Owner Scorecard


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UAN, CVR Partners LP Common

Agricultural Inputs capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

CVR Partners, LP is a Delaware limited partnership formed in 2011 by CVR Energy, Inc.

The Partnership produces and distributes nitrogen fertilizer products, which are used by farmers to improve the yield and quality of their crops, primarily corn and wheat.

The Facilities manufacture ammonia and are able to further upgrade such ammonia to other nitrogen fertilizer products, principally urea ammonium nitrate ("UAN").

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UAN · CVR Partners LP Common
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$606M
+15.4% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $643M 5-yr avg $636M
Gross margin 29% 5-yr avg 31%
Operating margin 23.6% 5-yr avg 26.3%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg 26%
Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg 26%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by UAN (62%) and Ammonia (24%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 15% and operating margin about 6.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −10% and 38% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 12% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

UAN is 62% of revenue, with Ammonia the other meaningful line at 24%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • UAN62%$374M
  • Ammonia24%$143M
  • Other revenue8%$51M
  • Urea products6%$37M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$356M$331M$351M$404M$350M$533M$836M$681M$525M$606M$643MRevenueRevenue
15%5%9%14%7%30%42%34%23%27%29%Gross marginGross mgn
8%8%7%6%5%5%4%4%5%6%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$25M($10M)$6M$27M($35M)$134M$320M$201M$90M$129M$152MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.9%−3.1%1.8%6.8%−10.0%25.3%38.3%29.6%17.2%21.2%23.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($27M)($73M)($50M)($35M)($98M)$78M$287M$172M$61M$99M$121MNet incomeNet inc.
0%0%0%0%-0%-0%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$45M$10M$32M$39M$20M$189M$301M$244M$151M$150M$170MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$58M$74M$72M$80M$76M$73M$82M$80M$88M$82M$84MDepreciationDeprec.
$11M$6M$8M($9M)$41M$14M($93M)($17M)($3M)($41M)($47M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$23M$15M$20M$19M$19M$21M$45M$24M$37M$51M$58MCapexCapex
6.5%4.4%5.6%4.6%5.3%3.9%5.3%3.6%7.1%8.4%9.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$22M($4M)$12M$21M$1M$168M$257M$219M$113M$99M$112MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.1%−1.3%3.5%5.1%0.3%31.6%30.7%32.2%21.6%16.3%17.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$22M($4M)$12M$21M$1M$168M$257M$219M$113M$99M$112MFree cash flowFCF
6.1%−1.3%3.5%5.1%0.3%31.6%30.7%32.2%21.6%16.3%17.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$64M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$7M$529K$12M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
Balance sheet
$56M$49M$62M$37M$31M$113M$86M$45M$91M$69M$128MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$14M$10M$62M$34M$37M$88M$90M$42M$65M$59M$53MReceivablesReceiv.
$58M$53M$64M$48M$42M$52M$78M$69M$76M$83M$88MInventoryInvent.
$29M$21M$27M$21M$20M$42M$46M$27MAccounts payablePayables
$43M$42M$98M$61M$60M$99M$122M$111M$141M$142M$114MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$135M$118M$194M$125M$118M$262M$266M$166M$234M$214M$271MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$63M$56M$123M$76M$76M$162M$126M$75M$111M$97M$99MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×2.1×1.6×1.7×1.5×1.6×2.1×2.2×2.1×2.2×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$41M$41M$41M$41M$0$0$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$975M$1.0B$969M$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$623M$626M$629M$632M$636M$611M$547M$547M$569M$570M$570MTotal debtDebt
$568M$577M$567M$595M$606M$498M$460M$502M$478M$501M$442MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.5×-0.2×2.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
0.8%0.9%0.9%0.9%0.3%4.3%3.0%1.2%0.9%1.6%1.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
10.3M11.3M11.3M11.3M11.2M10.7M10.6M10.6M10.6M10.6M10.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$34.49$29.20$30.99$35.68$31.26$49.84$78.88$64.47$49.70$57.34$60.85Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.61$-6.43$-4.42$-3.09$-8.77$7.31$27.07$16.31$5.76$9.33$11.49EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.10$-0.37$1.10$1.81$0.10$15.74$24.24$20.75$10.73$9.35$10.60Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.10$-0.37$1.10$1.81$0.10$15.74$24.24$20.75$10.73$9.35$10.60Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.25$1.28$1.75$1.65$1.66$1.93$4.22$2.29$3.51$4.81$5.49Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.8%/yr+12.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+18.0%/yr+146.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.8%/yr+23.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Ammonia+10.1%
    “Ammonia and UAN sales price were favorable primarily due to improved market conditions, primarily driven by tight inventory levels.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
11Mpeak FY2017
Gross margin
27%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.1×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$99Mowner earningsvs.$99Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $99M of profit into $99M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$99M
Owner earnings$99M · 16% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$99M$61M$172M$287M$78M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$82M+$88M+$80M+$82M+$73M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$10M+$5M+$8M+$25M+$23M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$41M−$3M−$17M−$93M+$14M
Cash from operations$150M$151M$244M$301M$189M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$51M−$37M−$24M−$45M−$21M
Owner earnings$99M$113M$219M$257M$168M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%22%32%31%32%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer $89M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $129M ÷ interest expense $63M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $501M · 3.9× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $69M − debt $570M
    What this means

