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TIGO, Millicom International Cellular S.A.
We provide certain customer data below that we believe will assist investors in understanding our performance and to which we refer later in this section in discussing our results of operations.
Our results of operations are therefore dependent on both the size of our customer base and on the amount that customers spend on our services.
We measure the amount that customers spend on our services using a telecommunications industry metric known as ARPU, or average revenue per user per month.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 72% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 11% to 28% — on a steadier 72% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −52 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 1 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $4.0B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $4.3B | $3.8B | $4.3B | $5.6B | $5.7B | $5.8B | $5.8B | $5.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| 71% | 70% | 72% | 72% | 72% | 72% | 73% | 73% | 76% | 77% | 77% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $490M | $632M | $640M | $575M | $402M | $619M | $915M | $826M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 12.1% | 16.1% | 16.2% | 13.3% | 10.6% | 14.5% | 16.3% | 14.6% | 23.1% | 28.2% | 28.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($32M) | $87M | ($10M) | $149M | ($344M) | $590M | $177M | ($82M) | $253M | $1.3B | $1.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 45% | — | 21% | 56% | — | 53% | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $878M | $820M | $792M | $801M | $821M | $956M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $853M | $812M | $803M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $57M | ($79M) | ($1M) | ($448M) | $46M | ($747M) | ($237M) | ($33M) | $116M | ($862M) | ($926M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $719M | $650M | $632M | $736M | $622M | $740M | $800M | $814M | $540M | $650M | $650M | CapexCapex |
| 17.8% | 16.5% | 16.0% | 17.0% | 16.3% | 17.4% | 14.2% | 14.4% | 9.3% | 11.2% | 11.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $159M | $170M | $160M | $65M | $199M | $216M | $484M | $409M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.9% | 4.3% | 4.1% | 1.5% | 5.2% | 5.1% | 8.6% | 7.2% | 18.3% | 18.6% | 18.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $159M | $170M | $160M | $65M | $199M | $216M | $484M | $409M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.9% | 4.3% | 4.1% | 1.5% | 5.2% | 5.1% | 8.6% | 7.2% | 18.3% | 18.6% | 18.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $265M | $265M | $266M | $268M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $754M | $754M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $10M | $50M | $0 | $5M | $99M | $119M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 5% | — | 6% | — | 5% | 5% | 4% | 8% | 15% | 15% | ROICROIC |
| -1% | 3% | -0% | 6% | -17% | 23% | 5% | -2% | 7% | 36% | 36% | Return on equityROE |
| −9% | −6% | −11% | −5% | −17% | 23% | 5% | −2% | 7% | 15% | 15% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $646M | $619M | $528M | $1.5B | $1.0B | $895M | $1.0B | $775M | $699M | $1.6B | $1.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $386M | $339M | $371M | $351M | $405M | $379M | $443M | $390M | $527M | $527M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $45M | $39M | $32M | $37M | $63M | $53M | $45M | $44M | $70M | $70M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $288M | $282M | $289M | $334M | $347M | $400M | $390M | $300M | $491M | $491M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $143M | $96M | $114M | $54M | $121M | $32M | $98M | $134M | $106M | $106M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $599M | $1.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $9.6B | $9.5B | $10.3B | $12.9B | $12.4B | $15.1B | $14.2B | $14.5B | $13.7B | $17.3B | $17.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $3.6B | $4.4B | $4.2B | $5.6B | $7.7B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $5.7B | $6.7B | $6.7B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $3.0B | $3.9B | $2.6B | $4.6B | $6.8B | $5.7B | $5.9B | $5.0B | $5.2B | $5.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.3× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 1.0× | 0.7× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 1.2× | 1.9× | 2.3× | 2.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.4B | $3.1B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.6B | $3.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 100M | 100M | 101M | 101M | 129M | 129M | 139M | 171M | 171M | 168M | 168M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $40.29 | $39.21 | $39.15 | $42.87 | $29.58 | $33.14 | $40.45 | $33.03 | $33.88 | $34.73 | $34.73 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.32 | $0.87 | $-0.10 | $1.47 | $-2.67 | $4.59 | $1.27 | $-0.48 | $1.48 | $7.85 | $7.85 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.58 | $1.69 | $1.59 | $0.64 | $1.55 | $1.68 | $3.48 | $2.39 | $6.21 | $6.47 | $6.47 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.58 | $1.69 | $1.59 | $0.64 | $1.55 | $1.68 | $3.48 | $2.39 | $6.21 | $6.47 | $6.47 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $2.64 | $2.64 | $2.64 | $2.65 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $4.50 | $4.50 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $7.17 | $6.48 | $6.27 | $7.28 | $4.84 | $5.76 | $5.75 | $4.75 | $3.15 | $3.88 | $3.88 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $33.57 | $30.84 | $25.22 | $23.83 | $16.01 | $20.09 | $25.93 | $20.59 | $21.18 | $21.72 | $21.72 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −1.6%/yr | +3.