Owner Scorecard


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SLB, SLB Limited

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive

SLB is an oilfield services company. It sells the technology, equipment, and crews that oil and gas producers use to drill wells and bring hydrocarbons to the surface. It makes its money on contracts to construct wells and to supply the production systems that operate them, so it is paid out of its customers' spending budgets rather than out of oil it does not own.

With a global presence in more than 100 countries and employees representing almost twice as many nationalities, we work each day on innovating energy technology, delivering digital at scale, decarbonizing industries, and developing and scaling new energy systems that accelerate the energy transition.

With nearly a century of market and technology leadership, SLB is well positioned and committed to being a leader in providing solutions to address this trilemma.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SLB · SLB Limited
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$35.7B
−1.6% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $35.9B 5-yr avg $31.2B
Operating margin 18.9% 5-yr avg 16.5%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Production Systems (37%) and Well Construction (33%), with 3 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
The governing question is whether this is a franchise or a contractor to a cyclical commodity: SLB owns no barrel, so its revenue follows what producers choose to spend on drilling, and the filing itself describes a long history of operating in a cyclical industry. The tests to watch are pricing power when activity turns down, whether its technology and scale let it hold margin while rivals cut, and the cost discipline a capital-heavy business demands when it carries net debt rather than net cash. The bad case is a deep down-cycle in which customers defer projects, prices weaken, and fixed costs and borrowings press on returns. The record below holds the margins, the returns on capital, and the debt.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 6 segments, the largest Production Systems at 37%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Production Systems37%$13.3B
  • Well Construction33%$11.9B
  • Reservoir Performance19%$6.8B
  • Digital Integration7%$2.7B
  • All Other6%$2.0B
  • Eliminations Other-3%($940M)

