Owner Scorecard


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SHIP, Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp.

Marine Shipping capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share
SHIP · Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$158M
−5.6% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $158M 5-yr avg $143M
Operating margin 27.4% 5-yr avg 30.2%
Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 26%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg −12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 13% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −41% and 43% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 33% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$36M$78M$95M$90M$66M$153M$125M$110M$167M$158M$158MRevenueRevenue
($15M)$3M$4M$12M($268K)$66M$30M$21M$63M$43M$43MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−40.9%3.6%4.5%13.4%−0.4%43.0%23.7%19.4%37.4%27.4%27.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($25M)($3M)($21M)($12M)($18M)$41M$17M$2M$43M$21M($9M)Net incomeNet inc.
0%-0%0%0%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($15M)$3M$6M$13M($10M)$81M$37M$31M$75M$53M$53MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$9M$11M$11M$11M$13M$17M$23M$25M$25MDepreciationDeprec.
$753K($5M)$16M$14M($4M)$22M($3M)$4M$32M$31M$37MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$41M$33M$31M$12M$20M$197M$70M$314K$71M$36M$36MCapexCapex
113.3%42.5%32.6%13.8%30.7%128.8%56.2%0.3%42.2%22.5%22.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($24M)($8M)($5M)$759K($22M)$64M$14M$31M$49M$28M$28MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−66.3%−10.0%−5.4%0.8%−34.2%41.5%11.1%28.1%29.3%17.7%17.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($56M)($30M)($25M)$759K($30M)($116M)($33M)$31M$5M$17M$17MFree cash flowFCF
−156.0%−38.9%−26.6%0.8%−45.6%−76.1%−26.4%28.1%2.8%10.8%10.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$18M$6M$11M$9M$9MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$2M$0$2M$5M$0BuybacksBuybacks
-5%1%-0%16%7%5%13%7%ROICROIC
-80%-8%-99%-39%-19%17%8%1%17%8%-3%Return on equityROE
−19%17%−0%−2%12%4%−7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$13M$9M$7M$14M$21M$41M$26M$19M$22M$48M$48MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3M$4M$3M$2M$801K$0$720K$896K$404K$871K$871KReceivablesReceiv.
$4M$5M$5M$4M$5M$1M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2MInventoryInvent.
$6M$9M$14M$16M$4M$6M$8M$5M$7M$13M$13MAccounts payablePayables
$482K($355K)($6M)($10M)$2M($4M)($5M)($3M)($5M)($11M)($11M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$22M$19M$17M$22M$31M$47M$62M$25M$46M$75M$75MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$21M$34M$36M$237M$31M$88M$95M$70M$62M$88M$88MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×0.6×0.5×0.1×1.0×0.5×0.7×0.4×0.7×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$258M$276M$268M$283M$295M$487M$514M$478M$546M$607M$607MTotal assetsAssets
$209M$195M$195M$188M$170M$215M$232M$211M$258M$290M$290MTotal debtDebt
$196M$186M$189M$175M$149M$174M$206M$191M$236M$242M$242MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.0×0.2×0.3×0.8×-0.0×3.7×1.9×1.0×3.0×2.0×2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$31M$41M$21M$30M$96M$244M$222M$228M$262M$281M$281MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
20.6M2.4M157K958K3.3M19.1M17.7M18.4M19.9M20.5M21.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.75$32.52$605.39$93.42$19.64$8.00$7.07$5.98$8.42$7.70$7.49Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.20$-1.35$-134.39$-12.21$-5.49$2.16$0.97$0.12$2.19$1.03$-0.42EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.16$-3.24$-32.89$0.79$-6.72$3.32$0.78$1.68$2.47$1.36$1.32Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.73$-12.64$-160.81$0.79$-8.95$-6.09$-1.87$1.68$0.23$0.83$0.81Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$1.01$0.33$0.54$0.46$0.45Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.98$13.81$197.34$12.89$6.04$10.31$3.98$0.02$3.55$1.73$1.69Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.50$17.29$135.95$31.16$28.62$12.78$12.54$12.39$13.19$13.70$13.33Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/8.6 into 2017 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/15.25 into 2018 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×6.12 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×3.49 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×5.72 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+17.9%/yr−17.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.5%/yr−22.1%/yr
Book value / share+27.9%/yr−13.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
21Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
7%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
8.7×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$28Mowner earningsvs.$21Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $28M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $25M it takes just to hold its position. It put $11M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $17M.

Reported net income$21M
Owner earnings$28M · 18% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$21M$43M$2M$17M$41M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$25M+$23M+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$31M+$32M+$4M−$3M+$22M
Cash from operations$53M$75M$31M$37M$81M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$25M−$26M−$314K−$23M−$17M
Owner earnings$28M$49M$31M$14M$64M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$11M−$45M−$47M−$180M
Free cash flow$17M$5M$31M($33M)($116M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue18%29%28%11%42%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $25M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $11M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $43M ÷ interest expense $21M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $242M · 5.6× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $48M − debt $290M
    What this means

    Netting $48M of cash and short-term investments against $290M of debt leaves $242M owed, about 5.6× a year's operating profit (6.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -5%–16%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $28M = operating cash $53M − maintenance capex $25M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. It chose to put $11M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $17M — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($9M) · cash from operations $53M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $9M ÷ Owner Earnings $28M
    What this means

    Of $28M Owner Earnings, $9M (34%) went back to shareholders, $9M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.44×
    Expanding
    Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $25M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $158M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.85×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $290M vs ($13M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.06/share (latest year $-0.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −11% → 28% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −11% early to 28% lately, median 13% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 16%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Worst year 2016 · −40.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$75M
  • Cash & short-term investments$48M
  • Receivables$871K
  • Inventory$2M
  • Other current assets$24M
Current liabilities$88M
  • Debt due within a year$55M
  • Accounts payable$13M
  • Other current liabilities$20M
Current ratio0.85×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.83×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.55×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($13M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$55M due · $48M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$281Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($250M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$290M$98K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $274M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$511M · 187%
  • Dividends$44M · 16%
  • Buybacks$8M · 3%
  • Returned to owners$52M

    41% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $44M as dividends and $8M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$290M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $290M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $209M to $290M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $8M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count2.7%

    The diluted count rose from 21M to 21M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.46/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$209M → $290M

    Debt rose from $209M to $290M while owner earnings went from about ($12M) to $36M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.$482M35.2%7%38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited$342M-1.1%-0%31%
SHIPSeanergy Maritime Holdings Corp.$158M16.4%6%6%
Group median9.6%5%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. has delivered.

Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. earns about $9M on its 6.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−26%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $17M on 21M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-12-31; net debt $242M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($36M) runs well above depreciation ($25M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $28M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. (SHIP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SHIP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SHG its page in the Manual SHMD →

Industry order: ← SFL the Marine Shipping chapter STNG →