Owner Scorecard


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SPH, Suburban Propane Partners L.P.

Specialty Retail retail Serial acquirer

Suburban Propane Partners L.P. is a nationwide marketer and distributor of a diverse array of products meeting the energy needs of our customers.

We specialize in the distribution of propane, renewable propane, renewable natural gas ("RNG"), fuel oil and refined fuels, as well as the marketing of natural gas and electricity in deregulated markets and production of and investing in low-carbon fuel alternatives.

In support of our core marketing and distribution operations, we install and service a variety of home comfort equipment, particularly in the areas of heating and ventilation.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SPH · Suburban Propane Partners L.P.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.4B
+7.9% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $1.4B
Gross margin 63% 5-yr avg 59%
Operating margin 15.4% 5-yr avg 14.4%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 54% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 60% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.0B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1B$1.3B$1.5B$1.4B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BRevenueRevenue
65%60%56%59%65%62%53%59%61%61%63%Gross marginGross mgn
6%5%5%6%6%6%5%6%7%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$90M$129M$158M$151M$140M$213M$206M$207M$171M$206M$214MOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.6%10.8%11.8%11.9%12.7%16.5%13.7%14.5%12.9%14.4%15.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$14M$38M$77M$69M$61M$123M$140M$124M$74M$107M$133MNet incomeNet inc.
4%1%-1%1%-0%1%0%1%1%1%1%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$157M$164M$210M$227M$209M$227M$221M$225M$161M$186M$206MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$130M$128M$125M$121M$117M$105M$59M$63M$67M$72M$70MDepreciationDeprec.
$13M($2M)$9M$37M$32M($796K)$22M$39M$19M$8M$2MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$38M$28M$33M$35M$32M$30M$44M$45M$59M$72M$73MCapexCapex
3.7%2.4%2.4%2.8%2.9%2.3%3.0%3.1%4.5%5.0%5.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$119M$136M$178M$192M$177M$197M$176M$180M$101M$114M$133MOwner earningsOwner earn.
11.4%11.4%13.2%15.1%16.0%15.3%11.7%12.6%7.6%8.0%9.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$119M$136M$178M$192M$177M$197M$176M$180M$101M$114M$133MFree cash flowFCF
11.4%11.4%13.2%15.1%16.0%15.3%11.7%12.6%7.6%8.0%9.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$43M$0$15M$19M$26M$9M$56M$130M$25M$59M$27MAcquisitionsAcquis.
Balance sheet
$37M$3M$5M$2M$3M$6M$4M$4M$3M$405K$4MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$54M$66M$71M$59M$55M$71M$79M$68M$66M$69M$148MReceivablesReceiv.
$45M$53M$59M$45M$47M$62M$67M$62M$55M$74M$64MInventoryInvent.
$32M$39M$38M$34M$32M$39M$35M$40M$41M$45M$45MAccounts payablePayables
$67M$80M$92M$70M$70M$94M$110M$89M$81M$98M$167MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$147M$139M$158M$123M$116M$180M$175M$164M$158M$166M$267MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$205M$210M$219M$216M$245M$287M$307M$308M$306M$303M$248MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.7×0.7×0.6×0.5×0.6×0.6×0.5×0.5×0.5×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.3B$2.2B$2.1B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$2.4BTotal assetsAssets
$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3BTotal debtDebt
$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.2×1.7×2.0×2.0×1.9×3.1×3.4×2.8×2.3×2.7×2.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
Per share
61.2M61.5M61.8M62.4M62.7M63.3M64.0M64.4M64.8M65.6M67KShares out (diluted)Shares
$17.10$19.30$21.74$20.33$17.66$20.36$23.45$22.18$20.47$21.84$20882.57Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.24$0.62$1.24$1.10$0.97$1.94$2.18$1.92$1.14$1.62$1998.91EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.95$2.20$2.87$3.08$2.82$3.11$2.75$2.80$1.56$1.74$1988.07Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.95$2.20$2.87$3.08$2.82$3.11$2.75$2.80$1.56$1.74$1988.07Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.63$0.46$0.53$0.56$0.52$0.47$0.69$0.70$0.92$1.10$1099.40Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh

The diluted share count moved ×1/983.17 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.8%/yr+4.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.2%/yr−9.2%/yr
EPS+23.9%/yr+10.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.4%/yr+16.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
66Mpeak FY2025
Gross margin
61%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
10.6×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$114Mowner earningsvs.$107Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $107M of profit into $114M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$107M
Owner earnings$114M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$107M$74M$124M$140M$123M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$72M+$67M+$63M+$59M+$105M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$8M+$19M+$39M+$22M−$796K
Cash from operations$186M$161M$225M$221M$227M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$72M−$59M−$45M−$44M−$30M
Owner earnings$114M$101M$180M$176M$197M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%8%13%12%15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $206M ÷ interest expense $76M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 5.9× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $405K − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Netting $405K of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 5.9× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 18 + DIO 48 − DPO 29 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–16%; latest $114M = operating cash $186M − maintenance capex $72M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $186M ÷ net income $107M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.00×
    Maintaining
    Capex $72M ÷ depreciation $72M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs ($137M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +136%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.53/share (latest year $1.61), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 10% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 14% lately, median 13% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 8.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.8%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$267M
  • Cash & short-term investments$4M
  • Receivables$148M
  • Inventory$64M
  • Other current assets$52M
Current liabilities$248M
  • Accounts payable$45M
  • Other current liabilities$203M
Current ratio1.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.82×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$20Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−6.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.4B$106M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$417M · 21%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.6B · 79%
  • Net change in share count−99.9%

    The diluted count fell from 61M to 0M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($825M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $12M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.2B54% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$382Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $417M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021M. Stivala$3.1M$3.4M$197M
2022M. Stivala$4.0M$4.4M$176M
2023M. Stivala$4.0M$3.7M$180M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2024 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio66:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2024 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Suburban Propane Partners L.P. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?9.4% vs 12.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.0% early in the record and 9.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?9% → 15% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $99M to $212M while revenue grew 33%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (9% of revenue then, 15% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SVVSavers Value Village Inc.$1.7B9.0%11%4%
FCFSFirstCash Holdings Inc.$1.7B39%21.7%8%19%
BNEDBarnes & Noble Education Inc$1.6B23%-2.3%-8%1%
GRDNGuardian Pharmacy Services Inc.$1.4B20%5.0%32%6%
SPHSuburban Propane Partners L.P.$1.4B60%12.8%12%
GCTGigaCloud Technology Inc$1.3B11.2%84%13%
EZPWEZCORP Inc. Class A Non Voting$1.3B79%7.7%6%7%
REALThe RealReal Inc.$693M64%-31.6%-21%
Group median50%8.3%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Suburban Propane Partners L.P. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Suburban Propane Partners L.P. earns about $174M on its 12.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $133M on 66M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $1.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Suburban Propane Partners L.P. (SPH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SPGI its page in the Manual SPHR →

Industry order: ← SIG the Specialty Retail chapter SVV →