Owner Scorecard


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SOFI, SoFi Technologies

We are a mission driven company designed to help our members achieve financial independence in order to realize their ambitions.

In order to help achieve our mission, we are a member-centric, one-stop shop for financial services that, through our Lending and Financial Services products, allows members to borrow, save, spend, invest and protect their money.

Lending related services that we offer through our Loan Platform Business help a broader range of borrowers to find lending solutions, through our relationships with members as well as third-party enterprise partners.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SOFI · SoFi Technologies
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.6B
+35.1% YoY · 45% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.9B 5-yr avg $2.2B
Return on equity 5% 5-yr avg −2%
Return on tangible equity 6% 5-yr avg −4%
Efficiency ratio 83% 5-yr avg 87%
Equity / assets 20.1% 5-yr avg 26.2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Technology Platform (58%) and Financial Services (42%).
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 5%, above 12% in only 2 of 7 years). It runs at a 83% efficiency ratio, on the heavy side. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Technology Platform at 58%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Technology Platform58%$361M
  • Financial Services42%$259M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$443M$566M$985M$1.6B$2.1B$2.7B$3.6B$3.9BRevenueRevenue
$330M$178M$252M$584M$1.3B$1.7B$2.2B$2.4BNet interest incomeNet int.
$113M$388M$733M$989M$861M$958M$1.4B$1.5BNoninterest incomeFee inc.
($240M)($224M)($484M)($320M)($301M)$499M$481M$577MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
-2.6%-5.3%-1.7%-1.0%1.4%1.0%1.1%Return on assetsROA
-11%-6%-6%8%5%5%Return on equityROE
−11%−6%−6%8%5%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
-15%-10%-9%10%5%6%Return on tangible equityROTCE
90%85%83%Efficiency ratioEffic.
Balance sheet
$8.6B$9.2B$19.0B$30.1B$36.3B$50.7B$53.7BTotal assetsAssets
$0$7.3B$18.6B$26.0B$37.5B$40.2BDepositsDeposits
$16M$899M$899M$1.6B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BGoodwillGoodwill
($339M)($120M)$4.4B$5.2B$5.2B$6.5B$10.5B$10.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
65.6M73.9M527M901M945M1.10B1.25B1.38BShares out (diluted)Shares
$-3.65$-3.03$-0.92$-0.36$-0.32$0.45$0.38$0.42EPS (diluted)EPS
$-5.17$-1.63$8.31$5.78$5.54$5.92$8.38$7.85Book value / shareBVPS
$-5.41$-18.61$6.06$3.49$3.68$4.39$7.08$6.68Tangible book / shareTBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×7.13 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.71 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−13.2%/yr−17.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−16.5%/yr−10.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.3Bpeak FY2025
Revenue
$3.6Blow FY2019
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $481M ÷ equity $10.5B
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Modest
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $1.4B − intangibles $232M)
    Industry peers: median 25%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • High cost ratio (>75%)
    Noninterest expense $3.1B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 36%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 20.7%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $10.5B ÷ assets $50.7B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $37.5B ÷ assets $50.7B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Provision or net interest income missing.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2021

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$780K
  • Cash & short-term investments$3.4B
  • Receivables$893M
Current liabilities$5M
  • Other current liabilities$5M
Current ratio0.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.15×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio654.99×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($4M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway0.5 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−7.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$9.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($42.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.5Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Noto$103.0M$119.1M($1.4B)
2022Mr. Noto$12.9M−$121.5M($7.3B)
2023Mr. Noto$18.3M$71.3M($7.3B)
2024Mr. Noto$28.1M$64.6M($1.3B)
2025Mr. Noto$30.3M$149.1M($4.0B)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$262M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 42% of revenue, equal to 20% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
BKKTBakkt Inc.$2.3B-146%-252%0.5%
GDOTGreen DOT Corp$2.0B5%13%-0.1%
ATLCAtlanticus Holdings Corporation$2.0B42%42%55%21.3%
UPSTUpstart$1.0B-7%-8%0.0%
SOFISoFi Technologies$3.6B-6%-9%85%3.6%
OMFOneMain Holdings Inc.$4.9B23%48%39%15.3%
SYFSynchrony Financial$19.0B21%25%27%15.5%
SLMSLM Corporation$2.0B30%31%33%5.0%
Group median13%19%39%4.3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what SoFi Technologies’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered6%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity−9%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $9.2B on 1283M shares, a −9% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SoFi Technologies (SOFI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SOFI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SOC its page in the Manual SOJC →

Industry order: ← SNEX the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter SORA →