← All companies ← STN Manual STVN → ← SHIP Marine Shipping TDW →
STNG, Scorpio Tankers Inc.
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 61% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 18% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −17% and 61% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 2 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $523M | $513M | $585M | $704M | $916M | $541M | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $938M | $938M | RevenueRevenue |
| $77M | ($45M) | $11M | $130M | $245M | ($91M) | $798M | $705M | $765M | $355M | $355M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.7% | −8.8% | 1.8% | 18.5% | 26.8% | −16.7% | 51.0% | 52.6% | 61.5% | 37.9% | 37.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($25M) | ($158M) | ($190M) | ($48M) | $94M | ($234M) | $637M | $547M | $669M | $344M | $344M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $179M | $42M | $58M | $210M | $419M | $73M | $769M | $865M | $825M | $491M | $491M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $121M | $141M | $177M | $180M | $194M | $197M | $168M | $178M | $185M | $180M | $180M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $82M | $59M | $71M | $78M | $131M | $110M | ($36M) | $140M | ($29M) | ($33M) | ($33M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $127M | $258M | $26M | $3M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | $573M | $573M | CapexCapex |
| 24.3% | 50.4% | 4.5% | 0.4% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — | 61.0% | 61.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $52M | ($100M) | $32M | $207M | $419M | $73M | — | — | — | $311M | $311M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.9% | −19.4% | 5.4% | 29.3% | 45.8% | 13.6% | — | — | — | 33.1% | 33.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $52M | ($217M) | $32M | $207M | $419M | $73M | — | — | — | ($81M) | ($81M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 9.9% | −42.2% | 5.4% | 29.3% | 45.8% | 13.6% | — | — | — | −8.7% | −8.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $87M | $10M | $15M | $21M | $23M | $23M | $23M | $58M | $84M | $83M | $83M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $17M | $0 | $23M | $1K | $13M | $0 | $161M | $490M | $336M | $309K | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 2% | -1% | 0% | 4% | 7% | -3% | — | 18% | 19% | 9% | 9% | ROICROIC |
| -2% | -9% | -10% | -2% | 5% | -13% | 25% | 21% | 23% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| −9% | −10% | −11% | −4% | 3% | −14% | 24% | 19% | 20% | 8% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $100M | $186M | $594M | $202M | $188M | $230M | $377M | $356M | $333M | $752M | $752M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $42M | $65M | $70M | $78M | $33M | $38M | $277M | $204M | $150M | $181M | $181M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $6M | $10M | $8M | $9M | $9M | $9M | $16M | $8M | $10M | $12M | $12M | InventoryInvent. |
| $9M | $13M | $12M | $23M | $13M | $35M | $29M | $10M | $32M | $34M | $34M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $39M | $62M | $66M | $64M | $29M | $12M | $264M | $201M | $128M | $159M | $159M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $158M | $279M | $687M | $303M | $242M | $289M | $687M | $577M | $576M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $385M | $209M | $447M | $486M | $406M | $528M | $473M | $510M | $237M | $119M | $119M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.4× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 1.5× | 1.1× | 2.4× | 9.3× | 9.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $0 | $11M | $12M | $12M | $9M | $9M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.2B | $4.5B | $4.8B | $5.2B | $5.2B | $5.0B | $4.6B | $4.2B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $3.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.2B | $999M | $971M | $666M | $264M | $939M | $666M | $600M | $600M | Total debtDebt |
| $1.4B | $1.8B | $598M | $797M | $784M | $436M | ($113M) | $584M | $333M | ($152M) | ($152M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.7× | -0.4× | 0.1× | 0.7× | 1.6× | -0.6× | 4.7× | 3.8× | 7.0× | 4.4× | 4.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 24.2M | 32.3M | 34.8M | 49.9M | 54.7M | 54.7M | 55.5M | 52.4M | 48.5M | 46.6M | 46.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $21.63 | $15.87 | $16.80 | $14.13 | $16.75 | $9.88 | $28.18 | $25.61 | $25.63 | $20.15 | $20.15 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.03 | $-4.90 | $-5.46 | $-0.97 | $1.72 | $-4.28 | $11.49 | $10.44 | $13.78 | $7.40 | $7.40 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.14 | $-3.08 | $0.91 | $4.14 | $7.67 | $1.34 | — | — | — | $6.68 | $6.68 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.14 | $-6.70 | $0.91 | $4.14 | $7.67 | $1.34 | — | — | — | $-1.75 | $-1.75 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $3.60 | $0.30 | $0.43 | $0.43 | $0.43 | $0.43 | $0.42 | $1.10 | $1.72 | $1.77 | $1.77 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $5.25 | $8.00 | $0.75 | $0.06 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | $12.30 | $12.30 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $54.42 | $52.18 | $52.81 | $39.65 | $37.79 | $33.57 | $45.20 | $48.76 | $59.04 | $68.72 | $68.72 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×1.43 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −0.8%/yr | +3.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +13.5%/yr | −2.7%/yr |
| EPS | — | +33.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −7.6%/yr | +33.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +9.9%/yr | — |
| Book value / share | +2.6%/yr | +12.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $311M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $180M it takes just to hold its position. It put $392M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($81M).
