Owner Scorecard


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SMG, Scotts Miracle-Gro

Agricultural Inputs capital-intensive Cyclical

We are the exclusive agent of Monsanto Company, a subsidiary of Bayer AG, for the marketing and distribution of certain of Monsanto's consumer Roundup 1 branded products within the United States and certain other specified countries.

Our products are marketed under some of the most recognized brand names in the consumer lawn and garden industry.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SMG · Scotts Miracle-Gro
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.4B
−3.9% YoY · −4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $3.9B
Gross margin 32% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 12.5% 5-yr avg 3.0%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 31% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −11% and 18% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 8 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.5B$2.6B$2.7B$3.2B$4.1B$4.9B$3.9B$3.6B$3.6B$3.4B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
36%37%33%32%33%30%26%24%26%31%32%Gross marginGross mgn
21%21%20%19%18%15%16%16%16%18%18%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%2%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$448M$433M$199M$410M$585M$723M($434M)($174M)$209M$359M$435MOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.9%16.4%7.5%13.0%14.2%14.7%−11.1%−4.9%5.9%10.5%12.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$315M$218M$64M$461M$387M$513M($438M)($380M)($35M)$145M$111MNet incomeNet inc.
30%35%24%24%24%35%48%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$244M$363M$343M$227M$558M$272M($129M)$531M$668M$371M$478MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$62M$74M$83M$89M$95M$94M$105M$93M$81M$63M$62MDepreciationDeprec.
($149M)$46M$155M($362M)$18M($375M)$169M$750M$541M$94M$248MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$58M$70M$68M$42M$63M$107M$114M$93M$84M$97M$98MCapexCapex
2.3%2.6%2.6%1.3%1.5%2.2%2.9%2.6%2.4%2.9%2.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$186M$294M$274M$184M$495M$165M($243M)$438M$584M$309M$416MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.4%11.1%10.3%5.8%12.0%3.3%−6.2%12.3%16.4%9.0%12.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$186M$294M$274M$184M$495M$165M($243M)$438M$584M$274M$380MFree cash flowFCF
7.4%11.1%10.3%5.8%12.0%3.3%−6.2%12.3%16.4%8.0%10.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$158M$122M$493M$7M$0$128M$237M$0$0$3M$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$117M$120M$120M$125M$411M$143M$166M$149M$151M$154M$154MDividends paidDiv. paid
$137M$255M$328M$3M$53M$129M$258M$9M$5M$18MBuybacksBuybacks
16%15%13%20%18%-11%-6%14%11%ROICROIC
44%34%18%64%56%51%-296%Return on equityROE
28%15%−16%47%−3%36%−409%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$29M$121M$34M$19M$17M$244M$87M$32M$72M$37M$6MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$127M$198M$226M$224M$475M$483M$299M$304M$177M$187M$767MReceivablesReceiv.
$395M$408M$481M$540M$622M$1.1B$1.3B$880M$588M$593M$696MInventoryInvent.
$131M$153M$151M$214M$391M$609M$423M$271M$255M$229M$386MAccounts payablePayables
$391M$452M$557M$550M$706M$1.0B$1.2B$913M$510M$551M$1.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.0B$882M$886M$1.0B$1.2B$2.0B$2.0B$1.4B$980M$940M$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$707M$545M$613M$621M$950M$1.1B$964M$774M$750M$740M$1.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.6×1.4×1.7×1.3×1.8×2.1×1.8×1.3×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$372M$442M$543M$539M$544M$605M$254M$244M$244M$244M$244MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.8B$2.7B$3.1B$3.0B$3.4B$4.8B$4.3B$3.4B$2.9B$2.7B$3.4BTotal assetsAssets
$1.2B$1.4B$2.0B$1.7B$1.5B$2.3B$3.0B$2.6B$2.2B$2.1B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
$1.2B$1.3B$2.0B$1.6B$1.5B$2.1B$2.9B$2.6B$2.2B$2.1B$2.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.1×5.7×2.3×4.0×7.4×9.2×-3.7×-1.0×1.3×2.8×3.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$715M$649M$355M$719M$697M$1.0B$148M($267M)($391M)($358M)($287M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%1.0%1.5%1.2%1.4%0.8%0.9%1.9%2.3%2.0%1.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$95M$522M$10M$10MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
62.0M60.2M57.1M56.3M56.9M57.2M55.5M56.0M56.8M58.7M59.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$40.42$43.89$46.64$56.06$72.61$86.10$70.70$63.42$62.55$58.14$58.83Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.09$3.63$1.12$8.18$6.81$8.96$-7.88$-6.79$-0.61$2.47$1.88EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.00$4.88$4.80$3.28$8.70$2.88$-4.37$7.83$10.27$5.26$7.05Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.00$4.88$4.80$3.28$8.70$2.88$-4.37$7.83$10.27$4.67$6.44Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.88$2.00$2.10$2.21$7.23$2.50$2.99$2.66$2.66$2.63$2.61Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.94$1.16$1.19$0.75$1.10$1.87$2.05$1.66$1.48$1.66$1.67Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.54$10.78$6.21$12.77$12.25$17.72$2.66$-4.77$-6.88$-6.09$-4.86Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.1%/yr−4.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.5%/yr−9.6%/yr
EPS−7.7%/yr−18.3%/yr
Dividends / share+3.8%/yr−18.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.5%/yr+8.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
59Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
14%low FY2022
Gross margin
31%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.7×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$309Mowner earningsvs.$145Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $309M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $63M it takes just to hold its position. It put $35M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $274M.