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$27.8B$30.4B$32.8B$32.9B$23.6B$22.9B$28.1B$33.1B$36.3B$35.7B$35.9BRevenueRevenue
75%73%77%Gross marginGross mgn
1%1%1%1%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%3%2%2%2%2%2%2%2%2%2%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$3.3B$3.9B$4.2B$4.0B$2.4B$3.4B$5.0B$6.5B$6.1B$4.8B$6.8BOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.8%12.9%12.8%12.1%10.2%14.7%17.8%19.7%16.7%13.4%18.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($1.7B)($1.5B)$2.1B($10.1B)($10.5B)$1.9B$3.4B$4.2B$4.5B$3.4B$3.3BNet incomeNet inc.
17%19%18%19%20%20%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$6.3B$5.7B$5.7B$5.4B$2.9B$4.7B$3.7B$6.6B$6.6B$6.5B$6.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$4.1B$3.8B$3.6B$3.6B$2.6B$2.1B$2.1B$2.3B$2.5B$2.6B$2.7BDepreciationDeprec.
$3.6B$3.0B($326M)$11.6B$10.5B$326M($2.2B)($171M)($694M)$140M($43M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$2.1B$2.1B$2.2B$1.7B$1.1B$1.1B$1.6B$1.9B$1.9B$1.7B$1.6BCapexCapex
7.4%6.9%6.6%5.2%4.7%5.0%5.8%5.9%5.3%4.7%4.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$4.2B$3.6B$3.6B$3.7B$1.8B$3.5B$2.1B$4.7B$4.7B$4.8B$4.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.1%11.7%10.8%11.3%7.7%15.3%7.5%14.2%12.9%13.4%13.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4.2B$3.6B$3.6B$3.7B$1.8B$3.5B$2.1B$4.7B$4.7B$4.8B$4.7BFree cash flowFCF
15.1%11.7%10.8%11.3%7.7%15.3%7.5%14.2%12.9%13.4%13.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.4B$847M$292M$23M$33M$103M$58M$242M$553M$553MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$2.6B$2.8B$2.8B$2.8B$1.7B$699M$848M$1.3B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
7%10%14%17%15%11%ROICROIC
-4%-4%6%-43%-87%13%19%21%21%13%13%Return on equityROE
−11%−12%−2%−54%−101%8%15%14%14%7%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$6.3B$3.3B$1.3B$1.0B$2.2B$1.4B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$3.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$9.4B$8.1B$7.9B$7.7B$5.2B$5.3B$6.8B$7.8B$8.0B$8.7B$9.0BReceivablesReceiv.
$4.2B$4.0B$4.0B$4.1B$3.4B$3.3B$4.0B$4.4B$4.4B$5.0B$5.3BInventoryInvent.
$4.0B$4.6B$4.7B$4.8B$2.9B$3.2B$3.9B$4.6B$4.2B$4.9B$11.1BAccounts payablePayables
$9.6B$7.5B$7.2B$7.1B$5.7B$5.4B$6.8B$7.6B$8.2B$8.9B$3.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$23.9B$18.5B$15.7B$15.5B$12.9B$12.7B$15.0B$17.7B$18.6B$19.5B$19.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$15.1B$15.3B$13.5B$13.1B$10.5B$10.4B$12.0B$13.4B$12.8B$14.7B$14.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.2×1.2×1.2×1.2×1.2×1.2×1.3×1.4×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9.0B$25.1B$24.9B$25.0B$13.0B$13.0B$13.0B$14.1B$14.6B$16.8B$16.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$78.0B$72.0B$70.5B$56.3B$42.4B$41.5B$43.1B$48.0B$48.9B$54.9B$54.5BTotal assetsAssets
$18.4B$14.9B$14.6B$14.8B$16.0B$13.3B$10.6B$10.8B$11.0B$9.7B$11.6BTotal debtDebt
$12.1B$11.6B$13.3B$13.7B$13.9B$11.9B$9.4B$9.8B$9.9B$8.6B$7.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.7×6.9×7.3×6.5×4.3×6.2×10.2×13.0×11.8×8.6×12.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$41.1B$36.8B$36.2B$23.8B$12.1B$15.0B$17.7B$20.2B$21.1B$26.1B$26.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%1.1%1.1%1.2%1.7%1.4%1.1%0.9%0.9%0.9%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$8.8B$210M$210MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
1.36B1.39B1.39B1.39B1.39B1.43B1.44B1.44B1.44B1.44B1.51BShares out (diluted)Shares
$20.49$21.93$23.56$23.77$16.98$16.07$19.55$22.96$25.27$24.85$23.72Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.24$-1.08$1.53$-7.32$-7.57$1.32$2.39$2.91$3.11$2.35$2.20EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.10$2.56$2.55$2.68$1.32$2.46$1.46$3.26$3.25$3.34$3.09Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.10$2.56$2.55$2.68$1.32$2.46$1.46$3.26$3.25$3.34$3.09Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.95$2.00$1.99$2.00$1.25$0.49$0.59$0.91$1.07$1.11$1.08Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.51$1.52$1.55$1.24$0.80$0.80$1.13$1.34$1.34$1.18$1.08Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$30.27$26.54$25.96$17.16$8.68$10.51$12.31$13.99$14.71$18.17$17.28Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.2%/yr+7.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+0.8%/yr+20.5%/yr
Dividends / share−6.0%/yr−2.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.7%/yr+8.0%/yr
Book value / share−5.5%/yr+15.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Production Systems+11.6%
    “Production Systems revenue of $13.3 billion increased 12% year on year reflecting five months of activity from the acquired ChampionX production chemicals and artificial lift businesses, which contributed $1.45 billion of revenue.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Well Construction-11.2%
    “Well Construction revenue of $11.9 billion decreased 11% year on year driven by a broad reduction in drilling activity both internationally, mainly in Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and offshore Africa, and in North America.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Reservoir Performance-5.0%
    “Reservoir Performance revenue of $6.8 billion decreased 5% year on year primarily due to a slowdown in evaluation and stimulation activity in the international markets. 17 Reservoir Performance pretax operating margin of 18% contracted 191 bps year on year due to the lower evaluation and stimulation activity.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.4Bpeak FY2023
ROIC
11%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.8×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$4.8Bowner earningsvs.$3.4Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $3.4B of profit into $4.8B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$3.4B
Owner earnings$4.8B · 13% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$3.4B$4.5B$4.2B$3.4B$1.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.6B+$2.5B+$2.3B+$2.1B+$2.1B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$332M+$316M+$293M+$313M+$324M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$140M−$694M−$171M−$2.2B+$326M
Cash from operations$6.5B$6.6B$6.6B$3.7B$4.7B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1.7B−$1.9B−$1.9B−$1.6B−$1.1B
Owner earnings$4.8B$4.7B$4.7B$2.1B$3.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%13%14%7%15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $332M), owner earnings is nearer $4.5B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $6.5B ÷ interest expense $558M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.4B · 1.1× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $3.1B + ST investments $1.2B − debt $11.7B
    What this means