    Netting $69M of cash and short-term investments against $570M of debt leaves $501M owed, about 3.9× a year's operating profit (4.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 36 + DIO 68 − DPO 38 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -1%–32%; latest $99M = operating cash $150M − maintenance capex $51M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves $89M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $150M ÷ net income $99M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $99M
    What this means

    Of $99M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.62×
    Harvesting
    Capex $51M ÷ depreciation $82M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $606M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.21×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $570M vs $117M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $10.47/share (latest year $9.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 2% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 23% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +32%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 32% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −10.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$271M
  • Cash & short-term investments$128M
  • Receivables$53M
  • Inventory$88M
  • Other current assets$2M
Current liabilities$99M
  • Accounts payable$27M
  • Other current liabilities$71M
Current ratio2.75×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.86×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$173Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+26.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.1× → 2.8×
Deeper floors
Debt incl. operating leases$563M$16M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$43Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$272M · 23%
  • Buybacks$20M · 2%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$888M · 75%
  • Returned to owners$20M

    2% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $20M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$26.35

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $20M, about $26.35 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $11.35 (2020) to $111.00 (2022), and 2022, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($12M).

  • Net change in share count2.3%

    The diluted count rose from 10M to 11M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained34%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($394M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $134M, so each retained $1 added about 0.34 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$26K0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$64Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $272M of capital spent building

$41M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 64% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$10M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why CVR Partners LP Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$90M · 14% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Our top two customers represented 28% and 25% for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2023, respectively, and our top customer represented 14% of net sales for the year ended December 31, 2024.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Agricultural Inputs

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SMGScotts Miracle-Gro$3.4B32%11.7%14%10%
ALTOAlto Ingredients Inc.$918M1%-1.8%-7%0%
ROGRogers Corporation$811M35%12.3%8%9%
ECVTEcovyst Inc.$724M27%11.8%4%12%
REXREX American Resources Corporation$650M11%6.8%13%8%
LXULSB Industries Inc.$615M5%-2.7%-1%-3%
UANCVR Partners LP Common$606M19%12.0%11%
LXFRLuxfer Holdings PLC$385M24%7.8%10%5%
Group median21%9.8%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CVR Partners LP Common has delivered.

CVR Partners LP Common’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, CVR Partners LP Common earns about $68M on its 11.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+32%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $112M on 11M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $442M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($58M) runs well above depreciation ($84M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $119M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CVR Partners LP Common (UAN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UAN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UAMY its page in the Manual UBER →

Industry order: ← SMG the Agricultural Inputs chapter