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ESTC, Elastic
We offer three Elasticsearch-powered solutions—Search & AI, Elastic Observability, and Elastic Security—that are built on our platform.
Elastic, the Search AI Company, enables its customers to transform data into answers, actions, and outcomes with Search AI.
While search technology revolutionized information retrieval through its ability to instantly return relevant results from massive datasets, it struggles when it comes to understanding context and generating insights.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −21% through the cycle on a 74% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −54%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →46% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States54%$947M
- International46%$792M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $88M | $160M | $272M | $428M | $608M | $862M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 77% | 75% | 71% | 71% | 74% | 73% | 72% | 74% | 74% | 76% | 76% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 30% | 18% | 17% | 21% | 17% | 14% | 13% | 13% | 12% | 11% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 37% | 35% | 37% | 39% | 33% | 32% | 29% | 27% | 25% | 26% | 26% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($47M) | ($48M) | ($101M) | ($171M) | ($129M) | ($174M) | ($219M) | ($130M) | ($55M) | ($33M) | ($33M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −53.5% | −30.0% | −37.3% | −40.0% | −21.3% | −20.1% | −20.5% | −10.3% | −3.7% | −1.9% | −1.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($52M) | ($53M) | ($102M) | ($167M) | ($129M) | ($204M) | ($236M) | $62M | ($108M) | $368M | $368M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($16M) | ($21M) | ($24M) | ($31M) | $23M | $6M | $36M | $149M | $266M | $327M | $327M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3M | $5M | $6M | $3M | $3M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $3M | $3M | $3M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $33M | $27M | $73M | $134M | $146M | $203M | $268M | $84M | $371M | ($44M) | ($46M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $843K | $3M | $3M | $5M | $4M | $2M | $3M | $3M | $4M | $5M | $5M | CapexCapex |
| 1.0% | 1.9% | 1.3% | 1.2% | 0.6% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($17M) | ($24M) | ($27M) | ($33M) | $19M | $3M | $33M | $145M | $263M | $324M | $324M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −19.2% | −14.9% | −10.1% | −7.8% | 3.2% | 0.4% | 3.1% | 11.5% | 17.7% | 18.6% | 18.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($17M) | ($24M) | ($27M) | ($36M) | $19M | $3M | $33M | $145M | $262M | $322M | $322M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −19.2% | −14.9% | −10.1% | −8.3% | 3.1% | 0.4% | 3.1% | 11.5% | 17.7% | 18.5% | 18.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $4M | $4M | $2M | $24M | $0 | $120M | $0 | $19M | $0 | $37M | $37M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $25K | $344K | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $340M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | -116% | -205% | -113% | -54% | -13% | -6% | -2% | -2% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -39% | -40% | -29% | -49% | -59% | 8% | -12% | 29% | 29% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −39% | −40% | −29% | −49% | −59% | 8% | −12% | 29% | 29% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| — | $51M | $298M | $297M | $401M | $861M | $644M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $53M | $81M | $129M | $160M | $215M | $261M | $323M | $376M | $464M | $464M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $2M | $4M | $11M | $7M | $28M | $35M | $26M | $17M | $9M | $9M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $51M | $77M | $117M | $153M | $187M | $226M | $297M | $358M | $456M | $456M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $132M | $430M | $480M | $637M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $125M | $204M | $333M | $450M | $593M | $717M | $871M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.1× | 2.1× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 2.0× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.9× | 1.7× | 1.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $12M | $19M | $20M | $198M | $199M | $304M | $304M | $319M | $319M | $356M | $356M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $183M | $486M | $804M | $973M | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $567M | $568M | $569M | $570M | $571M | $571M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | ($401M) | ($294M) | ($77M) | ($516M) | ($828M) | ($799M) | ($799M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | -699.9× | -8.4× | -8.7× | -5.0× | -2.2× | -1.3× | -1.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($129M) | ($154M) | $263M | $414M | $451M | $415M | $399M | $738M | $927M | $1.3B | $1.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | — | 0.4% | 0.3% | — | — | — | — | 0.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 30.4M | 32.0M | 54.9M | 78.8M | 87.2M | 92.5M | 95.7M | 104M | 104M | 107M | 107M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.90 | $4.99 | $4.95 | $5.43 | $6.98 | $9.32 | $11.17 | $12.19 | $14.31 | $16.22 | $16.22 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.71 | $-1.65 | $-1.86 | $-2.12 | $-1.48 | $-2.20 | $-2.47 | $0.59 | $-1.04 | $3.43 | $3.43 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.56 | $-0.74 | $-0.50 | $-0.42 | $0.22 | $0.03 | $0.34 | $1.40 | $2.54 | $3.02 | $3.02 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.56 | $-0.74 | $-0.50 | $-0.45 | $0.21 | $0.03 | $0.34 | $1.40 | $2.53 | $3.00 | $3.00 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.09 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.05 | $0.05 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-4.23 | $-4.79 | $4.79 | $5.25 | $5.17 | $4.49 | $4.17 | $7.10 | $8.94 | $11.91 | $11.91 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.71 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +21.1%/yr | +18.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +68.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +6.1%/yr | +1.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +18.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned $324M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $3M it takes just to hold its position. It put $2M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $322M.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $368M | ($108M) | $62M | ($236M) | ($204M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$3M | +$3M | +$4M | +$4M | +$4M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | — | — | — | — | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$44M | +$371M | +$84M | +$268M | +$203M |
