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SEI, Solaris Energy Infrastructure Inc.

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

Solaris serves multiple U.S. end markets, including data center, energy, and other commercial and industrial sectors.

We provide modular and scalable equipment-based solutions for power generation, control and distribution, and the management of raw materials in oil and natural gas well completions.

Our offerings support data center, energy, and other commercial and industrial sector customers by providing flexible, on-demand power infrastructure, including power control and distribution capabilities.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SEI · Solaris Energy Infrastructure Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$622M

+98.7% YoY · 44% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $626M 5-yr avg $335M

Operating margin 26.2% 5-yr avg 13.9%

Owner-earnings margin 28% 5-yr avg 10%

Free cash flow margin −93% 5-yr avg −22%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 104% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 17% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −60% and 50% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 27% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$18M	$67M	$197M	$242M	$101M	$146M	$300M	$293M	$313M	$622M	$626M	RevenueRevenue
12%	21%	8%	8%	16%	13%	8%	9%	11%	10%	11%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	—	—	—	—	—	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$3M	$25M	$99M	$108M	($60M)	($387K)	$42M	$50M	$53M	$135M	$164M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
15.8%	37.8%	50.3%	44.7%	−59.5%	−0.3%	13.9%	17.0%	16.9%	21.8%	26.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$3M	($4M)	$42M	$52M	($29M)	($868K)	$21M	$24M	$16M	$30M	$46M	Net incomeNet inc.
2%	—	23%	25%	—	—	27%	24%	34%	33%	36%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$5M	$27M	$116M	$115M	$44M	$16M	$68M	$89M	$59M	$209M	$262M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4M	$7M	$18M	$27M	$27M	$27M	$30M	$36M	$47M	$84M	$89M	DepreciationDeprec.
($2M)	$21M	$52M	$31M	$41M	($15M)	$10M	$21M	($14M)	$71M	$104M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$11M	$94M	$161M	$35M	$5M	$20M	$81M	$64M	$188M	$647M	$846M	CapexCapex
60.0%	139.3%	81.7%	14.4%	4.6%	13.5%	27.1%	22.0%	60.2%	103.9%	135.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$729K	$20M	$98M	$88M	$39M	($3M)	$38M	$53M	$12M	$125M	$173M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.0%	29.8%	49.7%	36.4%	38.9%	−2.2%	12.5%	18.1%	3.9%	20.1%	27.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($6M)	($67M)	($45M)	$80M	$39M	($3M)	($13M)	$25M	($129M)	($438M)	($583M)	Free cash flowFCF
−35.1%	−99.7%	−22.7%	33.1%	38.9%	−2.2%	−4.5%	8.5%	−41.2%	−70.3%	−93.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$5M	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$122M	$29M	$29M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$3M	$13M	$12M	$13M	$14M	$14M	$15M	$22M	$24M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	$3M	$27M	—	—	$26M	$8M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
4%	25%	—	—	-34%	-0%	14%	16%	—	—	—	ROICROIC
4%	-4%	21%	20%	-15%	-0%	10%	12%	4%	5%	6%	Return on equityROE
—	—	20%	15%	−21%	−7%	3%	5%	0%	1%	3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$4M	$63M	$25M	$67M	$60M	$36M	$9M	$6M	$114M	$353M	$344M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$5M	$13M	$40M	$39M	$18M	$30M	$65M	—	$72M	$103M	$148M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1M	$8M	$10M	$7M	$954K	$2M	$5M	$7M	$11M	$14M	$18M	InventoryInvent.
$705K	$5M	$9M	$4M	$7M	$10M	$26M	$13M	$21M	$78M	$65M	Accounts payablePayables
$5M	$16M	$41M	$42M	$12M	$21M	$44M	($6M)	$62M	$40M	$102M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$10M	$88M	$81M	$118M	$82M	$81M	$89M	$67M	$251M	$483M	$521M	Current assetsCur. assets
$3M	$21M	$35M	$20M	$20M	$29M	$56M	$37M	$66M	$163M	$468M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.2×	4.3×	2.3×	5.8×	4.0×	2.8×	1.6×	1.8×	3.8×	3.0×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$13M	$17M	$17M	$17M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$104M	$105M	$105M	GoodwillGoodwill
$77M	$300M	$459M	$505M	$412M	$406M	$463M	$468M	$1.1B	$2.1B	$3.0B	Total assetsAssets
$2M	$0	$13M	—	—	—	$8M	$30M	$316M	$184M	$715M	Total debtDebt
($1M)	($63M)	($12M)	—	—	—	($835K)	$24M	$201M	($169M)	$371M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
124.4×	262.5×	265.5×	170.2×	—	—	—	14.5×	4.0×	4.9×	6.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$71M	$113M	$198M	$264M	$201M	$203M	$216M	$206M	$356M	$564M	$781M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%	5.5%	2.0%	1.9%	4.7%	3.6%	2.0%	2.6%	3.4%	3.8%	3.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
—	12K	26K	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	30K	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	$5562.02	$7634.67	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$20915.48	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	$-344.47	$1642.77	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1546.87	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	$1658.33	$3791.98	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$5795.44	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	$-5544.52	$-1731.15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$-19496.27	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$7750.43	$6236.36	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$28265.31	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	$9358.17	$7683.22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$26102.50	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.13 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+37.3%/yr (1-yr)	+37.3%/yr (1-yr)
Owner earnings / share	+128.7%/yr (1-yr)	+128.7%/yr (1-yr)
Capital spending / share	−19.5%/yr (1-yr)	−19.5%/yr (1-yr)
Book value / share	−17.9%/yr (1-yr)	−17.9%/yr (1-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

