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SKX, Skechers U.S.A.

Footwear & Accessories consumer brand

A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and the pricing power it commands.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K

SKX · Skechers U.S.A.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024

$9.0B

+12.1% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $9.4B 5-yr avg $7.1B

Gross margin 53% 5-yr avg 50%

Operating margin 8.9% 5-yr avg 7.9%

ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 16%

Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 5%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 48% and operating margin about 9.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −57 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 20%, above 15% in 7 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	TTMTTMJun 2025
										Income statement
$3.6B	$4.2B	$4.6B	$5.2B	$4.6B	$6.3B	$7.4B	$8.0B	$9.0B	$9.4B	RevenueRevenue
46%	47%	48%	48%	48%	50%	47%	52%	53%	53%	Gross marginGross mgn
29%	30%	39%	38%	45%	32%	32%	34%	34%	35%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$371M	$383M	$438M	$518M	$134M	$598M	$547M	$785M	$904M	$837M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.4%	9.2%	9.4%	9.9%	2.9%	9.5%	7.3%	9.8%	10.1%	8.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$243M	$179M	$301M	$347M	$99M	$742M	$373M	$546M	$639M	$665M	Net incomeNet inc.
23%	45%	17%	20%	8%	—	20%	22%	19%	19%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$362M	$159M	$569M	$427M	$331M	$212M	$238M	$1.2B	$687M	$641M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$66M	$97M	$110M	$112M	$143M	$140M	$154M	$182M	$211M	$229M	DepreciationDeprec.
$29M	($145M)	$127M	($73M)	$25M	($729M)	($348M)	$435M	($250M)	($345M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$119M	$136M	$143M	$236M	$310M	$310M	$359M	$324M	$417M	$578M	CapexCapex
3.4%	3.3%	3.1%	4.5%	6.7%	4.9%	4.8%	4.0%	4.6%	6.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$296M	$63M	$459M	$315M	$189M	$73M	$85M	$1.0B	$476M	$412M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.3%	1.5%	9.9%	6.0%	4.1%	1.2%	1.1%	13.1%	5.3%	4.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$242M	$23M	$426M	$190M	$22M	($98M)	($121M)	$907M	$271M	$63M	Free cash flowFCF
6.8%	0.6%	9.2%	3.6%	0.5%	−1.5%	−1.6%	11.3%	3.0%	0.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$23M	—	—	$101M	—	—	—	$70M	—	$70M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$100M	$30M	—	—	$74M	$160M	$330M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
30%	18%	29%	26%	7%	21%	13%	20%	20%	16%	ROICROIC
15%	10%	15%	15%	4%	23%	10%	14%	15%	14%	Return on equityROE
15%	10%	15%	15%	4%	23%	10%	14%	15%	14%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$719M	$736M	$972M	$937M	$1.5B	$895M	$718M	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.5B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$327M	$406M	$502M	$645M	$620M	$733M	$848M	$860M	$991M	$1.1B	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.9B	InventoryInvent.
$520M	$505M	$680M	$765M	$744M	$876M	$957M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Accounts payablePayables
($194M)	($99M)	($178M)	($120M)	($124M)	($144M)	($109M)	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.9B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.6B	$4.0B	$4.4B	$4.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
$622M	$597M	$850M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$2.3B	$2.3B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×	3.5×	2.9×	2.3×	2.8×	2.3×	2.3×	2.4×	2.0×	2.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	$71M	$93M	$93M	$93M	$101M	$94M	$104M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B	$2.7B	$3.2B	$4.9B	$5.8B	$6.5B	$6.9B	$7.5B	$8.5B	$9.3B	Total assetsAssets
$69M	$73M	$90M	$115M	$732M	$340M	$320M	$290M	$422M	$812M	Total debtDebt
($650M)	($664M)	($882M)	($821M)	($740M)	($554M)	($398M)	($973M)	($813M)	($671M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
59.1×	57.3×	74.9×	69.1×	8.2×	40.1×	27.7×	35.0×	41.3×	29.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.6B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$3.3B	$3.6B	$4.0B	$4.3B	$4.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%	1.4%	1.0%	0.8%	0.8%	1.0%	1.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
155M	157M	156M	154M	155M	157M	157M	156M	154M	151M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$22.98	$26.60	$29.67	$33.86	$29.78	$40.25	$47.54	$51.20	$58.30	$62.17	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.57	$1.14	$1.92	$2.25	$0.64	$4.73	$2.38	$3.49	$4.16	$4.40	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.91	$0.40	$2.93	$2.04	$1.22	$0.46	$0.54	$6.71	$3.09	$2.72	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.56	$0.15	$2.72	$1.24	$0.14	$-0.62	$-0.77	$5.81	$1.76	$0.42	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.77	$0.87	$0.91	$1.53	$2.00	$1.98	$2.29	$2.07	$2.71	$3.82	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.34	$11.69	$13.01	$15.02	$16.02	$20.79	$22.80	$25.72	$27.80	$31.54	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+12.3%/yr	+11.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+6.2%/yr	+8.6%/yr
EPS	+12.9%/yr	+13.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+17.0%/yr	+12.1%/yr
Book value / share	+13.2%/yr	+13.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

154Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

20%low FY2020

Gross margin

53%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$476Mowner earningsvs.$639Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2024cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business earned $476M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $211M it takes just to hold its position. It put $205M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $271M.

