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SPSC, SPS Commerce

Software asset-light CyclicalSerial acquirer

SPS Commerce is a global supply chain network that connects retailers, brands, distributors, manufacturers, and logistics providers through shared infrastructure built to handle the complexity of modern commerce operations.

Our network powers our portfolio of solutions that orchestrate the critical processes, protocols, and data exchanges needed to get the right product, in the right place, at the right time, every time.

We have embedded deep expertise, proven processes, and compliance logic built from over 20 years of commerce intelligence into every connection, delivering a full-service experience that empowers partners to move forward faster, together.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SPSC · SPS Commerce

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$752M

+17.8% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $762M 5-yr avg $552M

Gross margin 69% 5-yr avg 67%

Operating margin 15.3% 5-yr avg 14.8%

ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 13%

Owner-earnings margin 23% 5-yr avg 21%

Free cash flow margin 22% 5-yr avg 21%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 65% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 67% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.3% to 16% — on a steadier 67% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 6.1% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$193M	$220M	$248M	$279M	$313M	$385M	$451M	$537M	$638M	$752M	$762M	RevenueRevenue
67%	67%	67%	67%	68%	66%	66%	66%	67%	69%	69%	Gross marginGross mgn
15%	17%	17%	16%	16%	16%	15%	16%	16%	17%	17%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%	11%	9%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	9%	9%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$6M	$10M	$27M	$38M	$50M	$55M	$71M	$77M	$89M	$118M	$117M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
3.3%	4.5%	10.8%	13.8%	16.0%	14.3%	15.8%	14.4%	13.9%	15.7%	15.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$5M	$351K	$24M	$34M	$46M	$45M	$55M	$66M	$77M	$93M	$91M	Net incomeNet inc.
36%	—	16%	20%	13%	17%	23%	23%	23%	25%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$19M	$31M	$55M	$72M	$89M	$113M	$100M	$132M	$157M	$179M	$194M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$7M	$7M	$9M	$11M	$13M	$15M	$16M	$19M	$19M	$21M	$22M	DepreciationDeprec.
($819K)	$11M	$10M	$12M	$11M	$26M	($5M)	$2M	$7M	$11M	$24M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$8M	$7M	$14M	$14M	$16M	$20M	$20M	$20M	$20M	$27M	$28M	CapexCapex
4.1%	3.3%	5.5%	4.9%	5.3%	5.1%	4.4%	3.7%	3.1%	3.5%	3.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$11M	$24M	$46M	$58M	$75M	$98M	$80M	$113M	$137M	$158M	$172M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.6%	10.8%	18.7%	20.9%	24.1%	25.5%	17.8%	21.0%	21.5%	21.0%	22.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$11M	$24M	$41M	$58M	$72M	$93M	$80M	$113M	$137M	$152M	$167M	Free cash flowFCF
5.6%	10.8%	16.6%	20.9%	23.1%	24.2%	17.8%	21.0%	21.5%	20.3%	21.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$18M	—	—	—	—	$17M	$91M	$70M	$148M	$143M	$992K	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$6M	$20M	$21M	$19M	$20M	$43M	$0	$38M	$114M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
3%	3%	12%	18%	16%	17%	15%	13%	11%	11%	11%	ROICROIC
2%	0%	7%	9%	11%	9%	10%	10%	9%	10%	9%	Return on equityROE
2%	0%	7%	9%	11%	9%	10%	10%	9%	10%	9%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$146M	$169M	$178M	$214M	$190M	$257M	$214M	$275M	$241M	$151M	$157M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$21M	$25M	$27M	$32M	$34M	$35M	$39M	$47M	$52M	$68M	$65M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$4M	$4M	$4M	$5M	$8M	$11M	$7M	$9M	$14M	$14M	Accounts payablePayables
$18M	$20M	$23M	$27M	$28M	$26M	$28M	$39M	$43M	$54M	$51M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$186M	$224M	$250M	$292M	$271M	$352M	$323M	$401M	$382M	$335M	$329M	Current assetsCur. assets
$32M	$44M	$57M	$68M	$80M	$103M	$111M	$131M	$147M	$154M	$155M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.8×	5.1×	4.4×	4.3×	3.4×	3.4×	2.9×	3.1×	2.6×	2.2×	2.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$50M	$52M	$70M	$77M	$135M	$144M	$197M	$249M	$399M	$542M	$541M	GoodwillGoodwill
$298M	$340M	$386M	$447M	$526M	$616M	$673M	$824M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Total assetsAssets
($146M)	($169M)	($178M)	($214M)	($190M)	($257M)	($214M)	($275M)	($241M)	($151M)	($157M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$258M	$288M	$319M	$355M	$421M	$484M	$537M	$667M	$855M	$974M	$962M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
4.2%	5.8%	5.0%	5.3%	6.1%	7.2%	7.4%	8.5%	8.6%	7.1%	7.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
34.5M	34.7M	35.2M	36.0M	36.3M	37.0M	37.0M	37.5M	37.9M	38.0M	37.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$5.60	$6.34	$7.05	$7.75	$8.62	$10.42	$12.20	$14.33	$16.85	$19.78	$20.35	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.14	$0.01	$0.68	$0.94	$1.26	$1.21	$1.49	$1.76	$2.04	$2.46	$2.43	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.31	$0.69	$1.32	$1.62	$2.08	$2.65	$2.17	$3.00	$3.63	$4.15	$4.61	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.31	$0.69	$1.17	$1.62	$1.99	$2.52	$2.17	$3.00	$3.63	$4.01	$4.46	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.23	$0.21	$0.39	$0.38	$0.45	$0.53	$0.54	$0.53	$0.53	$0.70	$0.73	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.48	$8.30	$9.06	$9.86	$11.59	$13.10	$14.53	$17.81	$22.58	$25.63	$25.70	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2017 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+15.0%/yr	+18.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+33.3%/yr	+14.8%/yr
EPS	+37.1%/yr	+14.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+13.0%/yr	+9.0%/yr
Book value / share	+14.7%/yr	+17.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

38Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

11%low FY2016

Gross margin

69%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$158Mowner earningsvs.$93Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $158M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $21M it takes just to hold its position. It put $5M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $152M.

Reported net income$93M

Owner earnings$158M · 21% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$93M	$77M	$66M	$55M	$45M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$21M	+$19M	+$19M	+$16M	+$15M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$54M	+$55M	+$46M	+$33M	+$28M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$11M	+$7M	+$2M	−$5M	+$26M
Cash from operations	$179M	$157M	$132M	$100M	$113M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$21M	−$20M	−$20M	−$20M	−$15M
Owner earnings	$158M	$137M	$113M	$80M	$98M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$5M	—	—	—	−$5M
Free cash flow	$152M	$137M	$113M	$80M	$93M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	21%	22%	21%	18%	25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $21M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $5M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $54M), owner earnings is nearer $104M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4381.6×

Comfortable

Operating income $118M ÷ interest expense $27K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$151M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $151M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $151M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $3M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $154M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 11d

Tight

DSO 33 + DIO 0 − DPO 22 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -20%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 21%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 6%–25%; latest $158M = operating cash $179M − maintenance capex $21M

Industry peers: median 0%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $54M of SBC) leaves $104M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.92×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $179M ÷ net income $93M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 72%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $114M ÷ Owner Earnings $158M

What this means
Of $158M Owner Earnings, $114M (72%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $114M buybacks. Net of $54M stock comp, the real buyback was about $61M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.26×

Expanding

Capex $27M ÷ depreciation $21M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $752M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.17×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +709%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.14/share (latest year $2.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $26.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Operating margin 6% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 15% lately, median 14% — pricing power intact or improving.
Owner earnings growth +27%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 27% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 3.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Adopting and utilizing AI and Machine Learning ("ML")-enabled products or services has become increasingly important within our competitive landscape.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$329M

Cash & short-term investments$154M
Receivables$65M
Other current assets$109M

Current liabilities$155M

Accounts payable$14M
Other current liabilities$140M

Current ratio2.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.12×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.00×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$174Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.2× → 2.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$215Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$130MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$7M$7M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$86Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $947M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$165M · 17%
Buybacks$281M · 30%
Retained (debt / cash)$501M · 53%

Returned to owners$281M
35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $281M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$112.44
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $234M, about $112.44 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $50.95 (2020) to $182.96 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $117.82 ($114M).
Net change in share count8.6%
The diluted count rose from 34M to 37M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained67%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($164M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $109M, so each retained $1 added about 0.67 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$758M65% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity56%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$487Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $165M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	—	$6.7M	$14.1M	$98M
2022	Archie Black	$6.1M	$4.5M	$80M
2023	Archie Black	$9.6M	$26.7M	$113M
2023	Chad Collins	$6.8M	$8.0M	$113M
2024	Chad Collins	$14.4M	$11.0M	$137M
2025	Chad Collins	$11.4M	−$5.6M	$158M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio125:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$54M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 45% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why SPS Commerce is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.6%
Diluted shares grew 8.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $281M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
QTWOQ2 Holdings Inc.	$795M	48%	-14.8%	-10%	0%
COURCoursera Inc.	$758M	53%	-22.9%	—	0%
BANDBandwidth Inc.	$754M	44%	-2.3%	-2%	5%
SPSCSPS Commerce	$752M	67%	14.1%	13%	21%
BRZEBraze	$738M	67%	-30.7%	-30%	-5%
CWANClearwater Analytics	$731M	72%	1.7%	0%	15%
APPNAppian Corporation	$727M	71%	-18.7%	-50%	-6%
NTSKNetskope Inc.	$709M	65%	-76.9%	-107%	-27%
Group median	—	66%	-16.7%	-10%	0%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what SPS Commerce has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, SPS Commerce earns about $157M on its 20.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($157M) Net of stock comp (−$58M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($173M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+13%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+27%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $167M on 37M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net cash $157M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($28M) runs well above depreciation ($22M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $173M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SPSC against another business →

The owners of SPSC: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SPS Commerce (SPSC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPSC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SPRY its page in the Manual SPT →

Industry order: ← SOUNW the Software chapter SPT →