Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← GDDY Manual GDRX → ← GCMG Capital Markets & Asset Management GEMI →

GDOT, Green DOT Corp

Green Dot Network is a service provider to accountholders in both our Consumer Services and B2B Services segments, as well as third-party programs.

The growth in gross dollar volume was driven primarily by certain BaaS programs that do not generate interchange fees and resulted in a net increase in segment revenue due to higher program management service fees earned from these BaaS partners.

Revenues within this segment were also adversely impacted by a decrease in breakage revenue on our gift card portfolio for the comparable period, as the program has been discontinued.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GDOT · Green DOT Corp
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.0B
+19.8% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Return on equity −8% 5-yr avg −0%
Return on tangible equity −13% 5-yr avg 1%
Equity / assets 14.1% 5-yr avg 17.6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is B2B Services (70%), Consumer Services (18%) and Money Movement Services (12%).
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 5%, above 12% in only 1 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

B2B Services is 70% of revenue, with Consumer Services the other meaningful segment at 18%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • B2B Services70%$1.4B
  • Consumer Services18%$356M
  • Money Movement Services12%$238M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$719M$901M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$2.0B$2.1BRevenueRevenue
($6M)($5M)($2M)($761K)($150K)($255K)($3M)($3M)Net interest incomeNet int.
($151K)$430K$3M$2M$859K$25M$34MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$42M$86M$119M$100M$23M$47M$64M$7M($27M)($99M)($71M)Net incomeNet inc.
32%17%4%17%18%25%23%54%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
2.4%3.9%5.2%4.1%0.6%1.0%1.3%0.1%-0.5%-1.7%-1.1%Return on assetsROA
6%11%13%11%2%4%8%1%-3%-11%-8%Return on equityROE
6%11%13%11%2%4%8%1%−3%−11%−8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
18%47%33%25%4%8%19%2%-6%-19%-13%Return on tangible equityROTCE
Balance sheet
$1.7B$2.2B$2.3B$2.5B$4.1B$4.7B$4.8B$4.8B$5.4B$6.0B$6.7BTotal assetsAssets
$737M$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$2.7B$3.3B$3.5B$3.3B$4.0B$4.4B$4.5BDepositsDeposits
$208M$302M$302M$302M$302M$302M$302M$302M$302M$302M$302MGoodwillGoodwill
$684M$765M$910M$927M$1.0B$1.1B$781M$859M$874M$890M$941MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
50.8M53.2M54.5M53.1M53.7M55.2M53.9M52.5M53.5M55.1M58.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.82$1.61$2.18$1.88$0.43$0.86$1.19$0.13$-0.50$-1.79$-1.22EPS (diluted)EPS
$13.46$14.37$16.70$17.45$18.81$19.39$14.51$16.37$16.32$16.16$16.21Book value / shareBVPS
$4.58$3.42$6.58$7.65$9.65$10.93$6.24$8.36$8.89$9.36$9.76Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.0%/yr+9.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.7%/yr−15.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.0%/yr+3.7%/yr
Book value / share+2.1%/yr−3.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Card revenues and other fees+27.2%
    “Card revenues and other fees increased primarily due to growth in gross dollar volume in our B2B Services segment programs, which resulted in higher program management service fees earned from our BaaS partners.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record
  • Interchange revenues-6.9%
    “Interchange Revenues — Interchange revenues totaled $184.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, a decrease of $13.7 million, or 7%, from the comparable prior year period. The decrease was primarily due to a 4% decrease in purchase volume during the year ended December 31, 2025, as well as a lower effective interchange rate which declined due to a mix-shift toward categories of consumer purchases with lower effective rates.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
55Mpeak FY2021
Revenue
$2.0Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Loss on equity
    Net income ($99M) ÷ equity $890M
    Industry peers: median -6%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Loss
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $302M − intangibles $73M)
    Industry peers: median -8%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 55%
    What this means

    Noninterest expense or revenue missing.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 14.9%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $890M ÷ assets $6.0B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $4.4B ÷ assets $6.0B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) -825%
    Net reserve release
    Provision for credit losses $25M ÷ net interest income ($3M)
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.7B
  • Receivables$196M
  • Other current assets$972M
Current liabilities$5.6B
  • Accounts payable$101M
  • Other current liabilities$5.5B
Current ratio0.50×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.50×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.29×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($2.8B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+17.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$566Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2M$2M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$5Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Henry$15.8M$51.3M$150M
2020$2.2M$2.1M$150M
2021Henry$14.0M−$5.7M$110M
2022Gresham$3.2M−$4.9M$221M
2022Henry$3.3M−$10.2M$221M
2023Gresham$8.4M$2.3M$39M
2024George Gresham$8.1M$4.9M$7M
2024Gresham$8.1M$4.9M$7M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership1.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio78:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 137% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
BKKTBakkt Inc.$2.3B-146%-252%0.5%
GDOTGreen DOT Corp$2.0B5%13%-0.1%
ATLCAtlanticus Holdings Corporation$2.0B42%42%55%21.3%
TREELendingTree Inc.$1.1B5%-2.2%
UPSTUpstart$1.0B-7%-8%0.0%
SOFISoFi Technologies$3.6B-6%-9%85%3.6%
ABTCAmerican Bitcoin Corp.$185M-38%-152%0.0%
SLMSLM Corporation$2.0B30%31%33%5.0%
Group median-0%-8%0.3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Green DOT Corp’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered−1%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity13%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $566M on 57M shares, a 13% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Green DOT Corp (GDOT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GDOT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GDDY its page in the Manual GDRX →

Industry order: ← GCMG the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter GEMI →