| Cash from operations | $327M | $266M | $149M | $36M | $6M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$3M | −$3M | −$3M | −$3M | −$2M |
| Owner earnings | $324M | $263M | $145M | $33M | $3M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$2M | −$1M | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $322M | $262M | $145M | $33M | $3M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 18% | 11% | 3% | 0% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $3M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($33M) ÷ interest expense $25M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $769M + ST investments $602M − debt $571M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $799M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 97 + DIO 0 − DPO 8 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -205%–-2%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($26M) ÷ invested capital $1.1BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High, recently turned positivelatest $324M = operating cash $327M − maintenance capex $3M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)Industry peers: median 16%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $321M.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $327M ÷ net income $368M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $340M ÷ Owner Earnings $324M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $324M of Owner Earnings, $340M (105%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $340M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $3M stock comp, the real buyback was about $338M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.70×ExpandingCapex $5M ÷ depreciation $3M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.68×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $571M vs $818M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.03/share (latest year $3.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −40% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −40% early to −5% lately, median −21% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2017 · −53.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our business, reputation, or financial results may be adversely affected by any failure by us to be successful in our AI initiatives, by significant competition we face in the AI landscape, and by uncertain market understanding and valuation of AI and machine learning technologies.…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.4B
- Receivables$464M
- Other current assets$189M
- Accounts payable$9M
- Other current liabilities$1.2B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $714M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$34M · 5%
- Buybacks$340M · 48%
- Retained (debt / cash)$340M · 48%
- Returned to owners$340M
50% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $340M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$76.93
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $340M, about $76.93 each.
- Net change in share count253.2%
The diluted count rose from 30M to 107M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $10.6M | $28.8M | $19M |
| 2022 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $17.9M | $12.9M | $3M |
| 2022 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $7.9M | $2.9M | $3M |
| 2023 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $13.7M | $9.4M | $33M |
| 2024 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $12.5M | $30.1M | $145M |
| 2024 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $6.5M | $11.3M | $145M |
| 2025 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $14.3M | $6.4M | $263M |
| 2025 | Ashutosh Kulkarni | $5.9M | $1.5M | $263M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Elastic is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?253.2%
Diluted shares grew 253.2% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $340M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DTDynatrace | $2.0B | 81% | 8.7% | 8% | 27% |
| MBLYMobileye Global Inc. | $1.9B | 47% | -13.1% | -1% | 27% |
| UUnity Software | $1.8B | 76% | -36.8% | -15% | -6% |
| ACIWACI Worldwide Inc. | $1.8B | 51% | 14.8% | 7% | 13% |
| ESTCElastic | $1.7B | 74% | -20.9% | -54% | 2% |
| TDCTeradata Corporation | $1.7B | 57% | 8.3% | 47% | 16% |
| PATHUiPath | $1.6B | 83% | -18.2% | -14% | 4% |
| BSYBentley Systems Incorporated | $1.5B | 80% | 18.9% | 11% | 29% |
| Group median | — | 75% | -2.4% | 3% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Elastic has delivered.
Elastic’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Elastic earns about $30M on its 1.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $322M on 104M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-29; net cash $799M. The if-converted diluted count is 107M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5M) runs well above depreciation ($3M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $324M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ESTA its page in the Manual ET →
Industry order: ← ECX the Software chapter EVCM →