Reported net income$145M
Owner earnings$309M · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$145M($35M)($380M)($438M)$513M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$63M+$81M+$93M+$105M+$94M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$69M+$80M+$69M+$34M+$41M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$94M+$541M+$750M+$169M−$375M
Cash from operations$371M$668M$531M($129M)$272M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$63M−$84M−$93M−$114M−$107M
Owner earnings$309M$584M$438M($243M)$165M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$35M
Free cash flow$274M$584M$438M($243M)$165M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%16%12%-6%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $63M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $35M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $69M), owner earnings is nearer $240M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $359M ÷ interest expense $129M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 5.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $37M − debt $2.1B
    What this means

    Netting $37M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 5.8× a year's operating profit (5.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 20 + DIO 92 − DPO 36 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -11%–20%; 14% latest = NOPAT $235M ÷ invested capital $1.7B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -6%–16%; latest $309M = operating cash $371M − maintenance capex $63M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put $35M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $274M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $69M of SBC) leaves $240M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $371M ÷ net income $145M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $173M ÷ Owner Earnings $309M
    What this means

    Of $309M Owner Earnings, $173M (56%) went back to shareholders, $154M dividends, $18M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($69M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.55×
    Expanding
    Capex $97M ÷ depreciation $63M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs $201M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −145%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.55/share (latest year $2.50), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-6.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 14% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 4% lately, median 11% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −11.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Further, the development of artificial intelligence is creating more sophisticated avenues to disrupt operational systems.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$6M
  • Receivables$767M
  • Inventory$696M
  • Other current assets$153M
Current liabilities$1.3B
  • Debt due within a year$279M
  • Accounts payable$386M
  • Other current liabilities$610M
Current ratio1.27×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.00×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$346Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$279M due · $6M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($881M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.7B$318M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'25$0
'26$250M
'27$0
'28$0
'29$450M
'30$900M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$250Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$900Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$1.6Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $2.1B of debt in all

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$796M · 23%
  • Dividends$1.7B · 48%
  • Buybacks$1.2B · 35%
  • Returned to owners$2.9B

    106% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.7B as dividends and $1.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$202M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $202M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.2B to $2.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$114.18

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $1.1B, about $114.18 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $76.33 (2016) to $234.45 (2022); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $93.63 ($328M).

  • Net change in share count−4.8%

    The diluted count fell from 62M to 59M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.63/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$646M24% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $796M of capital spent building

$627M written down across 3 years (2018, 2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 55% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021James Hagedorn$10.7M$8.2M$165M
2022James Hagedorn$8.2M−$3.4M($243M)
2023James Hagedorn$12.0M$6.8M$438M
2024James Hagedorn$15.2M$35.8M$584M
2025James Hagedorn$12.3M−$9.3M$309M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership24.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio184:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$69M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 19% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Scotts Miracle-Gro is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?21% → 42% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $522M to $1.5B while revenue grew 38%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (21% of revenue then, 42% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$347M · 10% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “The Home Depot and Lowe's are our two largest customers and are the only customers that individually represent more than 10% of reported consolidated net sales during any of the three most recent fiscal years.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Agricultural Inputs

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MOSMosaic Company (The)$12.1B16%8.2%6%7%
CFCF Industries Holdings Inc.$7.1B30%24.1%24%27%
CBTCabot$3.7B24%11.3%15%8%
FULH. B. Fuller Company$3.5B28%8.2%6%5%
FMCFMC Corp.$3.5B40%14.8%11%9%
SMGScotts Miracle-Gro$3.4B32%11.7%14%10%
AVNTAvient$3.3B27%6.5%7%5%
NEUNewMarket Corp$2.7B29%15.5%20%11%
Group median28%11.5%13%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Scotts Miracle-Gro has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Scotts Miracle-Gro earns about $330M on its 9.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $380M on 58M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $2.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($98M) runs well above depreciation ($62M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $415M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Scotts Miracle-Gro (SMG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SMG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SMCIP its page in the Manual SMP →

Industry order: ← NTR the Agricultural Inputs chapter UAN →