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SPH, Suburban Propane Partners L.P.
Suburban Propane Partners L.P. is a nationwide marketer and distributor of a diverse array of products meeting the energy needs of our customers.
We specialize in the distribution of propane, renewable propane, renewable natural gas ("RNG"), fuel oil and refined fuels, as well as the marketing of natural gas and electricity in deregulated markets and production of and investing in low-carbon fuel alternatives.
In support of our core marketing and distribution operations, we install and service a variety of home comfort equipment, particularly in the areas of heating and ventilation.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 54% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 60% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 65% | 60% | 56% | 59% | 65% | 62% | 53% | 59% | 61% | 61% | 63% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 6% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $90M | $129M | $158M | $151M | $140M | $213M | $206M | $207M | $171M | $206M | $214M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.6% | 10.8% | 11.8% | 11.9% | 12.7% | 16.5% | 13.7% | 14.5% | 12.9% | 14.4% | 15.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $14M | $38M | $77M | $69M | $61M | $123M | $140M | $124M | $74M | $107M | $133M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 4% | 1% | -1% | 1% | -0% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $157M | $164M | $210M | $227M | $209M | $227M | $221M | $225M | $161M | $186M | $206M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $130M | $128M | $125M | $121M | $117M | $105M | $59M | $63M | $67M | $72M | $70M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $13M | ($2M) | $9M | $37M | $32M | ($796K) | $22M | $39M | $19M | $8M | $2M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $38M | $28M | $33M | $35M | $32M | $30M | $44M | $45M | $59M | $72M | $73M | CapexCapex |
| 3.7% | 2.4% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 2.9% | 2.3% | 3.0% | 3.1% | 4.5% | 5.0% | 5.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $119M | $136M | $178M | $192M | $177M | $197M | $176M | $180M | $101M | $114M | $133M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.4% | 11.4% | 13.2% | 15.1% | 16.0% | 15.3% | 11.7% | 12.6% | 7.6% | 8.0% | 9.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $119M | $136M | $178M | $192M | $177M | $197M | $176M | $180M | $101M | $114M | $133M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.4% | 11.4% | 13.2% | 15.1% | 16.0% | 15.3% | 11.7% | 12.6% | 7.6% | 8.0% | 9.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $43M | $0 | $15M | $19M | $26M | $9M | $56M | $130M | $25M | $59M | $27M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $37M | $3M | $5M | $2M | $3M | $6M | $4M | $4M | $3M | $405K | $4M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $54M | $66M | $71M | $59M | $55M | $71M | $79M | $68M | $66M | $69M | $148M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $45M | $53M | $59M | $45M | $47M | $62M | $67M | $62M | $55M | $74M | $64M | InventoryInvent. |
| $32M | $39M | $38M | $34M | $32M | $39M | $35M | $40M | $41M | $45M | $45M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $67M | $80M | $92M | $70M | $70M | $94M | $110M | $89M | $81M | $98M | $167M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $147M | $139M | $158M | $123M | $116M | $180M | $175M | $164M | $158M | $166M | $267M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $205M | $210M | $219M | $216M | $245M | $287M | $307M | $308M | $306M | $303M | $248M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.2× | 1.7× | 2.0× | 2.0× | 1.9× | 3.1× | 3.4× | 2.8× | 2.3× | 2.7× | 2.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 61.2M | 61.5M | 61.8M | 62.4M | 62.7M | 63.3M | 64.0M | 64.4M | 64.8M | 65.6M | 67K | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $17.10 | $19.30 | $21.74 | $20.33 | $17.66 | $20.36 | $23.45 | $22.18 | $20.47 | $21.84 | $20882.57 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.24 | $0.62 | $1.24 | $1.10 | $0.97 | $1.94 | $2.18 | $1.92 | $1.14 | $1.62 | $1998.91 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.95 | $2.20 | $2.87 | $3.08 | $2.82 | $3.11 | $2.75 | $2.80 | $1.56 | $1.74 | $1988.07 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.95 | $2.20 | $2.87 | $3.08 | $2.82 | $3.11 | $2.75 | $2.80 | $1.56 | $1.74 | $1988.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.63 | $0.46 | $0.53 | $0.56 | $0.52 | $0.47 | $0.69 | $0.70 | $0.92 | $1.10 | $1099.40 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
The diluted share count moved ×1/983.17 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.8%/yr | +4.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −1.2%/yr | −9.2%/yr |
| EPS | +23.9%/yr | +10.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +6.4%/yr | +16.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $107M of profit into $114M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $107M | $74M | $124M | $140M | $123M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$72M | +$67M | +$63M | +$59M | +$105M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$8M | +$19M | +$39M | +$22M | −$796K |
| Cash from operations | $186M | $161M | $225M | $221M | $227M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$72M | −$59M | −$45M | −$44M | −$30M |
| Owner earnings | $114M | $101M | $180M | $176M | $197M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 8% | 13% | 12% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $206M ÷ interest expense $76M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 5.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $405K − debt $1.2B
What this means
Netting $405K of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 5.9× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 18 + DIO 48 − DPO 29 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 8%–16%; latest $114M = operating cash $186M − maintenance capex $72MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $186M ÷ net income $107M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.00×MaintainingCapex $72M ÷ depreciation $72M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs ($137M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +136%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.53/share (latest year $1.61), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 10% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 14% lately, median 13% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 8.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.8%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$4M
- Receivables$148M
- Inventory$64M
- Other current assets$52M
- Accounts payable$45M
- Other current liabilities$203M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$417M · 21%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.6B · 79%
- Net change in share count−99.9%
The diluted count fell from 61M to 0M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−1%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($825M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $12M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | M. Stivala | $3.1M | $3.4M | $197M |
| 2022 | M. Stivala | $4.0M | $4.4M | $176M |
| 2023 | M. Stivala | $4.0M | $3.7M | $180M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2024 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio66:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2024 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Suburban Propane Partners L.P. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?9.4% vs 12.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.0% early in the record and 9.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?9% → 15% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $99M to $212M while revenue grew 33%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (9% of revenue then, 15% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Specialty Retail
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SVVSavers Value Village Inc. | $1.7B | — | 9.0% | 11% | 4% |
| FCFSFirstCash Holdings Inc. | $1.7B | 39% | 21.7% | 8% | 19% |
| BNEDBarnes & Noble Education Inc | $1.6B | 23% | -2.3% | -8% | 1% |
| GRDNGuardian Pharmacy Services Inc. | $1.4B | 20% | 5.0% | 32% | 6% |
| SPHSuburban Propane Partners L.P. | $1.4B | 60% | 12.8% | — | 12% |
| GCTGigaCloud Technology Inc | $1.3B | — | 11.2% | 84% | 13% |
| EZPWEZCORP Inc. Class A Non Voting | $1.3B | 79% | 7.7% | 6% | 7% |
| REALThe RealReal Inc. | $693M | 64% | -31.6% | — | -21% |
| Group median | — | 50% | 8.3% | — | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Suburban Propane Partners L.P. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Suburban Propane Partners L.P. earns about $174M on its 12.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $133M on 66M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $1.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SPGI its page in the Manual SPHR →
Industry order: ← SIG the Specialty Retail chapter SVV →