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NTR, Nutrien Ltd.
We are a leading global provider of crop inputs and services.
We operate a world-class network of production, distribution and agriculture retail facilities that positions us to efficiently serve farmers.
Our fertilizer manufacturing assets are primarily located in North America, which provides access to high-quality resources, lower cost inputs and an extensive distribution network to efficiently supply our customers.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Retail (66%) and Nitrogen (18%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 33% and operating margin about 9.3% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 2.1% and 29% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 24% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →The largest slice of sales is Retail at 66%, but the profit engine is Potash: 15% of revenue and 38% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Corporate and Others ran a $442M operating loss.
- Retail66%$17.6B24% of profit
- Nitrogen18%$4.7B36% of profit
- Potash15%$4.0B38% of profit
- Phosphate7%$2.0B2% of profit
- Corporate and Others1%$246Mloss of $442M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $4.5B | $19.6B | $20.1B | $20.9B | $27.7B | $37.9B | $29.1B | $26.0B | $26.9B | $26.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 27% | 32% | 31% | 29% | 37% | 43% | 33% | 33% | 35% | 35% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $209M | $414M | $1.9B | $902M | $4.8B | $10.8B | $2.7B | $1.9B | $3.7B | $3.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.6% | 2.1% | 9.3% | 4.3% | 17.3% | 28.5% | 9.4% | 7.1% | 13.9% | 13.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $327M | $3.6B | $992M | $459M | $3.2B | $7.7B | $1.3B | $674M | $2.3B | $2.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | -3% | 24% | — | 24% | 25% | 35% | 39% | 25% | 25% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $1.2B | $2.1B | $3.7B | $3.3B | $3.9B | $8.1B | $5.1B | $3.5B | $4.0B | $4.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $692M | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.4B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $1.6B | $71M | $4.5B | $875M | ($1.2B) | ($1.6B) | $1.6B | $522M | ($629M) | ($629M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $651M | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | CapexCapex |
| 14.3% | 7.2% | 8.6% | 6.8% | 6.4% | 5.9% | 8.3% | 7.8% | 7.0% | 7.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $824M | $647M | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $5.9B | $2.7B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 18.1% | 3.3% | 9.6% | 9.1% | 7.6% | 15.5% | 9.1% | 5.8% | 7.9% | 7.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $574M | $647M | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $5.9B | $2.7B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 12.6% | 3.3% | 9.6% | 9.1% | 7.6% | 15.5% | 9.1% | 5.8% | 7.9% | 7.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $330M | $952M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | $1.8B | $1.9B | $160M | $1.0B | $4.5B | $1.0B | $184M | $551M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 2% | 1% | 4% | 3% | 11% | 23% | 5% | 3% | 8% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| 4% | 15% | 4% | 2% | 13% | 30% | 5% | 3% | 9% | 9% | Return on equityROE |
| −0% | 11% | −0% | −3% | 9% | 26% | 1% | −2% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $116M | $2.3B | $671M | $1.5B | $499M | $901M | $941M | $853M | $701M | $701M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $489M | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $5.4B | $6.2B | $5.4B | $5.4B | $5.7B | $5.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $788M | $4.9B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $6.3B | $7.6B | $6.3B | $6.1B | $7.0B | $7.0B | InventoryInvent. |
| $836M | $6.7B | $7.4B | $8.1B | $10.1B | $11.3B | $9.5B | $9.1B | $9.3B | $9.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $441M | $1.6B | $1.1B | $498M | $1.6B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $3.3B | $3.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $3.3B | $11.7B | $10.7B | $11.5B | $13.8B | $16.3B | $14.2B | $13.8B | $14.7B | $14.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.6B | $8.3B | $9.1B | $8.5B | $12.4B | $14.3B | $12.1B | $12.0B | $11.0B | $11.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.4× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.3× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $97M | $11.4B | $12.0B | $12.2B | $12.2B | $12.4B | $12.1B | $12.0B | $12.1B | $12.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $17.0B | $45.5B | $46.8B | $47.2B | $50.0B | $54.6B | $52.7B | $51.8B | $52.3B | $52.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $4.4B | $8.2B | $9.5B | $10.2B | $9.1B | $10.2B | $10.7B | $10.4B | $10.2B | $10.2B | Total debtDebt |
| $4.3B | $5.9B | $8.9B | $8.8B | $8.6B | $9.3B | $9.8B | $9.6B | $9.5B | $9.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.9× | 0.8× | 3.4× | 1.7× | 7.8× | 19.2× | 3.5× | 2.6× | 5.4× | 5.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $8.3B | $24.4B | $22.9B | $22.4B | $23.7B | $25.8B | $25.2B | $24.4B | $25.3B | $25.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 840M | 625M | 582M | 570M | 570M | 538M | 496M | 494M | 486M | 491M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.41 | $31.42 | $34.49 | $36.70 | $48.65 | $70.35 | $58.54 | $52.55 | $55.28 | $54.75 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.39 | $5.72 | $1.70 | $0.81 | $5.53 | $14.23 | $2.53 | $1.36 | $4.66 | $4.62 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.98 | $1.04 | $3.33 | $3.34 | $3.70 | $10.88 | $5.34 | $3.06 | $4.37 | $4.33 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.68 | $1.04 | $3.33 | $3.34 | $3.70 | $10.88 | $5.34 | $3.06 | $4.37 | $4.33 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.39 | $1.52 | $1.76 | $1.81 | $1.83 | $1.91 | $2.08 | $2.14 | $2.18 | $2.16 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.77 | $2.25 | $2.97 | $2.50 | $3.12 | $4.18 | $4.87 | $4.10 | $3.87 | $3.83 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $9.88 | $39.09 | $39.34 | $39.26 | $41.52 | $47.95 | $50.68 | $49.39 | $52.07 | $51.57 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +33.7%/yr | +8.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +20.5%/yr | +5.5%/yr |