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +16.9%/yr | +33.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +6.1%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −6.6%/yr | −4.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | −4.7%/yr | +6.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $1.3B of profit but $1.1B of owner earnings: $232M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.3B | $253M | ($82M) | $177M | $590M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.3B | +$1.2B | +$1.3B | +$1.3B | +$1.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$862M | +$116M | −$33M | −$237M | −$747M |
| Cash from operations | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $956M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$650M | −$540M | −$814M | −$800M | −$740M |
| Owner earnings | $1.1B | $1.1B | $409M | $484M | $216M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 18% | 7% | 9% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $1.6B ÷ interest expense $702M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.2B · 3.2× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $1.6B − debt $6.7B
What this means
Netting $1.6B of cash and short-term investments against $6.7B of debt leaves $5.2B owed, about 3.2× a year's operating profit (4.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 33 + DIO 19 − DPO 137 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range 4%–15%; 15% latest = NOPAT $1.3B ÷ invested capital $8.8BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 1%–19%; latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.7B − maintenance capex $650MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.7B ÷ net income $1.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $873M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B
What this means
Of $1.1B Owner Earnings, $873M (81%) went back to shareholders, $754M dividends, $119M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.48×HarvestingCapex $650M ÷ depreciation $1.3B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +3204%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.93/share (latest year $7.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $21.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 15% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 15% early to 22% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 17%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +23%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 23% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · 10.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +5.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $10.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$6.9B · 63%
- Dividends$1.8B · 17%
- Buybacks$283M · 3%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 17%
- Returned to owners$2.1B
52% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.8B as dividends and $283M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $283M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count67.0%
The diluted count rose from 100M to 168M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$4.50/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Millicom International Cellular S.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?67.0%
Diluted shares grew 67.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $283M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Telecom Operators
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SIRISiriusXM Holdings Inc. | $8.6B | 100% | 21.2% | 17% | 20% |
| VSNTVersant Media Group, Inc. | $6.7B | — | 26.1% | 13% | 31% |
| TIGOMillicom International Cellular S.A. | $5.8B | 72% | 15.3% | 5% | 5% |
| NXSTNexstar Media Group Inc. | $4.9B | — | 24.3% | 9% | 22% |
| ROKURoku Inc. | $4.7B | 44% | -4.6% | -15% | 5% |
| VSATViaSat Inc. | $4.6B | 88% | -2.7% | -2% | 7% |
| FWONALiberty Media Corporation | $4.5B | 73% | 13.6% | 4% | 18% |
| LILALiberty Latin America Ltd. | $4.4B | 77% | 2.0% | 0% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 75% | 14.5% | 5% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Millicom International Cellular S.A. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Millicom International Cellular S.A. has delivered.
Millicom International Cellular S.A.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Millicom International Cellular S.A. earns about $300M on its 5.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $1.1B on 169M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $5.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← THCH its page in the Manual TIGR →
Industry order: ← TEO the Telecom Operators chapter TIMB →