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TDC, Teradata Corporation

Software asset-light Cyclical

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Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TDC · Teradata Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.7B

−5.0% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.8B

Gross margin 60% 5-yr avg 61%

Operating margin 6.1% 5-yr avg 10.6%

ROIC 41% 5-yr avg 63%

Owner-earnings margin 40% 5-yr avg 20%

Free cash flow margin 40% 5-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Services and other (70%) and Subscription software licenses (16%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 56% and operating margin about 6.6% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.5% to 12% — on a steadier 56% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 5.5% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 47%, above 15% in 8 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Services and other is 70% of revenue, with Subscription software licenses the other meaningful line at 16%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Services and other70%$1.2B
Subscription software licenses16%$273M
Consulting services12%$201M
Software And Hardware Perpetual1%$17M

By geographyInternational50%United States50%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.7B	RevenueRevenue
51%	47%	47%	50%	56%	62%	60%	61%	60%	59%	60%	Gross marginGross mgn
29%	30%	31%	33%	36%	34%	36%	35%	32%	30%	37%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%	14%	15%	17%	18%	16%	17%	16%	16%	17%	17%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$235M	$68M	$43M	$10M	$16M	$231M	$118M	$186M	$209M	$205M	$103M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
10.1%	3.2%	2.0%	0.5%	0.9%	12.1%	6.6%	10.1%	11.9%	12.3%	6.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$125M	($67M)	$30M	($20M)	$129M	$147M	$33M	$62M	$114M	$130M	$421M	Net incomeNet inc.
43%	—	—	—	—	23%	51%	47%	30%	27%	24%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$446M	$324M	$364M	$148M	$267M	$463M	$419M	$375M	$303M	$305M	$698M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$128M	$138M	$130M	$150M	$172M	$149M	$134M	$116M	$100M	$90M	$95M	DepreciationDeprec.
$131M	$185M	$139M	($65M)	($135M)	$55M	$126M	$71M	($30M)	($27M)	$63M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$53M	$78M	$153M	$54M	$44M	$28M	$14M	$19M	$24M	$19M	$28M	CapexCapex
2.3%	3.6%	7.1%	2.8%	2.4%	1.5%	0.8%	1.0%	1.4%	1.1%	1.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$393M	$246M	$211M	$94M	$223M	$435M	$405M	$356M	$279M	$286M	$670M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
16.9%	11.4%	9.8%	4.9%	12.1%	22.7%	22.6%	19.4%	15.9%	17.2%	39.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$393M	$246M	$211M	$94M	$223M	$435M	$405M	$356M	$279M	$286M	$670M	Free cash flowFCF
16.9%	11.4%	9.8%	4.9%	12.1%	22.7%	22.6%	19.4%	15.9%	17.2%	39.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$82M	$351M	$300M	$300M	$100M	$244M	$387M	$308M	$215M	$140M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
24%	29%	16%	—	—	63%	32%	67%	75%	78%	41%	ROICROIC
13%	-10%	6%	-8%	32%	32%	13%	46%	86%	57%	76%	Return on equityROE
13%	−10%	6%	−8%	32%	32%	13%	46%	86%	57%	76%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$974M	$1.1B	$715M	$494M	$529M	$592M	$569M	$486M	$420M	$493M	$816M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$548M	$554M	$588M	$398M	$331M	$336M	$364M	$286M	$234M	$251M	$322M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$34M	$30M	$28M	$31M	$29M	$26M	$8M	$13M	$18M	$13M	$5M	InventoryInvent.
$103M	$74M	$141M	$66M	$50M	$67M	$94M	$100M	$106M	$96M	$58M	Accounts payablePayables
$479M	$510M	$475M	$363M	$310M	$295M	$278M	$199M	$146M	$168M	$269M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.4B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$869M	$749M	$837M	$1.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$729M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$886M	$952M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$996M	$930M	$914M	$954M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×	1.6×	1.4×	1.1×	1.1×	1.1×	1.0×	0.9×	0.8×	0.9×	1.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$390M	$399M	$395M	$396M	$401M	$396M	$390M	$398M	$394M	$399M	$397M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.4B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$2.1B	Total assetsAssets
$568M	$538M	$497M	$479M	$455M	$412M	$498M	$499M	$480M	$456M	$449M	Total debtDebt
($406M)	($551M)	($218M)	($15M)	($74M)	($180M)	($71M)	$13M	$60M	($37M)	($367M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
19.6×	4.5×	2.0×	0.4×	0.6×	8.9×	4.9×	6.2×	7.2×	7.9×	4.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$971M	$668M	$495M	$262M	$400M	$460M	$258M	$135M	$133M	$230M	$557M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.7%	3.2%	3.0%	4.4%	5.5%	5.8%	7.0%	6.9%	6.8%	6.7%	7.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
132M	126M	121M	114M	112M	113M	106M	102M	98.2M	96.6M	96.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$17.66	$17.14	$17.85	$16.63	$16.45	$16.98	$16.97	$17.90	$17.82	$17.22	$17.48	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.95	$-0.53	$0.25	$-0.18	$1.16	$1.30	$0.31	$0.61	$1.16	$1.35	$4.36	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.99	$1.96	$1.74	$0.82	$2.00	$3.85	$3.83	$3.48	$2.84	$2.96	$6.94	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.99	$1.96	$1.74	$0.82	$2.00	$3.85	$3.83	$3.48	$2.84	$2.96	$6.94	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.40	$0.62	$1.26	$0.47	$0.39	$0.25	$0.13	$0.19	$0.24	$0.20	$0.29	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.38	$5.31	$4.08	$2.29	$3.58	$4.07	$2.44	$1.32	$1.35	$2.38	$5.77	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.3%/yr	+0.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−0.1%/yr	+8.2%/yr
EPS	+3.9%/yr	+3.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	−7.7%/yr	−13.0%/yr
Book value / share	−11.8%/yr	−7.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

97Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

78%low FY2018

Gross margin

59%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$286Mowner earningsvs.$130Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $130M of profit into $286M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$130M

Owner earnings$286M · 17% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$130M	$114M	$62M	$33M	$147M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$90M	+$100M	+$116M	+$134M	+$149M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$112M	+$119M	+$126M	+$126M	+$112M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$27M	−$30M	+$71M	+$126M	+$55M
Cash from operations	$305M	$303M	$375M	$419M	$463M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$19M	−$24M	−$19M	−$14M	−$28M
Owner earnings	$286M	$279M	$356M	$405M	$435M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	17%	16%	19%	23%	23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $112M), owner earnings is nearer $174M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 7.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $205M ÷ interest expense $26M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$37M

Net cash

Cash $493M − debt $456M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $37M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 10d

Tight

DSO 55 + DIO 7 − DPO 52 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 32%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

8-yr median, range 16%–78%; 78% latest = NOPAT $150M ÷ invested capital $193M

Industry peers: median -4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 78% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 16%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 5%–23%; latest $286M = operating cash $305M − maintenance capex $19M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $112M of SBC) leaves $174M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.35×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $305M ÷ net income $130M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 49%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $140M ÷ Owner Earnings $286M

What this means
Of $286M Owner Earnings, $140M (49%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $140M buybacks. Net of $112M stock comp, the real buyback was about $28M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.21×

Harvesting

Capex $19M ÷ depreciation $90M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.92×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $456M vs ($77M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +248%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.08/share (latest year $1.38), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 5% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 11% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −1%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 0.5% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −3.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our ability to successfully scale and operate our platform, including AI-enabled capabilities, depends on our ability to develop appropriate business models, infrastructure, systems, and operational processes, and to attract, retain, and develop skilled personnel in a competitive labor market.…”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B

Cash & short-term investments$816M
Receivables$322M
Inventory$5M
Other current assets$97M

Current liabilities$954M

Debt due within a year$25M
Accounts payable$58M
Other current liabilities$871M

Current ratio1.30×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.29×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.86×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$286Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$25M due · $816M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 1.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$121Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($345M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$455M$6M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$615Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$486M · 14%
Buybacks$2.4B · 71%
Retained (debt / cash)$501M · 15%

Returned to owners$2.4B
83% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.4B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−26.5%
The diluted count fell from 132M to 97M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$441M25% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $486M of capital spent building

$80M written down across 1 year (2016): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Stephen McMillan	$11.6M	$19.3M	$435M
2022	Stephen McMillan	$15.0M	$11.0M	$405M
2023	Stephen McMillan	$14.7M	$19.9M	$356M
2024	Stephen McMillan	$17.4M	$6.9M	$279M
2025	Stephen McMillan	$16.1M	$6.9M	$286M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio193:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$112M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 55% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Teradata Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
UUnity Software	$1.8B	76%	-36.8%	-15%	-6%
ACIWACI Worldwide Inc.	$1.8B	51%	14.8%	7%	13%
ESTCElastic	$1.7B	74%	-20.9%	-54%	2%
TDCTeradata Corporation	$1.7B	57%	8.3%	47%	16%
PATHUiPath	$1.6B	83%	-18.2%	-14%	4%
BSYBentley Systems Incorporated	$1.5B	80%	18.9%	11%	29%
PCTYPaylocity	$1.5B	66%	11.0%	22%	19%
BILLBILL Holdings	$1.5B	76%	-17.6%	-4%	-2%
Group median	—	75%	-4.6%	1%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Teradata Corporation has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Teradata Corporation earns about $273M on its 16.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($273M) Net of stock comp (−$119M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($679M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−9%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $670M on 94M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $367M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($28M) runs well above depreciation ($95M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $679M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TDC against another business →

The owners of TDC: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Teradata Corporation (TDC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TDC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TDAY its page in the Manual TDG →

Industry order: ← TBLA the Software chapter TEAM →