Share count
163Mpeak FY2024
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SVV, Savers Value Village Inc.
Specialty Retail retail
Savers Value Village Inc. is the largest for-profit thrift operator in the United States and Canada based on number of stores.
With nearly 24,000 team members, we operate a total of 367 stores under the Savers , Value Village , Value Village Boutique , Village des Valeurs MD , Unique and 2nd Ave. banners.
We then process, select, price, merchandise and sell these items in our stores.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$1.7B
+9.2% YoY · 5% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $1.7B 4-yr avg $1.5B
Revenue $403M +8.9% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 3.1% yr-ago 2.8%
Net income ($5M) yr-ago ($5M)
Net margin −1.3% yr-ago −1.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 8.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →43% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2026
- United States57%$960M
- Canada37%$624M
- Australia3%$53M
- Rest of world3%$43M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 21% | 21% | 22% | 22% | 23% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $206M | $142M | $130M | $124M | $126M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.3% | 9.5% | 8.5% | 7.4% | 7.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $85M | $53M | $29M | $23M | $22M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 32% | — | 41% | 39% | 39% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| $169M | $175M | $134M | $167M | $185M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $56M | $61M | $70M | $80M | $84M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $27M | ($12M) | ($26M) | $26M | $44M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $110M | $92M | $106M | $119M | $126M | CapexCapex |
| 7.7% | 6.1% | 6.9% | 7.1% | 7.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $59M | $83M | $28M | $49M | $59M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.1% | 5.6% | 1.8% | 2.9% | 3.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $59M | $83M | $28M | $49M | $59M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 4.1% | 5.6% | 1.8% | 2.9% | 3.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $3M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $69M | $262M | $0 | $0 | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $699K | $32M | $45M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 15% | 14% | 8% | 7% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 37% | 14% | 7% | 5% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | −56% | 7% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $112M | $180M | $150M | $86M | $62M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $14M | $12M | $17M | $17M | $18M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $22M | $33M | $34M | $41M | $45M | InventoryInvent. |
| $81M | $93M | $83M | $76M | $73M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($45M) | ($48M) | ($32M) | ($17M) | ($11M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $192M | $258M | $230M | $197M | $180M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $273M | $241M | $231M | $244M | $229M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.7× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 0.8× | 0.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $681M | $687M | $665M | $678M | $674M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| $834M | $789M | $741M | $716M | $714M | Total debtDebt |
| $721M | $609M | $591M | $630M | $653M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $227M | $376M | $422M | $436M | $430M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 4.8% | 4.0% | 2.3% | 2.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||
| 146M | 156M | 167M | 163M | 155M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.84 | $9.61 | $9.22 | $10.31 | $11.04 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.58 | $0.34 | $0.17 | $0.14 | $0.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.41 | $0.53 | $0.17 | $0.30 | $0.38 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.41 | $0.53 | $0.17 | $0.30 | $0.38 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.48 | $1.68 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.75 | $0.59 | $0.64 | $0.73 | $0.81 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.56 | $2.41 | $2.53 | $2.68 | $2.78 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.2%/yr | +1.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | −7.4%/yr | −7.4%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | −30.0%/yr | −30.0%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −0.9%/yr | −0.9%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | +14.5%/yr | +14.5%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
7%low FY2026
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
12.9×peak FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$49Mowner earningsvs.$23Mnet incomelow FY2024
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2022FY2026
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $23M of profit into $49M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $23M | $29M | $53M | $85M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$80M | +$70M | +$61M | +$56M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$39M | +$62M | +$73M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$26M | −$26M | −$12M | +$27M |
| Cash from operations | $167M | $134M | $175M | $169M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$119M | −$106M | −$92M | −$110M |
| Owner earnings | $49M | $28M | $83M | $59M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 2% | 6% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $39M), owner earnings is nearer $10M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We previously identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting and have completed remediation activities to address those identified material weaknesses.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $630M · 5.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $86M − debt $716M
What this means
Netting $86M of cash and short-term investments against $716M of debt leaves $630M owed, about 5.1× a year's operating profit (5.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range 7%–15%; 7% latest = NOPAT $76M ÷ invested capital $1.1BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle4-yr median margin, range 2%–6%; latest $49M = operating cash $167M − maintenance capex $119MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $39M of SBC) leaves $10M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $167M ÷ net income $23M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $45M ÷ Owner Earnings $49M
What this means
Of $49M Owner Earnings, $45M (93%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $45M buybacks. Net of $39M stock comp, the real buyback was about $7M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.47×ExpandingCapex $119M ÷ depreciation $80M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.81×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $716M vs ($47M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.23/share (latest year $0.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 4
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → 8% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 8% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −14%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 14% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2026 · 7.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +2.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Conditions in our market could also change rapidly and significantly as a result of technological advancements (including artificial intelligence and machine learning), partnering by our competitors or continuing market consolidation or strategic changes we or our competitors make in response to macro-economic or other…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$180M
- Cash & short-term investments$62M
- Receivables$18M
- Inventory$45M
- Other current assets$56M
Current liabilities$229M
- Debt due within a year$8M
- Accounts payable$73M
- Other current liabilities$148M
Current ratio0.79×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.59×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($49M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$8M due · $62M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 4, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($396M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.4B$693M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.4B (annual-report basis)
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$148Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$965Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$688Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$716M
Lease obligations (present value)$688M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.4B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.4B, of which the leases are 49%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 3, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2022–2026
Over the record, the business generated $646M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$426M · 66%
- Dividends$332M · 51%
- Buybacks$78M · 12%
- Returned to owners$409M
186% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $332M as dividends and $78M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$190M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $190M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $51M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$12.60
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 6M shares were bought for $77M, about $12.60 each.
- Net change in share count6.2%
The diluted count rose from 146M to 155M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$831M41% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$3Mover 4 years buying other businesses, against $426M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Walsh | $10.1M | $17.6M | $83M |
| 2024 | Mr. Walsh | $5.1M | −$15.9M | $28M |
| 2026 | Mr. Walsh | $5.8M | $2.1M | $49M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$39M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 31% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Savers Value Village Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2026.
3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.4% vs 4.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 4.8% early in the record and 2.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?6.2%
Diluted shares grew 6.2% over 2022–2026, even as the company spent $78M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 4% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $36M to $62M while revenue grew 19%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 4% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
And these came back clean
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Specialty Retail
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SGUStar Group L.P. | $1.8B | 62% | 4.1% | — | 4% |
| SVVSavers Value Village Inc. | $1.7B | — | 9.0% | 11% | 4% |
| FCFSFirstCash Holdings Inc. | $1.7B | 39% | 21.7% | 8% | 19% |
| BNEDBarnes & Noble Education Inc | $1.6B | 23% | -2.3% | -8% | 1% |
| GRDNGuardian Pharmacy Services Inc. | $1.4B | 20% | 5.0% | 32% | 6% |
| SPHSuburban Propane Partners L.P. | $1.4B | 60% | 12.8% | — | 12% |
| EZPWEZCORP Inc. Class A Non Voting | $1.3B | 79% | 7.7% | 6% | 7% |
| REALThe RealReal Inc. | $693M | 64% | -31.6% | — | -21% |
| Group median | — | — | 6.3% | 8% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Savers Value Village Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Savers Value Village Inc. earns about $59M on its 3.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $59M on 154M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $653M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Savers Value Village Inc. (SVV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SVV, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SVRA its page in the Manual SW →
Industry order: ← SPH the Specialty Retail chapter TITN →