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PATH, UiPath

Software asset-light

Revenue is Subscription services (59%), License (38%) and Professional services and other (3%).

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

PATH · UiPath

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$1.6B

+12.7% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.3B

Gross margin 83% 5-yr avg 83%

Operating margin 6.0% 5-yr avg −21.9%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg −67%

Owner-earnings margin 22% 5-yr avg 11%

Free cash flow margin 22% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −18% through the cycle on a 83% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 28% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −14%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Subscription services at 59%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026

Subscription services59%$954M
License38%$606M
Professional services and other3%$50M

By geographyAmericas50%EMEA33%Asia Pacific18%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMApr 2026
								Income statement
$336M	$608M	$892M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	RevenueRevenue
82%	89%	81%	83%	85%	83%	83%	83%	Gross marginGross mgn
53%	27%	28%	23%	18%	16%	13%	13%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
39%	18%	31%	27%	25%	27%	24%	23%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($517M)	($110M)	($501M)	($348M)	($165M)	($163M)	$57M	$101M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−153.9%	−18.2%	−56.1%	−32.9%	−12.6%	−11.4%	3.5%	6.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($520M)	($92M)	($526M)	($328M)	($90M)	($74M)	$282M	$327M	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
($359M)	$29M	($55M)	($10M)	$299M	$321M	$371M	$384M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$9M	$12M	$15M	$19M	$23M	$17M	$17M	$21M	DepreciationDeprec.
$14M	$23M	($60M)	($70M)	($6M)	$19M	($219M)	($232M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$16M	$2M	$9M	$24M	$7M	$15M	$19M	$9M	CapexCapex
4.7%	0.3%	1.0%	2.2%	0.6%	1.0%	1.2%	0.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($368M)	$27M	($64M)	($29M)	$292M	$306M	$352M	$375M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−109.5%	4.5%	−7.2%	−2.7%	22.3%	21.4%	21.9%	22.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($375M)	$27M	($64M)	($34M)	$292M	$306M	$352M	$375M	Free cash flowFCF
−111.6%	4.5%	−7.2%	−3.2%	22.3%	21.4%	21.9%	22.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$19M	$20M	$5M	$30M	$0	$0	$25M	$149M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$129M	$0	$0	$0	$103M	$391M	$329M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-258%	-53%	-14%	-13%	5%	8%	ROICROIC
—	—	-27%	-17%	-4%	-4%	14%	17%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−27%	−17%	−4%	−4%	14%	17%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$234M	$461M	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.4B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$172M	$252M	$374M	$436M	$451M	$488M	$300M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$7M	$12M	$9M	$3M	$33M	$10M	$20M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$166M	$240M	$365M	$433M	$418M	$478M	$280M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$734M	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$1.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$365M	$528M	$626M	$712M	$799M	$905M	$832M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	2.0×	4.3×	3.7×	3.6×	2.9×	2.5×	2.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$25M	$28M	$54M	$88M	$89M	$87M	$125M	$186M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$866M	$2.6B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$2.9B	Total assetsAssets
($234M)	($461M)	($1.9B)	($1.8B)	($1.9B)	($1.7B)	($1.7B)	($1.4B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($800M)	($804M)	$1.9B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$1.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
41.0%	14.2%	57.8%	34.9%	28.4%	25.1%	18.0%	16.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
152M	168M	455M	548M	564M	560M	545M	528M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.21	$3.61	$1.96	$1.93	$2.32	$2.55	$2.96	$3.17	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.41	$-0.55	$-1.16	$-0.60	$-0.16	$-0.13	$0.52	$0.62	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.42	$0.16	$-0.14	$-0.05	$0.52	$0.55	$0.65	$0.71	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.46	$0.16	$-0.14	$-0.06	$0.52	$0.55	$0.65	$0.71	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.10	$0.01	$0.02	$0.04	$0.01	$0.03	$0.03	$0.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-5.25	$-4.78	$4.23	$3.50	$3.58	$3.30	$3.82	$3.61	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.7 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+5.0%/yr	−3.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+31.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	−16.5%/yr	+24.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

545Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

5%low FY2022

Gross margin

83%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$352Mowner earningsvs.$282Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2021FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $282M of profit into $352M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$282M

Owner earnings$352M · 22% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$282M	($74M)	($90M)	($328M)	($526M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$17M	+$17M	+$23M	+$19M	+$15M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$291M	+$358M	+$372M	+$370M	+$516M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$219M	+$19M	−$6M	−$70M	−$60M
Cash from operations	$371M	$321M	$299M	($10M)	($55M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$19M	−$15M	−$7M	−$19M	−$9M
Owner earnings	$352M	$306M	$292M	($29M)	($64M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$5M	—
Free cash flow	$352M	$306M	$292M	($34M)	($64M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	22%	21%	22%	-3%	-7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $291M), owner earnings is nearer $61M.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$1.5B

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $871M + ST investments $601M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.5B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $217M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $1.7B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 97d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 111 + DIO 0 − DPO 14 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 22%

High, recently turned positive

latest $352M = operating cash $371M − maintenance capex $19M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 22% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $291M of SBC) leaves $61M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.31×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $371M ÷ net income $282M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 93%

Returns most of it

Dividends + buybacks $329M ÷ Owner Earnings $352M

What this means
Of $352M Owner Earnings, $329M (93%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $329M buybacks. Net of $291M stock comp, the real buyback was about $38M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.12×

Maintaining

Capex $19M ÷ depreciation $17M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.48×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.08/share (latest year $0.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −76% → −7% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −76% early to −7% lately, median −18% — pricing power intact or improving.
Worst year 2020 · −153.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Demand for our platform may be affected by a number of factors, many of which are beyond our control, including continued market acceptance and integration of our platform into our customers' operations; the continued volume, variety, and velocity of automations that are generated through use of our platform; timing of…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B

Cash & short-term investments$1.3B
Receivables$300M
Other current assets$311M

Current liabilities$832M

Accounts payable$20M
Other current liabilities$812M

Current ratio2.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.31×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.57×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+17.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.6× → 2.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$917MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$83M$83M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$658Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2020–2026

Over the record, the business generated $596M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$92M · 15%
Buybacks$951M · 160%

Returned to owners$951M
184% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $951M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$447M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $447M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$11.48
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 63M shares were bought for $720M, about $11.48 each.
Net change in share count246.4%
The diluted count rose from 152M to 528M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Daniel Dines	$670k	$670k	($64M)
2023	Daniel Dines	$772k	$772k	($29M)
2023	Robert Enslin	$54.1M	$52.4M	($29M)
2024	Daniel Dines	$726k	$726k	$292M
2024	Robert Enslin	$16.5M	$34.9M	$292M
2025	Daniel Dines	$1.1M	$1.1M	$306M
2025	Robert Enslin	$15.9M	−$42.5M	$306M
2026	Daniel Dines	$1.3M	$1.3M	$352M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership11.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$291M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 18% of revenue, equal to 512% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why UiPath is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2026.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?246.4%
Diluted shares grew 246.4% over 2020–2026, even as the company spent $951M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
UUnity Software	$1.8B	76%	-36.8%	-15%	-6%
ACIWACI Worldwide Inc.	$1.8B	51%	14.8%	7%	13%
ESTCElastic	$1.7B	74%	-20.9%	-54%	2%
TDCTeradata Corporation	$1.7B	57%	8.3%	47%	16%
PATHUiPath	$1.6B	83%	-18.2%	-14%	4%
BSYBentley Systems Incorporated	$1.5B	80%	18.9%	11%	29%
PCTYPaylocity	$1.5B	66%	11.0%	22%	19%
BILLBILL Holdings	$1.5B	76%	-17.6%	-4%	-2%
Group median	—	75%	-4.6%	1%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what UiPath has delivered.

UiPath’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, UiPath earns about $208M on its 12.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($208M) Net of stock comp (−$268M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+10%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $375M on 524M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $1.4B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PATH against another business →

The owners of PATH: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "UiPath (PATH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PATH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PARR its page in the Manual PATK →

Industry order: ← OTEX the Software chapter PAYC →