Share count
506Mpeak FY2021
← All companies ← SHEL Manual SHIP → ← SHBI Banks SMBC →
SHG, Shinhan Financial Group Co Ltd
Banks financial
Shinhan is one of South Korea's large financial holding groups, built around a bank. It takes in deposits and lends the money back out — to households, to small and mid-sized businesses, and to large companies — and earns the gap between what it pays savers and what it charges borrowers. Around that core sit fee businesses: stock brokerage, credit cards, insurance, and asset management, with the customer base concentrated in Korea and, for brokerage, in the Seoul area.
We have maintained a vision of becoming a "customer-centered, top-tier Shinhan" recognized by our clients as well as the broader community.
In line with this vision, we have identified three core agendas as foundational principles to guide our overall strategic direction: (i) "Scandal Zero," (ii) enhanced customer experience and convenience, and (iii) sustainable revenue generation.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
₩15.70T
+4.7% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2024, with 5-yr average
Revenue ₩15.70T 5-yr avg ₩14.76T
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- A bank's product is money, much the same from one lender to the next, so the test is whether Shinhan funds itself more cheaply and lends more carefully than the bank beside it — a low-cost, sticky deposit base on one side and disciplined underwriting on the other. Watch the spread it earns, and what competition for the same lower-risk loans does to that spread; watch credit losses across a full cycle, since the loan book and nearly the whole franchise sit inside one country. The bad case is plain: a Korean downturn that strikes household and small-business borrowers at once while rivals compete the spread away. The figures for margin, returns and loan losses are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 9%, above 12% in only 0 of 9 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, charted
FY2015–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
₩15.70Tlow FY2015
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Below the cost of equityNet income ₩4.45T ÷ equity ₩56.05TIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill ₩4.67T − intangibles ₩981.4B)Industry peers: median 13%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Efficiency ratio 39%Cost-income, not comparable to the US gradesNoninterest expense ₩6.12T ÷ (net interest income + fees)Industry peers: median 62%
What this means
The share of revenue eaten by running costs. A 20-F/IFRS filer structures its income statement differently from a US bank, so this figure is not comparable to the US thresholds and is shown without a lean/bloated grade — read it against the bank's own history, not across the pool.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 7.6%ModestEquity ₩56.05T ÷ assets ₩739.76T
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 57%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits ₩422.78T ÷ assets ₩739.76T
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 7%LowProvision for credit losses ₩815.2B ÷ net interest income ₩11.40T
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPMJPMorgan Chase & Co. | $182.4B | 13% | 16% | 57% | 2.0% |
| BACBank of America Corp. | $113.1B | 10% | 13% | 64% | 1.8% |
| CCitigroup Inc. | $85.2B | 7% | 8% | 62% | 2.3% |
| WFCWells Fargo & Co. | $83.7B | 11% | 13% | 67% | 2.5% |
| COFCapital One Financial Corporation | $53.4B | 8% | 12% | 54% | 6.0% |
| USBU.S. Bancorp | $28.7B | 12% | 17% | 59% | 2.5% |
| TFCTruist Financial Corporation | $20.3B | 8% | 11% | 63% | 2.7% |
| SHGShinhan Financial Group Co Ltd | ₩15.70T | 9% | 10% | 39% | 1.7% |
| Group median | — | 9% | 12% | 61% | 2.4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “each ADS represented two common”; Shinhan Financial Group Co Ltd reports in KRW, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at KRW 1 = $0.0007 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in KRW.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Shinhan Financial Group Co Ltd’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered7%/yr’19→’24
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity10%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $34.1B on 239M shares, a 10% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Shinhan Financial Group Co Ltd (SHG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SHG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SHEL its page in the Manual SHIP →
Industry order: ← SHBI the Banks chapter SMBC →