    Netting $4.3B of cash and short-term investments against $11.7B of debt leaves $7.4B owed, about 1.1× a year's operating profit (1.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 89 + DIO 220 − DPO 213 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    6-yr median, range 7%–17%; 15% latest = NOPAT $5.2B ÷ invested capital $34.7B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 7%–15%; latest $4.8B = operating cash $6.5B − maintenance capex $1.7B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $332M of SBC) leaves $4.5B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $6.5B ÷ net income $3.4B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $1.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.8B
    What this means

    Of $4.8B Owner Earnings, $1.6B (33%) went back to shareholders, $1.6B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.64×
    Harvesting
    Capex $1.7B ÷ depreciation $2.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $35.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.33×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $11.7B vs $4.8B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.68/share (latest year $2.26), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 17% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 17% lately, median 13% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 10.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.6%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Additionally, they unlock data and utilize artificial intelligence ("AI") and machine learning to reduce cycle time and improve efficiency of workflows to allow customers to make better, faster decisions to improve their project economics and reservoir performance.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$19.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$3.7B
  • Receivables$9.0B
  • Inventory$5.3B
  • Other current assets$1.3B
Current liabilities$14.4B
  • Debt due within a year$2.0B
  • Accounts payable$11.1B
  • Other current liabilities$1.3B
Current ratio1.34×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.98×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.9Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.0B due · $3.7B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($7.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$11.6Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$752Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $54.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$17.5B · 32%
  • Dividends$18.7B · 35%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$17.9B · 33%
  • Returned to owners$18.7B

    51% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $18.7B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count11.6%

    The diluted count rose from 1357M to 1515M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.11/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$21.8B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity64%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$4.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $17.5B of capital spent building

$9.0B written down across 2 years (2019, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Le Peuch$16.8M$32.4M$3.5B
2022Mr. Le Peuch$15.7M$39.5M$2.1B
2023Mr. Le Peuch$18.2M$26.2M$4.7B
2024Mr. Le Peuch$17.3M$2.8M$4.7B
2025Mr. Le Peuch$17.3M$17.5M$4.8B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio123:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$332M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why SLB Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.6%

    Diluted shares grew 11.6% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SLBSLB Limited$35.7B77%13.1%13%12%
EOGEOG Resources Inc.$22.6B27.0%15%25%
HALHalliburton Company$22.2B81%10.2%12%7%
OXYOccidental Petroleum Corporation$21.6B86%17.9%7%21%
DVNDevon Energy Corporation$16.8B53%20.7%12%20%
EXEExpand Energy Corporation$12.1B-0.9%-0%5%
LBRTLiberty Energy$4.0B22%7.1%2%4%
OIIOceaneering International$2.6B12%2.6%5%4%
Group median65%11.7%9%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what SLB Limited has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, SLB Limited earns about $4.4B on its 12.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $4.7B on 1495M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $7.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SLB Limited (SLB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SLB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SLAB its page in the Manual SLDB →

Industry order: ← SEI the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter STAK →