Reported net income$639M

Owner earnings$476M · 5% of revenue

	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020
Reported net income	$639M	$546M	$373M	$742M	$99M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$211M	+$182M	+$154M	+$140M	+$143M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$87M	+$68M	+$60M	+$60M	+$65M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$250M	+$435M	−$348M	−$729M	+$25M
Cash from operations	$687M	$1.2B	$238M	$212M	$331M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$211M	−$182M	−$154M	−$140M	−$143M
Owner earnings	$476M	$1.0B	$85M	$73M	$189M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$205M	−$142M	−$205M	−$170M	−$167M
Free cash flow	$271M	$907M	($121M)	($98M)	$22M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	5%	13%	1%	1%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $211M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $205M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $87M), owner earnings is nearer $389M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 41.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $904M ÷ interest expense $22M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$813M

Net cash

Cash $1.1B + ST investments $118M − debt $422M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $813M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 99d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 40 + DIO 167 − DPO 108 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 20%

High through the cycle

9-yr median, range 7%–30%; 20% latest = NOPAT $734M ÷ invested capital $3.6B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range 1%–13%; latest $476M = operating cash $687M − maintenance capex $211M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 9 years. It chose to put $205M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $271M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $87M of SBC) leaves $389M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.07×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $687M ÷ net income $639M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 69%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $330M ÷ Owner Earnings $476M

What this means
Of $476M Owner Earnings, $330M (69%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $330M buybacks. Net of $87M stock comp, the real buyback was about $243M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.97×

Expanding

Capex $417M ÷ depreciation $211M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $9.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.97×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $422M vs $2.2B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +115%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.47/share (latest year $4.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.57/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 9

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 10% early, 9% lately, median 9%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +20%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 20% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · 2.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.1%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.9B

Cash & short-term investments$1.5B
Receivables$1.1B
Inventory$1.9B
Other current assets$347M

Current liabilities$2.3B

Debt due within a year$317M
Accounts payable$1.2B
Other current liabilities$839M

Current ratio2.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.29×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.64×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$317M due · $1.5B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2025 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$4.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$949MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.1B$1.7B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.9B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'25$356M

'26$304M

'27$254M

'28$201M

'29$164M

later$446M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$356Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.5Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$422M

Lease obligations (present value)$1.5B

Total fixed claims on the business$1.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.9B, of which the leases are 78%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2024 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2024

Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.4B · 56%
Buybacks$694M · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 28%

Returned to owners$694M
23% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $694M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $743M and cash and short-term investments rose $765M.
Average price paid for buybacks$47.69
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $664M, about $47.69 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $27.34 (2018) to $64.09 (2024), and 2024, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($330M).
Net change in share count−2.4%
The diluted count fell from 155M to 151M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $264M, so each retained $1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2020	Robert Greenberg	$20.3M	$4.1M	$189M
2021	Robert Greenberg	$24.0M	$29.4M	$73M
2022	Robert Greenberg	$22.1M	$20.2M	$85M
2023	Robert Greenberg	$18.8M	$34.5M	$1.0B
2024	Robert Greenberg	$23.5M	$26.4M	$476M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$87M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Skechers U.S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2024.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$69M → $812M
Debt rose from $69M to $812M while owner earnings went from about $272M to $537M — about 0.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.5 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?9% → 12% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $327M to $1.1B while revenue grew 164%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (9% of revenue then, 12% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Footwear & Accessories

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SKXSkechers U.S.A.	$9.0B	48%	9.5%	20%	5%
TPRTapestry Inc.	$7.0B	69%	15.7%	20%	12%
CPRICapri Holdings	$3.5B	61%	6.8%	10%	10%
CALCaleres	$2.8B	43%	6.2%	10%	5%
SHOOSteven Madden Ltd.	$2.5B	39%	10.7%	23%	9%
WWWWolverine World Wide	$1.9B	40%	6.1%	10%	8%
Group median	—	46%	8.1%	15%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Skechers U.S.A. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Skechers U.S.A. earns about $476M on its 5.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($476M) Net of stock comp (−$92M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($430M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+55%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’24+20%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $63M on 150M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $671M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($578M) runs well above depreciation ($229M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $430M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SKX against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Skechers U.S.A. (SKX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SKX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SKWD its page in the Manual SKY →

Industry order: ← SHOO the Footwear & Accessories chapter TPR →