| FY2025 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $344M | ($234M) | $94M | ($48M) | ($190M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$180M | +$197M | +$194M | +$180M | +$177M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$33M | +$110M | +$131M | +$78M | +$71M |
| Cash from operations | $491M | $73M | $419M | $210M | $58M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$180M | — | — | −$3M | −$26M |
| Owner earnings | $311M | $73M | $419M | $207M | $32M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$392M | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ($81M) | $73M | $419M | $207M | $32M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 33% | 14% | 46% | 29% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $180M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $392M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $355M ÷ interest expense $80M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- Net cashCash $752M − debt $600M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $152M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -3%–19%; 9% latest = NOPAT $281M ÷ invested capital $3.0BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -19%–46%; latest $311M = operating cash $491M − maintenance capex $180MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 33% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 7 years. It chose to put $392M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($81M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $491M ÷ net income $344M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $83M ÷ Owner Earnings $311M
What this means
Of $311M Owner Earnings, $83M (27%) went back to shareholders, $83M dividends, $309K buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.18×ExpandingCapex $573M ÷ depreciation $180M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $938M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 9.33×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $600M vs $990M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $10.05/share (latest year $6.65), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $61.80/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → 51% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 51% lately, median 18% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2021 · −16.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$752M
- Receivables$181M
- Inventory$12M
- Other current assets$164M
- Accounts payable$34M
- Other current liabilities$85M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$987M · 67%
- Dividends$262M · 18%
- Buybacks$53M · 4%
- Retained (debt / cash)$170M · 12%
- Returned to owners$315M
32% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $262M as dividends and $53M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $930M and cash and short-term investments rose $652M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $53M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count92.6%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 47M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.77/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Scorpio Tankers Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?92.6%
Diluted shares grew 92.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $53M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?9% → 21% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $48M to $193M while revenue grew 79%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (9% of revenue then, 21% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Marine Shipping
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEXKirby | $3.4B | — | 7.7% | 4% | 10% |
| MATXMatson | $3.3B | 96% | 11.4% | 11% | 12% |
| TDWTidewater Inc. | $1.4B | — | -12.5% | -6% | 3% |
| STNGScorpio Tankers Inc. | $938M | — | 22.6% | 4% | 14% |
| INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock | $843M | — | 12.3% | 3% | 33% |
| PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. | $632M | — | 7.7% | 10% | 10% |
| LPGDorian LPG Ltd. | $482M | — | 35.2% | 7% | 38% |
| GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited | $342M | — | -1.1% | -0% | 31% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.6% | 4% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Scorpio Tankers Inc.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Scorpio Tankers Inc. has delivered.
Scorpio Tankers Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Scorpio Tankers Inc. earns about $127M on its 13.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 33.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($81M) on 52M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $152M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($573M) runs well above depreciation ($180M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $311M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← STN its page in the Manual STVN →
Industry order: ← SHIP the Marine Shipping chapter TDW →