ROIC

16%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-1.4×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$125Mowner earningsvs.$30Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $125M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $84M it takes just to hold its position. It put $562M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($438M).

Reported net income$30M

Owner earnings$125M · 20% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$30M	$16M	$24M	$21M	($868K)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$84M	+$47M	+$36M	+$30M	+$27M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$23M	+$11M	+$8M	+$6M	+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$71M	−$14M	+$21M	+$10M	−$15M
Cash from operations	$209M	$59M	$89M	$68M	$16M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$84M	−$47M	−$36M	−$30M	−$20M
Owner earnings	$125M	$12M	$53M	$38M	($3M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$562M	−$141M	−$28M	−$51M	—
Free cash flow	($438M)	($129M)	$25M	($13M)	($3M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	20%	4%	18%	13%	-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $84M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $562M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer $101M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4.9×

Adequate

Operating income $135M ÷ interest expense $28M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$169M

Net cash

Cash $353M − debt $184M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $169M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -34%–25%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 18%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -2%–50%; latest $125M = operating cash $209M − maintenance capex $84M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. It chose to put $562M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($438M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves $101M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 6.93×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $209M ÷ net income $30M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 17%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $22M ÷ Owner Earnings $125M

What this means
Of $125M Owner Earnings, $22M (17%) went back to shareholders, $22M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 7.67×

Expanding

Capex $647M ÷ depreciation $84M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $622M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.96×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $184M vs $320M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +71%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.32/share (latest year $0.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 35% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 35% early to 19% lately, median 17% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +23%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 23% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −59.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$521M

Cash & short-term investments$344M
Receivables$148M
Inventory$18M
Other current assets$10M

Current liabilities$468M

Debt due within a year$320M
Accounts payable$65M
Other current liabilities$84M

Current ratio1.11×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.07×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.74×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$53Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$320M due · $344M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+55.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$603Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$731M$16M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$76Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$4M

'27$23M

'28$25M

'29$25M

'30$25M

later$84M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$4Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$27Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$25Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$186Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$344M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$125M

Together, against $4M due next year117.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $469M against the $4M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 117 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $749M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.3B · 174%
Dividends$106M · 14%
Buybacks$64M · 9%

Returned to owners$170M
36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $106M as dividends and $64M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$727M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $727M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2M to $715M.
Average price paid for buybacks$11.41
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $30M, about $11.41 each.
Net change in share count147.0%
The diluted count rose from 0M to 0M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$106.47/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	William A. Zartler	$1.7M	$1.8M	($3M)
2022	William A. Zartler	$2.8M	$4.2M	$38M
2023	William A. Zartler	$2.5M	$2.9M	$53M
2024	William A. Zartler	$3.8M	$16.9M	$12M
2025	Amanda M. Brock	$7.0M	$6.0M	$125M
2025	William A. Zartler	$13.9M	$27.1M	$125M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$23M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 17% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Solaris Energy Infrastructure Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?14.0% vs 27.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 27.8% early in the record and 14.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?147.0%
Diluted shares grew 147.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $64M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2M → $715M
Debt rose from $2M to $715M while owner earnings went from about $40M to $63M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
WHDCactus	$1.1B	37%	24.7%	41%	—
INVXInnovex International Inc.	$978M	29%	4.1%	3%	6%
FETForum Energy Technologies Inc.	$791M	25%	-14.0%	-7%	0%
FLOCFlowco Holdings Inc.	$760M	54%	21.8%	—	17%
CRCTCricut Inc.	$709M	39%	11.0%	32%	—
OISOil States International Inc.	$669M	22%	-10.5%	-5%	6%
PLOWDouglas Dynamics Inc.	$656M	27%	12.6%	12%	9%
SEISolaris Energy Infrastructure Inc.	$622M	—	17.0%	9%	19%
Group median	—	—	11.8%	9%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Solaris Energy Infrastructure Inc. has delivered.

Solaris Energy Infrastructure Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Solaris Energy Infrastructure Inc. earns about $119M on its 19.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($119M) Net of stock comp (−$23M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($178M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+41%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+23%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($583M) on 74M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $371M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($846M) runs well above depreciation ($89M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $178M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SEI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Solaris Energy Infrastructure Inc. (SEI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SEI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SEG its page in the Manual SEIC →

Industry order: ← SDRL the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter SLB →