| EPS | +36.4%/yr | +42.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +23.9%/yr | +3.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +22.3%/yr | +9.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +23.1%/yr | +5.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $2.3B of profit but $2.1B of owner earnings: $142M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $2.3B | $674M | $1.3B | $7.7B | $3.2B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2.4B | +$2.3B | +$2.2B | +$2.0B | +$2.0B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$629M | +$522M | +$1.6B | −$1.6B | −$1.2B |
| Cash from operations | $4.0B | $3.5B | $5.1B | $8.1B | $3.9B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1.9B | −$2.0B | −$2.4B | −$2.3B | −$1.8B |
| Owner earnings | $2.1B | $1.5B | $2.7B | $5.9B | $2.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 6% | 9% | 15% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $3.7B ÷ interest expense $687M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.5B · 2.5× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $701M − debt $10.2B
What this means
Netting $701M of cash and short-term investments against $10.2B of debt leaves $9.5B owed, about 2.5× a year's operating profit (2.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 77 + DIO 145 − DPO 193 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range 1%–23%; 8% latest = NOPAT $2.8B ÷ invested capital $34.8BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median margin, range 3%–18%; latest $2.1B = operating cash $4.0B − maintenance capex $1.9BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 9 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $4.0B ÷ net income $2.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $1.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.1B
What this means
Of $2.1B Owner Earnings, $1.6B (76%) went back to shareholders, $1.1B dividends, $551M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.79×HarvestingCapex $1.9B ÷ depreciation $2.4B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $26.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.34×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $10.2B vs $3.7B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −14%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.85/share (latest year $4.62), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.57/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 9
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 5% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words confirm the number: the filing says price increases held their volume, and the margin widened with them — Buffett’s strongest mark of pricing power.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 10% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 2.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −6.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$701M
- Receivables$5.7B
- Inventory$7.0B
- Other current assets$1.4B
- Debt due within a year$873M
- Accounts payable$9.3B
- Other current liabilities$859M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $34.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$15.6B · 45%
- Dividends$8.6B · 25%
- Buybacks$11.2B · 32%
- Returned to owners$19.8B
101% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $8.6B as dividends and $11.2B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $5.8B and cash and short-term investments rose $585M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $11.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−41.6%
The diluted count fell from 840M to 491M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$2.18/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 24% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Nutrien Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?7.6% vs 10.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.4% early in the record and 7.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?28% → 47% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.3B to $12.7B while revenue grew 491%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (28% of revenue then, 47% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Agricultural Inputs
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOWDow Inc. Common Stock | $40.0B | 15% | 4.5% | 4% | 6% |
| LINLinde plc | $34.0B | — | 21.4% | 8% | 16% |
| LYBLyondellBasell | $30.2B | 14% | 11.1% | 19% | 9% |
| NTRNutrien Ltd. | $26.9B | 33% | 9.3% | 4% | 9% |
| PPGPPG Industries Inc. | $15.9B | 41% | 14.7% | 16% | 7% |
| MOSMosaic Company (The) | $12.1B | 16% | 8.2% | 6% | 7% |
| CFCF Industries Holdings Inc. | $7.1B | 30% | 24.1% | 24% | 27% |
| SMGScotts Miracle-Gro | $3.4B | 32% | 11.7% | 14% | 10% |
| Group median | — | 30% | 11.4% | 11% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Nutrien Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nutrien Ltd. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Nutrien Ltd. earns about $2.4B on its 9.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $2.1B on 491M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2024-12-31; net debt $9.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← NTES its page in the Manual NU →
Industry order: ← MOS the Agricultural Inputs chapter SMG →