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SOUNW, SoundHound AI Inc.
SoundHound developer platform, Houndify, is an open-access platform that allows developers to leverage SoundHound's Voice AI technology and a library of over 100 content domains, including commonly used domains for points of interest, weather, flight status, sports and more.
We are a global leader in conversational intelligence, offering independent Voice AI solutions that enable businesses to deliver high-quality conversational experiences to their customers.
Built on proprietary technology, SoundHound's voice AI delivers best-in-class speed and accuracy in numerous languages to product creators across automotive, TV, and IoT, and to customer service industries via groundbreaking AI-driven products like Smart Answering, Smart Ordering, and Dynamic Interaction , and Employee Assist.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −308% through the cycle on a 69% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −29 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →36% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States64%$108M
- Other25%$43M
- South Korea6%$10M
- France4%$7M
- Germany0%$360K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $21M | $31M | $46M | $85M | $169M | $184M | RevenueRevenue |
| 69% | 69% | 75% | 49% | 42% | 41% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 78% | 98% | 62% | 63% | 49% | 49% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 279% | 245% | 112% | 83% | 58% | 54% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($65M) | ($106M) | ($69M) | ($341M) | ($23M) | ($174M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −308.2% | −339.5% | −149.6% | −403.0% | −13.8% | −94.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($80M) | ($117M) | ($89M) | ($351M) | ($14M) | ($169M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| ($66M) | ($94M) | ($68M) | ($109M) | ($98M) | ($105M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $6M | $4M | $2M | $1M | $1M | $3M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $2M | ($10M) | ($10M) | $207M | ($166M) | ($21M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $636K | $1M | $392K | $640K | $902K | $1M | CapexCapex |
| 3.0% | 4.3% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($67M) | ($95M) | ($69M) | ($110M) | ($99M) | ($107M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −315.2% | −306.3% | −149.7% | −129.3% | −58.7% | −57.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($67M) | ($95M) | ($69M) | ($110M) | ($99M) | ($107M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −315.2% | −306.3% | −149.7% | −129.3% | −58.7% | −57.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $0 | $12M | $55M | $55M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | -315% | — | -9% | -42% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -316% | -192% | -3% | -37% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −316% | −192% | −3% | −37% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $155M | $9M | $95M | $198M | $248M | $349M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2M | $3M | $3M | $4M | $32M | $30M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $4M | $3M | $2M | $6M | $11M | $8M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($2M) | $616K | $2M | ($1M) | $22M | $22M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $27M | $18M | $114M | $256M | $329M | $289M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $88M | $39M | $24M | $68M | $72M | $73M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.3× | 0.5× | 4.7× | 3.8× | 4.6× | 3.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | $0 | $102M | $122M | $122M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $49M | $38M | $151M | $554M | $688M | $645M | Total assetsAssets |
| $125K | $35M | $84M | $0 | — | $84M | Total debtDebt |
| ($155M) | $26M | ($11M) | ($198M) | — | ($264M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -7.8× | -15.3× | -3.9× | -28.1× | -34.7× | -344.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($343M) | ($37M) | $28M | $183M | $464M | $461M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 29.8% | 92.5% | 60.9% | 39.1% | 47.7% | 44.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| 67.3M | 157M | 229M | 338M | 409M | 430M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.32 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.25 | $0.41 | $0.43 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.18 | $-0.74 | $-0.39 | $-1.04 | $-0.03 | $-0.39 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.99 | $-0.61 | $-0.30 | $-0.32 | $-0.24 | $-0.25 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.99 | $-0.61 | $-0.30 | $-0.32 | $-0.24 | $-0.25 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-5.10 | $-0.23 | $0.12 | $0.54 | $1.13 | $1.07 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.34 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.48 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.0%/yr | +7.0%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −30.5%/yr | −30.5%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $14M loss but ($99M) of owner earnings: $85M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($14M) | ($351M) | ($89M) | ($117M) | ($80M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1M | +$1M | +$2M | +$4M | +$6M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$81M | +$33M | +$28M | +$29M | +$6M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$166M | +$207M | −$10M | −$10M | +$2M |
| Cash from operations | ($98M) | ($109M) | ($68M) | ($94M) | ($66M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$902K | −$640K | −$392K | −$1M | −$636K |
| Owner earnings | ($99M) | ($110M) | ($69M) | ($95M) | ($67M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -59% | -129% | -150% | -306% | -315% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $81M), owner earnings is nearer ($180M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We identified material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2025.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -34.7×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($23M) ÷ interest expense $670K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $248M − debt $84M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $164M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $133M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $297M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 70 + DIO 0 − DPO 40 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($18M) ÷ invested capital $300M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -34%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -150%Consumes cash through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -315%–-59%; latest ($99M) = operating cash ($98M) − maintenance capex $902KIndustry peers: median 1%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -59% of revenue this year, a -150% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $81M of SBC) leaves ($180M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($98M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($14M) · cash from operations ($98M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.90×MaintainingCapex $902K ÷ depreciation $1M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $169M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.59×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $84M vs $257M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.36/share (latest year $-0.03), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −324% → −208% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −324% early to −208% lately, median −308% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2024 · −403.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If we are unable to use generative AI, it could make our business less efficient and result in competitive disadvantages.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$216M
- Receivables$30M
- Other current assets$43M
- Accounts payable$8M
- Other current liabilities$65M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio28:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$81M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 48% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$26M · 14% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“For the year ended December 31, 2024, one customer accounted for 14% of the Company's total revenues.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRNCCerence Inc. | $252M | 70% | 1.3% | -1% | 12% |
| AIC3.ai Inc. | $250M | 67% | -80.5% | -36% | -37% |
| WEAVWeave Communications Inc. | $239M | 63% | -35.0% | -111% | -10% |
| XZOExzeo Group Inc. | $217M | 40% | 28.4% | — | 35% |
| IIIVi3 Verticals Inc. | $213M | 32% | 1.9% | 1% | 10% |
| SOUNWSoundHound AI Inc. | $169M | 69% | -308.2% | -6% | -150% |
| BLZEBackblaze Inc. | $146M | 52% | -32.1% | -88% | 1% |
| BBAIBigBear.ai Inc. | $128M | 25% | -62.6% | -31% | -19% |
| Group median | — | 57% | -33.5% | -31% | -5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFSoundHound AI Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered67%/yr’21→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← SOUN its page in the Manual SPB →
Industry order: ← SOUN the Software chapter SPSC →