	-33%	-41%	-40%	ROICROIC
—	-23%	-35%	-23%	-20%	-38%	3%	Return on equityROE
—	−23%	−35%	−23%	−20%	−38%	3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
							Balance sheet
$103M	$472M	$332M	$257M	$215M	$89M	$157M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$3M	$3M	$4M	$5M	$5M	$7M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$903K	$1M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$3M	InventoryInvent.
—	$11M	$12M	$17M	$19M	$20M	$17M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($8M)	($8M)	($12M)	($12M)	($12M)	($8M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$507M	$346M	$276M	$235M	$130M	$175M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$48M	$73M	$92M	$116M	$119M	$109M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	10.7×	4.8×	3.0×	2.0×	1.1×	1.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6M	$36M	$36M	$36M	$36M	$28M	$28M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$763M	$909M	$857M	$857M	$788M	$913M	Total assetsAssets
($103M)	($472M)	($332M)	($257M)	($215M)	($89M)	($157M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-350.5×	-1544.8×	-2329.4×	-955.8×	-373.8×	-7332.5×	-3087.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($307M)	$653M	$541M	$483M	$446M	$356M	$489M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.2%	8.5%	16.7%	8.5%	5.8%	5.4%	4.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
							Per share
16.1M	27.8M	110M	112M	114M	118M	120M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$13.74	$12.23	$4.27	$5.22	$5.92	$5.76	$5.61	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-8.80	$-5.51	$-1.73	$-1.01	$-0.79	$-1.14	$0.14	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-7.30	$-3.60	$-0.81	$-0.29	$-0.21	$-0.71	$-0.75	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-8.63	$-5.36	$-1.27	$-0.56	$-0.36	$-1.01	$-0.99	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.00	$3.04	$0.88	$0.80	$0.74	$0.90	$0.85	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-19.15	$23.51	$4.91	$4.31	$3.90	$3.02	$4.07	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.73 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×3.96 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	5-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−16.0%/yr	−16.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−21.3%/yr	−21.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

118Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−41%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($84M)owner earningsvs.($134M)net incomelow FY2020

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($84M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $72M it takes just to hold its position. It put $35M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($119M).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($134M)	($90M)	($113M)	($190M)	($153M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$72M	+$67M	+$59M	+$46M	+$36M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$36M	+$39M	+$50M	+$79M	+$29M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$13M	+$27M	+$31M	+$22M	+$24M
Cash from operations	($13M)	$43M	$26M	($43M)	($65M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$72M	−$67M	−$59M	−$46M	−$36M
Owner earnings	($84M)	($24M)	($33M)	($90M)	($100M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$35M	−$17M	−$30M	−$50M	−$49M
Free cash flow	($119M)	($41M)	($63M)	($140M)	($149M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-12%	-4%	-6%	-19%	-29%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $72M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $35M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $36M), owner earnings is nearer ($121M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -7332.5×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($139M) ÷ interest expense $19K

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$89M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $89M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $89M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin -19%

Consumes cash through the cycle

6-yr median margin, range -53%–-4%; latest ($84M) = operating cash ($13M) − maintenance capex $72M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -12% of revenue this year, a -19% median across 6 years. It chose to put $35M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($119M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $36M of SBC) leaves ($121M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($13M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($134M) · cash from operations ($13M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 1.49×

Expanding

Capex $106M ÷ depreciation $72M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $679M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.95/share (latest year $-1.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 6

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −48% → −19% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −48% early to −19% lately, median −40% — pricing power intact or improving.
Worst year 2020 · −64.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our competitors may incorporate or deploy generative AI more quickly or more effectively than us, which may cause competitive harm to our business.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$175M

Cash & short-term investments$157M
Receivables$7M
Inventory$3M
Other current assets$9M

Current liabilities$109M

Accounts payable$17M
Other current liabilities$92M

Current ratio1.61×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.58×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.44×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$66Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Cash runway1.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.7× → 1.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$451Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($248M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$356M$356M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $354M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$7Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$64M

'27$68M

'28$63M

'29$61M

'30$55M

later$149M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$64Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$460Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$354Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$0

Lease obligations (present value)$354M

Total fixed claims on the business$354M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $354M, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Jonathan Neman	$38.8M	$111.3M	($100M)
2022	Jonathan Neman	$350k	−$61.5M	($90M)
2023	Jonathan Neman	$623k	$6.7M	($33M)
2024	Jonathan Neman	$911k	$52.3M	($24M)
2025	Jonathan Neman	$3.2M	−$36.1M	($84M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership8.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$36M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FWRGFirst Watch Restaurant Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	2.3%	2%	4%
CAVACAVA Group	$1.2B	—	0.6%	10%	7%
DINDine Brands Global Inc.	$879M	63%	17.1%	9%	12%
PTLOPortillo's Inc.	$732M	—	8.2%	7%	6%
WINGWingstop	$697M	80%	25.6%	48%	19%
SGSweetgreen Inc.	$679M	—	-30.2%	-43%	-16%
LOCOEl Pollo Loco Holdings Inc.	$490M	—	8.5%	8%	6%
BHBiglari Holdings Inc.	$395M	57%	5.8%	3%	16%
Group median	—	—	7.0%	8%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Sweetgreen Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered25%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−18%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh SG against another business →

The owners of SG: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sweetgreen Inc. (SG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SFST its page in the Manual SGI →

Industry order: ← SBUX the Restaurants chapter SHAK →